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There is a great difficulty in the way of a writer who attempts to sketch
a living Constitution, — a Constitution that is in actual work and power.
The difficulty is that the object is in constant change. An historical writer
does not feel this difficulty: he deals only with the past; he can say
definitely, the Constitution worked in such and such a manner in the
year at which he begins, and in a manner in such and such respects
different in the year at which he ends; he begins with a definite point of
time and ends with one also. But a contemporary writer who tries to
paint what is before him is puzzled and perplexed; what he sees is chang-
ing daily. He must paint it as it stood at some one time, or else he will be
putting side by side in his representations things which never were con-
temporaneous in reality. The difficulty is the greater because a writer
who deals with a living government naturally compares it with the most
important other living governments, and these are changing too; what
he illustrates are altered in one way, and his sources of illustration are
altered probably in a different way. This difficulty has been constantly
in my way in preparing a second edition of this book. It describes the
English Constitution as it stood in the years 1865 and 1866. Roughly
speaking, it describes its working as it was in the time of Lord Palmerston;
and since that time there have been many changes, some of spirit and
some of detail. In so short a period there have rarely been more changes.
If I had given a sketch of the Palmerston time as a sketch of the present
time, it would have been in many points untrue; and if I had tried to
change the sketch of seven years since into a sketch of the present time,
I should probably have blurred the picture and have given something
equally unlike both.
The best plan in such a case is, I think, to keep the original sketch in6/Walter Bagehot
all essentials as it was at first written, and to describe shortly such changes
either in the Constitution itself, or in the Constitutions compared with it,
as seem material. There are in this book various expressions which al-
lude to persons who were living and to events which were happening
when it first appeared; and I have carefully preserved these. They will
serve to warn the reader what time he is reading about, and to prevent
his mistaking the date at which the likeness was attempted to be taken. I
proceed to speak of the changes which have taken place either in the
Constitution itself or in the competing institutions which illustrate it.
It is too soon as yet to attempt to estimate the effect of the Reform
Act of 1867. The people enfranchised under it do not yet know their
own power: a single election, so far from teaching us how they will use
that power, has not been even enough to explain to them that they have
such power. The Reform Act of 1832 did not for many years disclose its
real consequences; a writer in 1836, whether he approved or disapproved
of them, whether he thought too little of or; whether he exaggerated
them, would have been sure to be mistaken in them. A new Constitution
does not produce its full effect as long as all its subjects were reared
under an old Constitution, as long as its statesmen were trained by that
old Constitution. It is not really tested till it comes to be worked by
statesmen and among a people neither of whom are guided by a different
experience.
In one respect we are indeed particularly likely to be mistaken as to
the effect of the last Reform Bill. Undeniably there has lately been a
great change in our politics. It is commonly said that “there is not a
brick of the Palmerston House standing.” The change since 1865 is a
change not in one point, but in a thousand points; it is a change not of
particular details, but of pervading spirit. We are now quarrelling as to
the minor details of an Education Act; in Lord Palmerston’s time no
such Act could have passed. In Lord Palmerston’s time Sir George Grey
said that the disestablishment of the Irish Church would be an “act of
Revolution:” it has now been disestablished by great majorities, with
Sir George Grey himself assenting. A new world has arisen which is not
as the old world; and we naturally ascribe the change to the Reform Act.
But this is a complete mistake. If there had been no Reform Act at all,
there would nevertheless have been a great change in English politics.
There has been a change of the sort which, above all, generates other
changes, — a change of generation. Generally, one generation in poli-
tics succeeds another almost silently; at every moment men of all agesThe English Constitution/7
between thirty and seventy have considerable influence; each year re-
moves many old men, makes all others older, brings in many new. The
transition is so gradual that we hardly perceive it. The board of direc-
tors of the political company has a few slight changes every year, and
therefore the shareholders are conscious of no abrupt change. But some-
times there is an abrupt change. It occasionally happens that several
ruling directors who are about the same age live on for many years,
manage the company all through those years, and then go off the scene
almost together. In that case the affairs of the company are apt to alter
much, for good or for evil: sometimes it becomes more successful, some-
times it is ruined, but it hardly ever stays as it was. Something like this
happened before 1865. All through the period between 1832 and 1865,
the pre-32 statesmen — if I may so call them — Lord Derby, Lord
Russell, Lord Palmerston retained great power. Lord Palmerston to the
last retained great prohibitive power. Though in some ways always young,
he had not a particle of sympathy with the younger generation; he brought
forward no young men; he obstructed all that young men wished. In
consequence, at his death a new generation all at once started into life:
the pre-32 all at once died out. Most of the new politicians were men
who might well have been Lord Palmerston’s grandchildren. He came
into Parliament in 1806, they entered it after 1856. Such an enormous
change in the age of the workers necessarily caused a great change in
the kind of work attempted and the way in which it was done. What we
call the “spirit” of politics is more surely changed by a change of gen-
eration in the men than by any other change whatever. Even if there had
been no Reform Act, this single cause would have effected grave alter-
ations.
The mere settlement of the Reform question made a great change
too. If it could have been settled by any other change, or even without
any change, the instant effect of the settlement would still have been
immense. New questions would have appeared at once. A political coun-
try is like an American forest: you have only to cut down the old trees,
and immediately new trees come up to replace them; the seeds were
waiting in the ground, and they began to grow as soon as the withdrawal
of the old ones brought in light and air. These new questions of them-
selves would have made a new atmosphere, new parties, new debates.
Of course I am not arguing that so important an innovation as the
Reform Act of 1867 will not have very great effects. It must, in all
likelihood, have many great ones. I am only saying that as yet we do not8/Walter Bagehot
know what those effects are; that the great evident change since 1865 is
certainly not strictly due to it; probably is not even in a principal mea-
sure due to it; that we have still to conjecture what it will cause and what
it will not cause.
The principal question arises most naturally from a main doctrine
of these essays. I have said that cabinet government is possible in En-
gland because England was a deferential country. I meant that the nomi-
nal constituency was not the real constituency; that the mass of the “ten-
pound” householders did not really form their own opinions, and did not
exact of their representatives an obedience to those opinions; that they
were in fact guided in their judgment by the better educated classes; that
they preferred representatives from those classes, and gave those repre-
sentatives much license. If a hundred small shopkeepers had by miracle
been added to any of the ‘32 Parliaments, they would have felt outcasts
there. Nothing could be more unlike those Parliaments than the average
mass of the constituency from which it was chosen.
I do not of course mean that the ten-pound householders were great
admirers of intellect or good judges of refinement. We all know that, for
the most part, they were not so at all: very few Englishmen are. They
were not influenced by ideas, but by facts; not by things palpable, but
by things impalpable. Not to put too fine a point upon it, they were
influenced by rank and wealth. No doubt the better sort of them believed
that those who were superior to them in these indisputable respects were
superior also in the more intangible qualities of sense and knowledge.
But the mass of the old electors did not analyze very much: they liked to
have one of their “betters” to represent them; if he was rich, they re-
spected him much; and if he was a lord, they liked him the better. The
issue put before these electors was, Which of two rich people will you
choose? And each of those rich people was put forward by great parties
whose notions were the notions of the rich, whose plans were their plans.
The electors only selected one or two wealthy men to carry out the
schemes of one or two wealthy associations.
So fully was this so, that the class to whom the great body of the
ten-pound householders belonged — the lower middle class — was,
above all classes: the one most hardly treated in the imposition of the
taxes. A small shopkeeper or a clerk, who just, and only just, was rich
enough to pay income tax, was perhaps the only severely taxed man in
the country. He paid the rates, the tea, sugar, tobacco, malt, and spirit
taxes, as well as the income tax, but his means were exceedingly small.The English Constitution/9
Curiously enough, the class which in theory was omnipotent was the
only class financially ill-treated. Throughout the history of our former
Parliaments the constituency could no more have originated the policy
which those Parliaments selected than they could have made the solar
system.
As I have endeavoured to show in this volume, the deference of the
old electors to their betters was the only way in which our old system
could be maintained. No doubt countries can be imagined in which the
mass of the electors would be thoroughly competent to form good opin-
ions; approximations to that state happily exist. But such was not the
state of the minor English shopkeepers. They were just competent to
make a selection between two sets of superior ideas; or rather — for the
conceptions of such people are more personal than abstract — between
two opposing parties, each professing a creed of such ideas. But they
could do no more. Their own notions, if they had been cross-examined
upon them, would have been found always most confused and often
most foolish. They were competent to decide an issue selected by the
higher classes, but they were incompetent to do more.
The grave question now is, How far will this peculiar old system
continue, and how far will it be altered? I am afraid I must put aside at
once the idea that it will be altered entirely and altered for the better. I
cannot expect that the new class of voters will be at all more able to
form sound opinions on complex questions than the old voters. There
was indeed an idea — a very prevalent idea when the first edition of this
book was published — that there then was an unrepresented class of
skilled artisans who could form superior opinions on national matters,
and ought to have the means of expressing them. We used to frame
elaborate schemes to give them such means. But the Reform Act of
1867 did not stop at skilled labour; it enfranchised unskilled labour too.
And no one will contend that the ordinary working-man who has no
special skill, and who is only rated because he has a house, can judge
much of intellectual matters. The messenger in an office is not more
intelligent than the clerks; not better educated, but worse: and yet the
messenger is probably a very superior specimen of the newly enfran-
chised classes. The average can only earn very scanty wages by coarse
labour. They have no time to improve themselves, for they are labouring
the whole day through; and their early education was so small that in
most cases it is dubious whether, even if they had much time, they could
use it to good purpose. We have not enfranchised a class less needing to10/Walter Bagehot
be guided by their betters than the old class; on the contrary, the new
class need it more than the old. The real question is, Will they submit to
it, will they defer in the same way to wealth and rank, and to the higher
qualities of which these are the rough symbols and the common accom-
paniments?
There is a peculiar difficulty in answering this question. Generally,
the debates upon the passing of an Act contain much valuable instruc-
tion as to what may be expected of it. But the debates on the Reform Act
of 1867 hardly tell any thing. They are taken up with technicalities as to
the ratepayers and the compound householder. Nobody in the country
knew what was being done. I happened at the time to visit a purely
agricultural and conservative county, and I asked the local Tories, “Do
you understand this Reform Bill? Do you know that your Conservative
Government has brought in a Bill far more Radical than any former
Bill, and that it is very likely to be passed?” The answer I got was,
“What stuff you talk! How can it be a Radical Reform Bill? Why, Bright
opposes it!” There was no answering that in a way which a “common
jury” could understand. The Bill was supported by the Times and op-
posed by Mr. Bright; and therefore the mass of the Conservatives and of
common moderate people, without distinction of party, had no concep-
tion of the effect. They said it was “London nonsense” if you tried to
explain it to them. The nation, indeed, generally looks to the discussions
in Parliament to enlighten it as to the effect of Bills. But in this case
neither party, as a party, could speak out. Many, perhaps most of the
intelligent Conservatives, were fearful of the consequences of the pro-
posal; but as it was made by the heads of their own party, they did not
like to oppose it, and the discipline of party carried them with it. On the
other side, many, probably most of the intelligent Liberals, were in con-
sternation at the Bill; they had been in the habit for years of proposing
Reform Bills; they knew the points of difference between each Bill, and
perceived that this was by far the most sweeping which had ever been
proposed by any Ministry. But they were almost all unwilling to say so.
They would have offended a large section in their constituencies if they
had resisted a Tory Bill because it was too democratic; the extreme
partisans of democracy would have said, “The enemies of the people
have confidence enough in the people to intrust them with this power,
but you, a ‘Liberal,’ and a professed friend of the people, have not that
confidence; if that is so, we will never vote for you again.” Many Radi-
cal members who had been asking for years for household suffrage wereThe English Constitution/11
much more surprised than pleased at the near chance of obtaining it;
they had asked for it as bargainers ask for the highest possible price, but
they never expected to get it. Altogether the Liberals, or at least the
extreme Liberals, were much like a man who has been pushing hard
against an opposing door till, on a sudden, the door opens, the resistance
ceases, and he is thrown violently forward. Persons in such an unpleas-
ant predicament can scarcely criticise effectually, and certainly the Lib-
erals did not so criticise. We have had no such previous discussions as
should guide our expectations from the Reform Bill, nor such as under
ordinary circumstances we should have had.
Nor does the experience of the last election much help us. The cir-
cumstances were too exceptional. In the first place, Mr. Gladstone’s
personal popularity was such as has not been seen since the time of Mr.
Pitt, and such as may never be seen again. Certainly it will very rarely
be seen. A bad speaker is said to have been asked how he got on as a
candidate. “Oh,” he answered, “when I do not know what to say, I say
‘Gladstone,’ and then they are sure to cheer, and I have time to think.”
In fact, that popularity acted as a guide both to constituencies and to
members. The candidates only said they would vote with Mr. Gladstone,
and the constituencies only chose those who said so. Even the minority
could only be described as anti-Gladstone, just as the majority could
only be described as pro-Gladstone. The remains, too, of the old elec-
toral organization were exceedingly powerful; the old voters voted as
they had been told, and the new voters mostly voted with them. In ex-
tremely few cases was there any new and contrary organization. At the
last election the trial of the new system hardly began, and, as far as it
did begin, it was favoured by a peculiar guidance.
In the mean time our statesmen have the greatest opportunities they
have had for many years, and likewise the greatest duty. They have to
guide the new voters in the exercise of the franchise; to guide them
quietly, and without saying what they are doing, but still to guide them.
The leading statesmen in a free country have great momentary power.
They settle the conversation of mankind. It is they who, by a great speech
or two, determine what shall be said and what shall be written for long
after. They, in conjunction with their counsellors, settle the programme
of their party, — the “platform,” as the Americans call it, on which they
and those associated with them are to take their stand for the political
campaign. It is by that programme, by a comparison of the programmes
of different statesmen, that the world forms its judgment. The common12/Walter Bagehot
ordinary mind is quite unfit to fix for itself what political question it
shall attend to; it is as much as it can do to judge decently of the ques-
tions which drift down to it, and are brought before it; it almost never
settles its topics; it can only decide upon the issues of those topics. And
in settling what these questions shall be, statesmen have now especially
a great responsibility. If they raise questions which will excite the lower
orders of mankind; if they raise questions on which those orders are
likely to be wrong; if they raise questions on which the interest of those
orders is not identical with, or is antagonistic to, the whole interest of
the state, they will have done the greatest harm they can do. The future
of this country depends on the happy working of a delicate experiment,
and they will have done all they could to vitiate that experiment. Just
when it is desirable that ignorant men, new to politics, should have good
issues, and only good issues, put before them, these statesmen will have
suggested bad issues. They will have suggested topics which will bind
the poor as a class together; topics which will excite them against the
rich; topics the discussion of which, in the only form in which that dis-
cussion reaches their ear, will be to make them think that some new law
can make them comfortable, — that it is the present law which makes
them uncomfortable, — that Government has at its disposal an inex-
haustible fund out of which it can give to those who now want without
also creating elsewhere other and greater wants. If the first work of the
poor voters is to try to create a “poor man’s paradise,” as poor men are
apt to fancy that paradise, and as they are apt to think they can create it,
the great political trial now beginning will simply fail. The wide gift of
the elective franchise will be a great calamity to the whole nation, and to
those who gain it as great a calamity as to any.
I do not of course mean that statesmen can choose with absolute
freedom what topics they will deal with, and what they will not. I am of
course aware that they choose under stringent conditions. In excited
states of the public mind they have scarcely a discretion at all; the ten-
dency of the public perturbation determines what shall and what shall
not be dealt with. But, upon the other hand, in quiet times statesmen
have great power; when there is no fire lighted they can settle what fire
shall be lit. And as the new suffrage is happily to be tried in a quiet time,
the responsibility of our statesmen is great because their power is great
too.
And the mode in which the questions dealt with are discussed is
almost as important as the selection of these questions. It is for ourThe English Constitution/13
principal statesmen to lead the public, and not to let the public lead
them. No doubt when statesmen live by public favour, as ours do, this is
a hard saying, and it requires to be carefully limited. I do not mean that
our statesmen should assume a pedantic and doctrinaire tone with the
English people; if there is any thing which English people thoroughly
detest, it is that tone exactly. And they are right in detesting it; if a man
cannot give guidance and communicate instruction formally without tell-
ing his audience, “I am better than you; I have studied this as you have
not,” then he is not fit for a guide or an instructor. A statesman who
should show that gaucherie would exhibit a defect of imagination, and
expose an incapacity for dealing with men, which would be a great
hindrance to him in his calling. But much argument is not required to
guide the public, still less a formal exposition of that argument. What is
mostly needed is the manly utterance of clear conclusions; if a states-
man gives these in a felicitous way (and if with a few light and humor-
ous illustrations so much the better), he has done his part. He will have
given the text, the scribes in the newspapers will write the sermon. A
statesman ought to show his own nature, and talk in a palpable way
what is to him important truth. And so he will both guide and benefit the
nation. But if, especially at a time when great ignorance has an unusual
power in public affairs, he chooses to accept and reiterate the decisions
of that ignorance, he is only the hireling of the nation, and does little
save hurt it.
I shall be told that this is very obvious, and that everybody knows
that two and two make four, and that there is no use in inculcating it.
But I answer that the lesson is not observed in fact; people do not do
their political sums so. Of all our political dangers, the greatest I con-
ceive is that they will neglect the lesson. In plain English, what I fear is
that both our political parties will bid for the support of the working-
man; that both of them will promise to do as he likes if he will only tell
them what it is; that, as he now holds the casting vote n our affairs, both
parties will beg and pray him to give that vote to them. I can conceive or
nothing more corrupting or worse for a set of poor, rant people than that
two combinations of well-taught and rich men should constantly offer
to defer to t decision, and compete for the office of executing Vox populi
will be Vox diaboli if it is worked in that manner.
And, on the other hand, my imagination conjures up a contrary
danger. I can conceive that questions being raised, which, if continually
agitated,. would combine the working-men as a class together, the higher14/Walter Bagehot
orders might have to consider whether they would concede the measure
that would settle such questions, or whether they would risk the effect of
the working-men’s combination.
No doubt the question cannot be easily discussed in the abstract;
much must depend on the nature of the measures in each particular
case; on the evil they would cause if conceded; on the attractiveness of
their idea to the working-classes if refused. But in all cases it must be
remembered that a political combination of the lower classes, as such
and for their own objects, is an evil of the first magnitude; that a perma-
nent combination of them would make them (now that so many of them
have the suffrage) supreme in the country; and that their supremacy, in
the state they now are, means the supremacy of ignorance over instruc-
tion and of numbers over knowledge. So long as they are not taught to
act together, there is a chance of this being averted, and it can only be
averted by the greatest wisdom and the greatest foresight in the higher
classes. They must avoid, not only every evil, but every appearance of
evil; while they have still the power they must remove, not only every
actual grievance, but, where it is possible, every seeming grievance too;
they must willingly concede every claim which they can safely concede,
in order that they may not have to concede unwillingly some claim which
would impair the safety of the country.
This advice, too, will be said to be obvious; but I have the greatest
fear that, when the time comes, it will be cast aside as timid and cow-
ardly. So strong are the combative propensities of man, that he would
rather fight a losing battle than not fight at all. It is most difficult to
persuade people that by fighting they may strengthen the enemy, yet that
would be so here; since a losing battle — especially a long and well-
fought one — would have thoroughly taught the lower orders to com-
bine, and would have left the higher orders face to face with an irritated,
organized, and superior voting power. The courage which strengthens
an enemy, and which so loses, not only the present battle, but many after
battles, is a heavy curse to men and nations.
In one minor respect, indeed, I think we may see with distinctness
the effect of the Reform Bill of 1867. I think it has completed one change
which the Act of 1832 began; it has completed the change which that
Act made in the relation of the House of Lords to the House of Com-
mons. As I have endeavoured in this book to explain, the literary theory
of the English Constitution is on this point quite wrong as usual. Ac-
cording to that theory, the two Houses are two branches of the Legisla-The English Constitution/15
ture, perfectly equal and perfectly distinct. But before the Act of 1832
they were not so distinct; there was a very large and a very strong com-
mon element. By their commanding influence in many boroughs and
counties the Lords nominated a considerable part of the Commons; the
majority of the other part were the richer gentry, — men in most re-
spects like the Lords, and sympathizing with the Lords. Under the Con-
stitution as it then was, the two Houses were not in their essence dis-
tinct; they were in their essence similar; they were, in the main, not
Houses of contrasted origin, but Houses of like origin. The predominant
part of both was taken from the same class — from the English gentry,
titled and untitled. By the Act of 1832 this was much altered. The aris-
tocracy and the gentry lost their predominance in the House of Com-
mons; that predominance passed to the middle class. The two Houses
then became distinct, but then they ceased to be co-equal. The Duke of
Wellington, in a most remarkable paper, has explained what pains he
took to induce the Lords to submit to their new position, and to submit,
time after time, their will to the will of the Commons.
The Reform Act of 1867 has, I think, unmistakably completed the
effect which the Act of 1832 began, but left unfinished. The middle
class element has gained greatly by the second change, and the aristo-
cratic element has lost greatly. If you examine carefully the lists of mem-
bers, especially of the most prominent members, of either side of the
House, you will not find that they are in general aristocratic names.
Considering the power and position of the titled aristocracy, you will
perhaps be astonished at the small degree in which it contributes to the
active part of our governing Assembly. The spirit of our present House
of Commons is plutocratic, not aristocratic; its most prominent states-
men are not men of ancient descent or of great hereditary estate; they are
men mostly of substantial means, but they are mostly, too, connected
more or less closely with the new trading wealth. The spirit of the two
Assemblies has become far more contrasted than it ever was.
The full effect of the Reform Act of 1832 was indeed postponed by
the cause which I mentioned just now. The statesmen who worked the
system which was put up had themselves been educated under the sys-
tem which was pulled down. Strangely enough, their predominant guid-
ance lasted as long as the system which they created. Lord Palmerston,
Lord Russell, Lord Derby, died or else lost their influence within a year
or two of 1867. The complete consequences of the Act of 1832 upon the
House of Lords could not be seen while the Commons were subject to16/Walter Bagehot
such aristocratic guidance. Much of the change which might have been
expected from the Act of 1832 was held in suspense, and did not begin
till that measure had been followed by another of similar and greater
power.
The work which the Duke of Wellington in part performed has now,
therefore, to be completed also. He met the half difficulty; we have to
surmount the whole one. We have to frame such tacit rules, to establish
such ruling but unenacted customs, as will make the House of Lords
yield to the Commons when and as often as our new Constitution re-
quires that it should yield. I shall be asked, How often is that, and what
is the test by which you know it?
I answer that the House of Lords must yield whenever the opinion
of the Commons is also the opinion of the nation, and when it is clear
that the nation has made up its mind. Whether or not the nation has
made up its mind is a question to be decided by all the circumstances of
the case, and in the common way in which all practical questions are
decided. There are some people who lay down a sort of mechanical test:
they say the House of Lords should be at liberty to reject a measure
passed by the Commons once or more, and then, if the Commons send it
up again and again, infer that the nation is determined. But no important
practical question in real life can be uniformly settled by a fixed and
formal rule in this way. This rule would prove that the Lords might have
rejected the Reform Act of 1832. Whenever the nation was both excited
and determined, such a rule would be an acute and dangerous political
poison. It would teach the House of Lords that it might shut its eyes to
all the facts of real life, and decide simply by an abstract formula. If in
1832 the Lords had so acted, there would have been a revolution. Un-
doubtedly there is a general truth in the rule. Whether a Bill has come up
once only, or whether it has come up several times, is one important fact
in judging whether the nation is determined to have that measure en-
acted; it is an indication, but it is only one of the indications. There are
others equally decisive. The unanimous voice of the people may be so
strong, and may be conveyed through so many organs, that it may be
assumed to be lasting.
Englishmen are so very miscellaneous, that that which has really
convinced a great and varied majority of them for the present may fairly
be assumed to be likely to continue permanently to convince them. One
sort might easily fall into a temporary and erroneous fanaticism, but all
sorts simultaneously are very unlikely to do so.The English Constitution/17
I should venture so far as to lay down for an approximate rule, that
the House of Lords ought, on a first-class subject, to be slow — very
slow — in rejecting a Bill passed even once by a large majority of the
House of Commons. I would not of course lay this down as an unvary-
ing rule: as I have said, I have for practical purposes no belief in un-
varying rules. Majorities may be either genuine or fictitious; and if they
are not genuine, if they do not embody the opinion of the representative
as well as the opinion of the constituency, no one would wish to have
any attention paid to them. But if the opinion of the nation be strong and
be universal, if it be really believed by members of Parliament, as well
as by those who send them to Parliament, in my judgment the Lords
should yield at once, and should not resist it.
My main reason is one which has not been much urged. As a theo-
retical writer I can venture to say, what no elected member of Parlia-
ment, Conservative or Liberal, can venture to say, that I am exceedingly
afraid of the ignorant multitude of the new constituencies. I wish to have
as great and as compact a power as possible to resist it. But a dissension
between the Lords and Commons divides that resisting power; as I have
explained, the House of Commons still mainly represents the plutoc-
racy, the Lords represent the aristocracy. The main interest of both these
classes is now identical, which is to prevent or to mitigate the rule of
uneducated members. But, to prevent it effectually, they must not quar-
rel among themselves; they must not bid one against the other for the aid
of their common opponent. And this is precisely the effect of a division
between Lords and Commons. The two great bodies of the educated
rich go to the constituencies to decide between them, and the majority of
the constituencies now consist of the uneducated poor. This cannot be
for the advantage of any one.
In doing so, besides, the aristocracy forfeit their natural position —
that by which they would gain most power, and in which they would do
most good. They ought to be the heads of the plutocracy. In all countries
new wealth is ready to worship old wealth, if old wealth will only let it,
and I need not say that in England new wealth is eager in its worship.
Satirist after satirist has told us how quick, how willing, how anxious
are the newly made rich to associate with the ancient rich. Rank prob-
ably in no country whatever has so much “market” value as it has in
England just now. Of course there have been many countries in which
certain old families, whether rich or poor, were worshipped by whole
populations with a more intense and poetic homage; but I doubt if there18/Walter Bagehot
has ever been any in which all old families and all titled families re-
ceived more ready observance from those who were their equals, per-
haps their superiors, in wealth, their equals in culture, and their inferi-
ors only in descent and rank. The possessors of the “material” distinc-
tions of life, as a political economist would class them, rush to worship
those who possess the immaterial distinctions. Nothing can be more
politically useful than such homage, if it be skilfully used; no folly can
be idler than to repel and reject it.
The worship is the more politically important because it is the wor-
ship of the political superior for the political inferior. At an election the
non-titled are much more powerful than the titled. Certain individual
peers have, from their great possessions, great electioneering influence,
but, as a whole, the House of Peers is not a principal electioneering
force. It has so many poor men inside it, and so many rich men outside
it, that its electioneering value is impaired. Besides it is in the nature of
the curious influence of rank to work much more on men singly than on
men collectively; it is an influence which most men — at least most
Englishmen — feel very much, but of which most Englishmen are some-
what ashamed. Accordingly, when any number of men are collected
together, each of whom worships rank in his heart, the whole body will
patiently hear — in many cases will cheer and approve- some rather
strong speeches against rank. Each man is a little afraid that his “sneak-
ing kindness for a lord,” as Mr. Gladstone put it, be found out; he is not
sure how far that weakness is shared by those around him.. And thus
Englishmen easily find themselves committed to anti-aristocratic senti-
ments which are the direct opposite of their real feeling, and their collec-
tive action may be bitterly hostile to rank while the secret sentiment of
each separately is especially favourable to rank. In 1832 the close bor-
oughs, which were largely held by peers, and were still more largely
supposed to be held by them, were swept away with a tumult of delight;
and in another similar time of great excitement, the Lords themselves, if
they deserve it, might pass away. The democratic passions gain by fo-
menting a diffused excitement, and by massing men in concourses; the
aristocratic sentiments gain by calm and quiet, and act most on men by
themselves, in their families, and when female influence is not absent.
The overt electioneering power of the Lords does not at all equal its real
social power. The English plutocracy, as is often said of something yet
coarser, must be “humoured, not drove;” they may easily be impelled
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are much stronger than the aristocracy, they might, if angered, even
destroy it; though in order to destroy it, they must help to arouse a wild
excitement among the ignorant poor, which, if once roused, may not be
easily calmed, and which may be fatal to far more than its beginners
intend.
This is the explanation of the anomaly which puzzles many clever
Lords. They think, if they do not say, “Why are we pinned up here?
Why are we not in the Commons where we could have so much more
power? Why is this nominal rank given us, at the price of substantial
influence? If we prefer real weight to unreal prestige, why may we not
have it?” The reply is, that the whole body of the Lords have an incalcu-
lably greater influence over society while there is still a House of Lords,
than they would have if the House of Lords were abolished; and that
though one or two clever young peers might do better in the Commons,
the whole order of peers, young and old, clever and not clever, is much
better where it is. The selfish instinct of the mass of peers on this point
is a keener and more exact judge of the real world than the fine intelli-
gence of one or two of them.
If the House of Peers ever goes, it will go in a storm, and the storm
will not leave all else as it is. It will not destroy the House of Peers and
leave the rich young peers, with their wealth and their titles, to sit in the
Commons. It would probably sweep all titles before it — at least all
legal titles — and somehow or other it would break up the curious sys-
tem by which the estates of great families all go to the eldest son. That
system is a very artificial one; you may make a fine argument for it, but
you cannot make a loud argument, an argument which would reach and
rule the multitude. The thing looks like injustice, and in a time of popu-
lar passion it would not stand. Much short of the compulsory equal
division of the Code Napoleon, stringent clauses might be provided to
obstruct and prevent these great aggregations of property. Few things
certainly are less likely than a violent tempest like this to destroy large
and hereditary estates. But then, too, few things are less likely than an
outbreak to destroy the House of Lords: my point is, that a catastrophe
which levels one will not spare the other.
I conceive, therefore, that the great power of the House of Lords
should be exercised very timidly and very cautiously. For the sake of
keeping the headship of the plutocracy, and through that of the nation,
they should not offend the plutocracy; the points upon which they have
to yield are mostly very minor ones, and they should yield many great20/Walter Bagehot
points rather than risk the bottom of their power. They should give large
donations out of income, if by so doing they keep, as they would keep,
their capital intact. The Duke of Wellington guided the House of Lords
in this manner for years, and nothing could prosper better for them or
for the country, and the Lords have only to go back to the good path in
which he directed them.
The events of 1870 caused much discussion upon life peerages; and
we have gained this great step, that whereas the former leader of the
Tory party in the Lords — Lord Lyndhurst — defeated the last proposal
to make life peers, Lord Derby, when leader of that party, desired to
create them. As I have given in this book what seemed to me good rea-
sons for making them, I need not repeat those reasons here, I need only
say how the notion stands in my judgment now.
I cannot look on life peerages in the way in which some of their
strongest advocates regard them; I cannot think of them as a mode in
which a permanent opposition or a contrast between the Houses of Lords
and Commons is to be remedied. To be effectual in that way, life peer-
ages must be very numerous. Now the House of Lords will never con-
sent to a very numerous life peerage without a storm; they must be in
terror to do it, or they will not do it. And if the storm blows strongly
enough to do so much, in all likelihood it will blow strongly enough to
do much more. If the revolution is powerful enough and eager enough to
make ain immense number of life peers, probably it will sweep away the
hereditary principle in the Upper Chamber entirely. Of course one may
fancy it to be otherwise; we may conceive of a political storm just going
to a life peerage limit, and then stopping suddenly. But in politics we
must not trouble ourselves with exceedingly exceptional accidents: it is
quite difficult enough to count on and provide for the regular and plain
probabilities. To speak mathematically, we may easily miss the perma-
nent course of the political curve if we engross our minds with its cusps
and conjugate points.
Nor, on the other hand, can I sympathize with the objection to life
peerages which some of the Radical party take and feel. They think it
will strengthen the Lords, and so make them better able to oppose the
Commons; they think, if they do not say, “The House of Lords is our
enemy and that of all Liberals; happily the mass of it is not intellectual;
a few clever men are born there which we cannot help, but we will not
‘vaccinate’ it with genius; we will not put in a set of clever men for their
lives who may as likely as not turn against us.” This objection assumesThe English Constitution/21
that clever peers are just as likely to oppose the Commons as stupid
peers. But this I deny. Most clever men who are in such a good place as
the House of Lords plainly is, will be very unwilling to lose it if they can
help it; at the clear call of a great duty they might lose it, but only at
such a call. And it does not take a clever man to see that systematic
opposition of the Commons is the only thing which can endanger the
Lords, or which will make an individual peer cease to be a peer. The
greater you make the sense of the Lords, the more they will see that their
plain interest is to make friends of the plutocracy, and to be the chiefs of
it, and not to wish to oppose the Commons where that plutocracy rules.
It is true that a completely new House of Lords, mainly composed
of men of ability, selected because they were able, might very likely
attempt to make ability the predominant power in the state, and to rival,
if not conquer, the House of Commons, where the standard of intelli-
gence is not much above the common English average. But in the present
English world such a House of Lords would soon lose all influence.
People would say “it was too clever by half,” and in an Englishman’s
mouth that means a very severe censure. The English people would
think it grossly anomalous if their elected assembly of rich men were
thwarted by a nominated assembly of talkers and writers. Sensible men
of substantial means are what we wish to be ruled by, and a peerage of
genius would not compare with it in power.
It is true, too, that at present some of the cleverest peers are not so
ready as some others to agree with the Commons. But it is not unnatural
that persons of high rank and of great ability should be unwilling to
bend to persons of lower rank, and of certainly not greater ability. A few
of such peers (for they are very few) might say, “We had rather not have
our peerage if we are to buy it at the price of yielding.” But a life peer
who had fought his way up to the peers would never think so. Young
men who are born to rank may risk it, not middle aged or old men who
have earned their rank. A moderate number of life peers would almost
always counsel moderation to the Lords, and would almost always be
right in counselling it.
Recent discussions have also brought into curious prominence an-
other part of the Constitution. I said in this book that it would very
much surprise people if they were only told how many things the Queen
could do without consulting Parliament, and it certainly has so proved,
for when the Queen abolished Purchase in the Army by an act of pre-
rogative (after the Lords had rejected the bill for doing so), there was a22/Walter Bagehot
great and general astonishment.
But this is nothing to what the Queen can by law do without con-
sulting Parliament. Not to mention other things, she could disband the
army (by law she cannot engage more than a certain number of men, but
she is not obliged to engage any men); she could dismiss all the officers,
from the General Commanding-in-Chief downwards; she could dismiss
all the sailors too; she could sell off all our ships of war and all our
naval stores; she could make a peace by the sacrifice of Cornwall, and
begin a war for the conquest of Brittany. She could make every citizen
in the United Kingdom, male or female, a peer; she could make every
parish in the United Kingdom a “university;” she could dismiss most of
the civil servants; she could pardon all offenders. In a word, the Queen
could by prerogative upset all the action of civil government within the
government, could disgrace the nation by a bad war or peace, and could,
by disbanding our forces, whether land or sea, leave us defenceless against
foreign nations. Why do we not fear that she would do this, or any
approach to it?
Because there are two checks, — one ancient and coarse, the other
modern and delicate. The first is the check of impeachment. Any Minis-
ter who advised the Queen so to use her prerogative as to endanger the
safety of the realm, might be impeached for high treason, and would be
so. Such a Minister would, in our technical law, be said to have levied,
or aided to levy, “war against the Queen.” This counsel to her so to use
her prerogative would by the Judge be declared to be an act of violence
against herself, and in that peculiar but effectual way the offender could
be condemned and executed. Against all gross excesses of the preroga-
tive this is a sufficient protection. But it would be no protection against
minor mistakes; any error of judgment committed bona fide, and only
entailing consequences which one person might say were good, and an-
other say were bad, could not be so punished. It would be possible to
impeach any Minister who disbanded the Queen’s army, and it would be
done for certain. But suppose a Minister were to reduce the army or the
navy much below the contemplated strength — suppose he were only to
spend upon them one-third of the amount which Parliament had permit-
ted him to spend — suppose a Minister of Lord Palmerston’s principles
were suddenly and while in office converted to the principles of Mr.
Bright and Mr. Cobden, and were to act on those principles, he could
not be impeached. The law of treason neither could nor ought to be
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— which was in good faith intended not to impair the well-being of the
State, but to promote and augment it. Against such misuses of the pre-
rogative our remedy is a change of Ministry. And in general this works
very well. Every Minister looks long before he incurs that penalty, and
no one incurs it wantonly. But, nevertheless, there are two defects in it.
The first is that it may not be a remedy at all; it may be only a punish-
ment. A Minister may risk his dismissal; he may do some act difficult to
undo, and then all which may be left will be to remove and censure him.
And the second is that it is only one House of Parliament which has
much to say to this remedy, such as it is: the House of Commons only
can remove a Minister by a vote of censure. Most of the Ministries for
thirty years have never possessed the confidence of the Lords, and in
such cases a vote of censure by the Lords could therefore have but little
weight; it would be simply the particular expression of a general politi-
cal disapproval. It would be like a vote of censure on a Liberal Govern-
ment by the Carlton, or on a Tory Government by the Reform Club.
And in no case has an adverse vote by the Lords the same decisive effect
as a vote of the Commons; the Lower House is the ruling and the choos-
ing House, and if a Government really possesses that, it thoroughly
possesses nine-tenths of what it requires. The support of the Lords is an
aid and a luxury; that of the Commons is a strict and indispensable
necessary.
These difficulties are particularly raised by questions of foreign
policy. On most domestic subjects, either custom or legislation has, lim-
ited the use of the prerogative. The mode of governing the country, ac-
cording to the existing laws, is mostly worn into a rut, and most Admin-
istrations move in it because it is easier to move there than anywhere
else. Most political crises — the decisive votes, which determine the
fate of Government — are generally either on questions of foreign policy
or of new laws; and the questions of foreign policy come out generally
in this way, that the Government has already clone something, and that
it is for the one part of the Legislature alone — for the House of Com-
mons, and not for the House of Lords — to say whether they have or
have not forfeited their place by the treaty they have made.
I think every one must admit that this is not an arrangement which
seems right on the face of it. Treaties are quite as important as most
laws, and to require the elaborate assent of representative assemblies to
every word of the law, and not to consult them even as to the essence of
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Constitution, this may have been quite right; the power was then really
lodged in the Crown, and because Parliament met very seldom, and for
other reasons, it was then necessary that, on a multitude of points, the
Crown should have much more power than is amply sufficient for it at
present. But now the real power is not in the Sovereign, it is in the Prime
Minister and in the Cabinet, — that is in the hands of a committee
appointed by Parliament, and of the chairman of that committee. Now,
beforehand, no one would have ventured to suggest that a committee of
Parliament on Foreign relations should be able to commit the country to
the greatest international obligations without consulting either Parlia-
ment or the country. No other select committee has any comparable
power; and considering how carefully we have fettered and limited the
powers of all other subordinate authorities, our allowing so much dis-
cretionary power on matters peculiarly dangerous and peculiarly deli-
cate to rest in the sole charge of one secret committee is exceedingly
strange. No doubt it may be beneficial; many seeming anomalies are so,
but at first sight it does not look right.
I confess that I should see no advantage in it if our two Chambers
were sufficiently homogeneous and sufficiently harmonious. On the con-
trary, if those two Chambers were as they ought to be, I should believe
it to be a great defect. If the Administration had in both Houses a major-
ity — not a mechanical majority ready to accept any thing, but a fair
and reasonable one, predisposed to think the Government right, but not
ready to find it to be so in the face of facts and in opposition to whatever
might occur; if a good Government were thus placed, I should think it
decidedly better that the agreements of the Administration with foreign
powers should be submitted to Parliament. They would then receive
that which is best for all arrangements of business, an understanding
and sympathizing criticism, but still a criticism. The majority of the
Legislature, being well disposed to the Government, would not “find”
against it except it had really committed some big and plain mistake.
But if the Government had made such a mistake, certainly the majority
of the Legislature would find against it. In a country fit for Parliamen-
tary institutions, the partisanship of members of the Legislature never
comes in manifest opposition to the plain interest of the nation; if it did,
the nation being (as are all nations capable of Parliamentary institu-
tions) constantly attentive to public affairs, would inflict on them the
maximum Parliamentary penalty at the next election, and at many fu-
ture elections. It would break their career. No English majority dareThe English Constitution/25
vote for an exceedingly bad treaty; it would rather desert its own leader
than insure its own ruin. And an English minority, inheriting a long
experience of Parliamentary affairs, would not be exceedingly ready to
reject a treaty made with a foreign Government. The leaders of an En-
glish Opposition are very conversant with the schoolboy maxim, “Two
can play at that fun.” They know that the next time they are in office the
same sort of sharp practice may be used against them, and therefore
they will not use it. So strong is this predisposition, that not long since a
subordinate member of the Opposition declared that the “front benches”
of the two sides of the House — that is, the leaders of the Government
and the leaders of the Opposition were in constant tacit league to sup-
press the objections of independent members. And what he said is often
quite true. There are often seeming objections which are not real objec-
tions, at least, which are, in the particular cases, outweighed by counter-
considerations; and these “independent members” having no real re-
sponsibility, not being likely to be hurt themselves if they make a mis-
take, are sure to blurt out, and to want to act upon. But the responsible
heads of the party who may have to decide similar things, or even the
same things, themselves will not permit it. They refuse, out of interest
as well as out of patriotism, to engage the country in a permanent for-
eign scrape, to secure for themselves and their party a momentary home
advantage. Accordingly, a Government which negotiated a treaty would
feel that its treaty would be subject certainly to a scrutiny, but still to a
candid and a lenient scrutiny; that it would go before judges, of whom
the majority were favourable, and among whom the most influential
part of the minority were in this case much opposed to excessive an-
tagonism. And this seems to be the best position in which negotiators
can be placed, namely, that they should be sure to have to account to
considerate and fair persons, but not to have to account to inconsiderate
and unfair ones.
At present the Government which negotiates a treaty can hardly be
said to be accountable to any one. It is sure to be subjected to vague
censure. Benjamin Franklin said, “I have never known a peace made,
even the most advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate, and
the makers condemned as injudicious or corrupt. ‘Blessed are the peace-
makers’ is, I suppose, to be understood in the other world, for in this
they are frequently cursed.” And this is very often the view taken now in
England of treaties. There being nothing practical in the Opposition —
nothing likely to hamper them hereafter — the leaders of Opposition are26/Walter Bagehot
nearly sure to suggest every objection. The thing is done and cannot be
undone, and the most natural wish of the Opposition leaders is to prove
that if they had been in office, and it therefore had been theirs to do it,
they could have done it much better. On the other hand, it is quite pos-
sible that there may be no real criticism on a treaty at all; or the treaty
has been made by the Government, and as it cannot be unmade by any
one, the Opposition may not think it worth while to say much about it.
The Government, therefore, is never certain of any criticism; on the
contrary, it has a good chance of escaping criticism; but if there be any
criticism the Government must expect it to be bitter, sharp, and captious
— made as an irresponsible objector would make it, and not as a re-
sponsible statesman, who may have to deal with a difficulty if he make
it, and therefore will be cautious how he says any thing which may
make it.
This is what happens in common cases; and in the uncommon —
the ninety-ninth case in a hundred — in which the Opposition hoped to
turn out the Government because of the alleged badness of the treaty
they have made, the criticism is sure to be of the most undesirable char-
acter, and to say what is most offensive to foreign nations. All the prac-
tised acumen of anti-Government writers and speakers is sure to be
engaged in proving that England has been imposed upon — that, as was
said in one case, “The moral and the intellectual qualities have been
divided; that our negotiation had the moral, and the negotiation on the
other side the intellectual,” and so on. The whole pitch of party malice is
then expended, because there is nothing to check the party in opposi-
tion. The treaty has been made, and though it may be censured, and the
party which made it ousted, yet the difficulty it was meant to cure is
cured, and the opposing party, if it takes office, will not have that diffi-
culty to deal with.
In abstract theory these defects in our present practice would seem
exceedingly great, but in practice they are not so. English statesmen and
English parties have really a great patriotism; they can rarely be per-
suaded, even by their passions or their interest, to do any thing contrary
to the real interest of England, or any thing which would lower England
in the eyes of foreign nations. And they would seriously hurt themselves
if they did. But still these are the real tendencies of our present practice,
and these are only prevented by qualities in the nation and qualities in
our statesmen, which will just as much exist if we change our practice.
It certainly would be in many ways advantageous to change it. If weThe English Constitution/27
require that in some form the assent of Parliament shall be given to such
treaties, we should have a real discussion prior to the making of such
treaties. We should have the reasons for the treaty plainly stated, and
also the reasons against it. At present, as we have seen, the discussion is
unreal. The thing is done, and cannot be altered; and what is said often
ought not to be said because it is captious, and what is not said ought as
often to be said because it is material. We should have a manlier and
plainer way of dealing with foreign policy, if Ministers were obliged to
explain clearly their foreign contracts before they were valid, just as
they have to explain their domestic proposals. before they can become
laws.
The objections to this are, as far as I know, three, and three only.
First. That it would not be always desirable for Ministers to state
clearly the motives which induced them to agree to foreign compacts.
“Treaties,” it is said, “are in one great respect different from laws, they
concern not only the Government which binds, the nation so bound, but
a third party too, — a foreign country, — and the feelings of that coun-
try are to be considered as well as our own. And that foreign country
will, probably, in the present state of the world be a despotic one, where
discussion is not practised, where it is not understood, where the expres-
sions of different speakers are not accurately weighed, where undue
offence may easily be given.” This objection might be easily avoided by
requiring that the discussion upon treaties in Parliament, like that dis-
cussion in the American Senate, should be “in secret session,” and that
no report should be published of it. But I should, for my own part, be
rather disposed to risk a public debate. Despotic nations now cannot
understand England; it is to them an anomaly “chartered by Providence;”
they have been time out of mind puzzled by its institutions, vexed at its
statesmen, and angry at its newspapers. A little more of such perplexity
and such vexation does not seem to me a great evil. And if it be meant as
it often is meant, that the whole truth as to treaties cannot be spoken out,
I answer, that. neither can the whole truth as to laws. All important laws
affect large “vested interests;” they touch great sources of political
strength; and these great interests require to be treated as delicately, and
with as nice a manipulation of language, as the feelings of any foreign
country. A Parliamentary Minister is a man trained by elaborate prac-
tice not to blurt out crude things, and an English Parliament is an as-
sembly which particularly dislikes any thing gauche or any thing impru-
dent. They would still more dislike it if it hurt themselves and the coun-28/Walter Bagehot
try as well as the speaker.
I am, too, disposed to deny entirely that there can be any treaty for
which adequate reasons cannot be given to the English people, which
the English people ought to make. A great deal of the reticence of diplo-
macy had, I think history shows, much better be spoken out. The worst
families are those in which the members never really speak their minds
to one another; they maintain an atmosphere of unreality, and every one
always lives in an atmosphere of suppressed ill-feeling. It is the same
with nations. The parties concerned would almost always be better for
hearing the substantial reasons which induced the negotiators to make
the treaty, and the negotiators would do their work much better, for half
the ambiguities in treaties are caused by the negotiators not liking the
fact or not taking the pains to put their own meaning distinctly before
their own minds. And they would be obliged to make it plain if they had
to defend it and argue on it before a great assembly.
Secondly, it may be objected to the change suggested that Parlia-
ment is not always sitting, and that if treaties required its assent, it
might have to be sometimes summoned out of season, or the treaties
would have to be delayed. And this is as far as it goes a just objection,
but I do not imagine that it goes far. The great bulk of treaties could wait
a little without harm, and in the very few cases when urgent haste is
necessary, an autumn session of Parliament could well be justified, for
the occasion must be of grave and critical importance.
Thirdly, it may be said that if we required the consent of both Houses
of Parliament to foreign treaties before they were valid we should much
augment the power of the House of Lords. And this is also, I think, a
just objection as far as it goes. The House of Lords, as it cannot turn out
the Ministry for making treaties, has in no case a decisive weight in
foreign policy, though its debates on them are often excellent; and there
is a real danger at present in giving it such weight. They are not under
the same guidance as the House of Commons. In the House of Com-
mons, of necessity, the Ministry has a majority, and the majority will
agree to the treaties the leaders have made if they fairly can. They will
not be anxious to disagree with them. But the majority of the House of
Lords may always be, and has lately been generally an opposition ma-
jority, and therefore the treaty may be submitted to critics exactly pledged
to opposite views. It might be like submitting the design of an architect
known to hold “mediaeval principles” to a committee wedded to “clas-
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Still, upon the whole, I think the augmentation of the power of the
Peers might be risked without real fear of serious harm. Our present
practice, as has been explained, only works because of the good sense
of those by whom it is worked, and the new practice would have to rely
on a similar good sense and practicality too. The House of Lords must
deal with the assent to treaties as they do with the assent to laws; they
must defer to the voice of the country and the authority of the Com-
mons, even in cases where their own judgment might guide them other-
wise. In very vital treaties probably, being Englishmen, they would be
of the same mind as the rest of Englishmen. If in such cases they showed
a reluctance to act as the people wished, they would have the sale lesson
taught them as on vital and exciting questions of domestic legislation,
and the case is not so likely to happen, for on these internal and organic
questions the interest and the feeling of the Peers is often presumably
opposed to that of other classes — they may be anxious not to relin-
quish the very power which other classes are anxious to acquire; but in
foreign policy there is no similar antagonism of interest — a peer and a
non-peer have presumably in that matter the same interest and the same
wishes.
Probably, if it were considered to be desirable to give to Parliament
a more direct control over questions of foreign policy than it possesses
now, the better way would be not to require a formal vote to the treaty
clause by clause. This would entail too much time, and would lead to
unnecessary changes in minor details. It would be enough to let the
treaty be laid upon the table of both Houses, say for fourteen days, and
to acquire validity unless objected to by one House or other before that
interval had expired.
II.
That is all which I think I need say on the domestic events which
have changed, or suggested changes, in the English Constitution since
this book was written. But there are also some foreign events which
have illustrated it, and of these I should like to say a few words.
Naturally, the most striking of these illustrative changes comes from
France. Since 1789 France has always been trying political experiments,
from which others may profit much, though as yet she herself has prof-
ited little. She is now trying one singularly illustrative of the English
Constitution. When the first edition of this book was published I had
great difficulty in persuading many people that it was possible for a30/Walter Bagehot
non-monarchical state, for the real chief of the practical Executive —
the Premier as we should call him — to be nominated and to be remov-
able by the vote of the National Assembly. The United States and its
copies were the only present and familiar Republics, and in these the
system was exactly opposite. The Executive was there appointed by the
people as the Legislative was too. No conspicuous example of any other
sort of Republic then existed. But now France has given an example —
M. Thiers is (with one exception) just the chef du pouvoir exécutif that
I endeavoured more than once in this book to describe. He is appointed
by and is removable by the Assembly. He comes down and speaks in it
just as our Premier does; he is responsible for managing it just as our
Premier is. No one can any longer doubt the possibility of a republic in
which the Executive and the Legislative authorities were united and fixed;
no one can assert such union to be the incommunicable attribute of a
Constitutional Monarchy.
But, unfortunately, we can as yet only infer from this experiment
that such a constitution is possible; we cannot as yet say whether it will
be bad or good. The circumstances are very peculiar, and that in three
ways. First, the trial of a specially Parliamentary Republic, of a Repub-
lic where Parliament appoints the Minister, is made in a nation which
has, to say the least of it, no peculiar aptitude for Parliamentary Gov-
ernment; which has possibly a peculiar inaptitude for it. In the last but
one of these essays I have tried to describe one of the mental conditions
of Parliamentary Government, which I call “rationality,” by which I do
not mean reasoning power, but rather the power of hearing the reasons
of others, of comparing them quietly with one’s own reasons, and then
being guided by the result. But a French Assembly is not easy to reason
with. Every Assembly is divided into parties and into sections of par-
ties, and in France each party, almost every section of a party, begins
not to clamour but to scream, and to scream as only Frenchmen can, as
soon as it hears anything which it particularly dislikes. With an Assem-
bly in this temper, real discussion is impossible, and Parliamentary
Government is impossible too, because the Parliament can neither choose
men nor measures. Ths French assemblies under the Restored Monar-
chy seem to have been quieter, probably because being elected from a
limited constituency they did not contain so many sections of opinion;
they had fewer irritants and fewer species of irritability. But the assem-
blies of the ‘48 Republic were disorderly in the extreme. I saw the last
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not possible in it. There was not an audience willing to hear. The As-
sembly now sitting at Versailles is undoubtedly also, at times, most tu-
multuous, and a Parliamentary Government in which it governs must be
under a peculiar difficulty because as a sovereign it is unstable, capri-
cious, and unruly.
The difficulty is the greater because there is no check, or little, from
the French nation upon the Assembly. The French, as a nation, do not
care for or appreciate Parliamentary Government. I have endeavoured
to explain how difficult it is for inexperienced mankind to take to such a
government; how much more natural, that is, how much more easy to
uneducated men is loyalty to a monarch. A nation which does not expect
good from a Parliament cannot check or punish a Parliament. France
expects, I fear, too little from her Parliaments ever to get what she ought.
Now that the. suffrage is universal, the average intellect and the average
culture of the constituent bodies are excessively low; and even such
mind and culture as there is has long been enslaved to authority: the
French peasant cares more for standing well with his present préfet than
for anything else whatever; he is far too ignorant to check and watch his
Parliament, and far too timid to think of doing either, if the executive
authority nearest to him did not like it. The experiment of a strictly
Parliamentary Republic — of a Republic where the Parliament appoints
the Executive — is being tried in France at an extreme disadvantage,
because in France a Parliament is unusually likely to be bad, and un-
usually likely also to be free enough to show its badness.
Secondly, the present polity of France is not a copy of the whole
effective part of the British Constitution, but only of a part of it, By our
Constitution nominally the Queen, but really the Prime Minister, has the
power of dissolving the Assembly. But M. Thiers has no such power;
and therefore, under ordinary circumstances, I believe, the policy would
soon become unmanageable. The result would be, as I have tried to
explain, that the Assembly would be always changing its Ministry, that
having no reason to fear the penalty which that change so often brings in
England, they would be ready to make it once a month. Caprice is the
characteristic vice of miscellaneous assemblies, and without some check
their selection would be unceasingly mutable. This peculiar danger of
the present Constitution of France has, however, been prevented by its
peculiar circumstances. The Assembly have not been inclined to re-
move M. Thiers, because in their lamentable present position they could
not replace M. Thiers. He has a monopoly of the necessary reputation.32/Walter Bagehot
It is the Empire — the Empire which he always opposed — that has
done him this kindness. For twenty years no great political reputation
could arise in France. The Emperor governed, and no one member could
show a capacity for government. M. Rouher, though of vast real ability,
was in the popular idea only the Emperor’s agent; and even had it been
otherwise, M. Rouher, the one great man of Imperialism, could not have
been selected as a head of the Government, at a moment of the greatest
reaction against the Empire. Of the chiefs before the twenty years’ si-
lence, of the eminent men known to be able to handle Parliaments and to
govern Parliaments, M. Thiers was the only one still physically able to
begin again to do so. The miracle is, that at seventy-four even he should
still be able. As no other great chief of the Parliament regime existed,
M. Thiers is not only the best choice, but the only choice. If he were
taken away, it would be most difficult to make any other choice, and
that difficulty keeps him where he is. At every crisis the Assembly feels
that after M. Thiers “the deluge,” and he lives upon that feeling. A
change of the President, though legally simple, is in practice all but
impossible; because all know that such a change might be a change, not
only of the President, but of much more too: that very probably it might
be a change of the polity — that it might bring in a Monarchy or an
Empire.
Lastly, by a natural consequence of the position, M. Thiers does not
govern as a Parliamentary Premier governs. He is not, he boasts that he
is not, the head of a party. On the contrary, being the one person essen-
tial to all parties, he selects Ministers from all parties, he constructs a
cabinet in which no one Minister agrees with any other in anything, and
with all the members of which he himself frequently disagrees. The se-
lection is quite in his hand. Ordinarily a Parliamentary Premier cannot
choose; he is brought in by a party, he is maintained in office by a party;
and that party requires that as they aid him, he shall aid them; that as
they give him the very best thing in the State, he shall give them the next
best things. But M. Thiers is under no such restriction. He can choose
as he likes, and does choose. Neither in the selection of his Cabinet nor
in the management of the Chamber, is M. Thiers guided as a similar
person in common circumstances would have to be guided. He is the
exception of a moment; he is not the example of a lasting condition.
For these reasons, though we may use the present Constitution of
France as a useful aid to our imaginations, in conceiving of a purely
Parliamentary republic, of a monarchy minus the monarch, we must notThe English Constitution/33
think of it as much more. It is too singular in its nature and too peculiar
in its accidents to be a guide to any thing except itself.
In this essay I have made many remarks on the American Constitu-
tion, in comparison with the English; and as to the American Constitu-
tion we have had a whole world of experience since I first wrote. My
great object was to contrast the office of President as an executive of-
ficer and to compare it with that of a Prime Minister; and I devoted
much space to showing that in one principal respect the English system
is by far the best. The English Premier being appointed by the selection,
and being removable at the pleasure, of the preponderant Legislative
Assembly, is sure to be able to rely on that assembly. If he wants legis-
lation to aid his policy he can obtain that legislation; he can carry out
that policy. But the American President has no similar security. He is
elected in one way, at one time, and Congress (no matter which House)
is elected in another way, at another time. The two have nothing to bind
them together, and in matter of fact they continually disagree.
This was written in the time of Mr. Lincoln, when Congress, the
President, and all the North were united as one man in the war against
the South. There was then no patent instance of mere disunion. But
between the time when the essays were first written in the Fortnightly,
and their subsequent junction into a book, Mr. Lincoln was assassi-
nated, and Mr. Johnson, the Vice-President, became President, and so
continued for nearly four years. At such a time the characteristic evils
of the Presidential system were shown most conspicuously. The Presi-
dent and the Assembly, so far from being (as it is essential to good
government that they should be) on terms of close union, were not on
terms of common courtesy. So far from being capable of a continuous
and concerted co-operation they were all the while trying to thwart one
another. He had one plan for the pacification of the South, and they
another: they would have nothing to say to his plans, and he vetoed their
plans as long as the Constitution permitted, and when they were, in spite
of him, carried, he, as far as he could (and this was very much), embar-
rassed them in action. The quarrel in most countries would have gone
beyond the law, and come to blows; even in America, the most law-
loving, of countries, it went as far as possible within the law. Mr. Johnson
described the most popular branch of the legislature — the House of
Representatives — as a body “hanging on the verge of government;”
and that House impeached him criminally, in the hope that in that way
they might get rid of him civilly. Nothing could be so conclusive against34/Walter Bagehot
the American Constitution, as a Constitution, as that incident. A hostile
legislature and a hostile executive were so tied together, that the legisla-
ture tried, and tried in vain, to rid itself of the executive by accusing it of
illegal practices. The legislature was so afraid of the President’s legal
power, that it unfairly accused him of acting beyond the law. And the
blame thus cast on the American Constitution is so much praise to be
given to the American political character. Few nations, perhaps scarcely
any nation, could have borne such a trial so easily and so perfectly.
This was the most striking instance of disunion between the Presi-
dent and the Congress that has ever yet occurred, and which probably
will ever occur. Probably for very many years the United States will
have great and painful reason to remember, that at the moment of all
their history, when it was most important to them to collect and concen-
trate all the strength and wisdom of their policy on the pacification of
the South, that policy was divided by a strife in the last degree unseemly
and degrading. But it will be for a competent historian hereafter to trace
out this accurately and in detail; the time is yet too recent, and I cannot
pretend that I know enough to do so. I cannot venture myself to draw the
full lessons from these events; I can only predict that when they are
drawn, those lessons will be most important and most interesting.
There is, however, one series of events which have happened in
America since the beginning of the civil war, and since the first publica-
tion of these essays, on which I should wish to say something in detail
— I mean the financial events. These lie within the scope of my peculiar
studies, and it is comparatively easy to judge of them, since whatever
may be the case with refined statistical reasoning, the great results of
money matters speak to and interest all mankind. And every incident in
this part of American financial history exemplifies the contrast between
a Parliamentary and a Presidential Government.
The distinguishing quality of Parliamentary Government is, that in
each stage of a public transaction there is a discussion; that the public
assist at this discussion; that it can, through Parliament, turn out an
administration which is not doing as it likes, and can put in an adminis-
tration which will do as it likes. But the characteristic of a Presidential
Government is, in a multitude of cases, that there is no such discussion;
that when there is a discussion the fate of Government does not turn
upon it, and, therefore, the people do not attend to it; that upon the
whole the administration itself is pretty much doing as it likes, and ne-
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offend the mass of the nation. The nation commonly does not attend, but
if by gigantic blunders you make it attend, it will remember it and turn
you out when its time comes; it will show you that your power is short,
and so on the instant weaken that power; it will make your present life in
office unbearable and uncomfortable by the hundred modes in which a
free people can, without ceasing, act upon the rulers which it elected
yesterday, and will have to reject or re-elect to-morrow.
In finance the most striking effect in America has, on the first view
of it, certainly been good. It has enabled the Government to obtain and
to keep a vast surplus of revenue over expenditure. Even before the civil
war it did this — from 1837 to 1857. Mr. Wells tells us that, strange as
it may seem, “There was not a single year in which the unexpended
balance in the National Treasury — derived from various sources — at
the end of the year, was not in excess of the total expenditure of the
preceding year; while in not a few years the unexpended balance was
absolutely greater than the sum of the entire expenditure of the twelve
months preceding.” But this history before the war is nothing to what
has happened since. The following are the surpluses of revenue over
expenditure since the end of the civil war:







No one who knows any thing of the working of Parliamentary Gov-
ernment will for a moment imagine that any Parliament would have
allowed any executive to keep a surplus of this magnitude. In England,
after the French war, the Government of that day, which had brought it
to a happy end, which had the glory of Waterloo, which was in conse-
quence exceedingly strong, which had besides elements of strength from
close boroughs and Treasury influence such as certainly no Govern-
ment has ever had since, and such perhaps as no Government ever had
before — that Government proposed to keep a moderate surplus and to
apply it to the reduction of the debt, but even this the English Parliament
would not endure. The administration with all its power derived both
from good and evil had to yield; the income tax was abolished, with it36/Walter Bagehot
went the surplus, and with the surplus all chance of any considerable
reduction of the debt for that time. In truth, taxation is so painful that in
a sensitive community which has strong organs of expression and ac-
tion, the maintenance of a great surplus is excessively difficult. The
opposition will always say that it is unnecessary, is uncalled for, is inju-
dicious; the cry will be echoed in every constituency; there will be a
series of large meetings in the great cities; even in the smaller constitu-
encies there will mostly be smaller meetings; every member of Parlia-
ment will be pressed upon by those who elect him; upon this point there
will be no distinction between town and country, the country gentleman
and the farmer disliking high taxes as much as any in the towns. To
maintain a great surplus by heavy taxes to pay off debt has never yet in
this country been possible, and to maintain a surplus of the American
magnitude would be plainly impossible.
Some part of the difference between England and America arises
undoubtedly not from political causes, but from economical. America is
not a country sensitive to taxes; no great country has perhaps ever been
so unsensitive in this respect; certainly she is far less sensitive than
England. In reality America is too rich, daily industry there is too com-
mon, too skilful, and too productive, for her to care much for fiscal
burdens. She is applying all the resources of science and skill and trained
labour, which have been in long ages painfully acquired in old coun-
tries, to develop with great speed the richest soil and the richest mines of
new countries; and the result is untold wealth. Even under a Parliamen-
tary Government such a community could and would bear taxation much
more easily than Englishmen ever would.
But difference of physical character in this respect is of little mo-
ment in comparison with difference of political constitution. If America
was under a Parliamentary Government, she would soon be convinced
that in maintaining this great surplus and in paying this high taxation
she would be doing herself great harm. She is not performing a great
duty, but perpetrating a great injustice. She is injuring posterity by crip-
pling and displacing industry, far more than she is aiding it by reducing
the taxes it will have to pay. In the first place, the maintenance of the
present high taxation compels the retention of many taxes which are
contrary to the maxims of free-trade. Enormous customs duties are nec-
essary, and it would be all but impossible to impose equal excise duties
even if the Americans desired it. In consequence, besides what the Ameri-
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their own citizens, and so are rearing a set of industries which never
ought to have existed, which are bad speculations at present because
other industries would have paid better, and which may cause a great
loss out of pocket hereafter when the debt is paid off and the fostering
tax withdrawn. Then probably industry will return to its natural chan-
nel, the artificial trade will be first depressed, then discontinued, and the
fixed capital employed in the trade will all be depreciated and much of it
be worthless. Secondly, all taxes on trade and manufacture are injurious
in various ways to them. You cannot put on a great series of such duties
without cramping trade in a hundred ways and without diminishing their
productiveness exceedingly. America is now working in heavy fetters,
and it would probably be better for her to lighten those fetters even
though a generation or two should have to pay rather higher taxes. Those
generations would really benefit, because they would be so much richer
that the slightly increased cost of government would never be perceived.
At any rate, under a Parliamentary Government this doctrine would
have been incessantly inculcated; a whole party would have made it
their business to preach it, would have made incessant small motions in
Parliament about it, which is the way to popularize their view. And in
the end I do not doubt that they would have prevailed. They would have
had to teach a lesson both pleasant and true, and such lessons are soon
learned. On the whole, therefore, the result of comparison is that a Presi-
dential Government makes it much easier than the Parliamentary to
maintain a great-surplus of income over expenditure, but that it does not
give the same facility for examining whether it is good or not good to
maintain a surplus; and, therefore, that it works blindly, maintaining
surpluses when they do extreme harm just as much as when they are
very beneficial.
In this point the contrast of Presidential with Parliamentary Gov-
ernment is mixed; one of the defects of Parliamentary Government prob-
ably is the difficulty under it of maintaining a surplus revenue to dis-
charge debt, and this defect Presidential Government escapes, though at
the cost of being likely to maintain that surplus upon inexpedient occa-
sions as well upon expedient. But in all other respects a Parliamentary
Government has in finance an unmixed advantage over the Presidential
in the incessant discussion. Though in one single case it produces evil as
well as good, in most cases it produces good only. And three of these
cases are illustrated by recent American experience.
First, as Mr. Goldwin Smith — no unfavourable judge of any thing38/Walter Bagehot
American — justly said some years since, the capital error made by the
United States Government was the “Legal Tender Act,” as it is called,
by which it made inconvertible paper notes issued by the Treasury the
sole circulating medium of the country. The temptation to do this was
very great, because it gave at once a great war fund when it was needed,
and with no pain to any one. If the notes of a Government supersede the
metallic currency medium of a country to the extent of $80,000,000,
this is equivalent to a recent loan of $80,000,000 to the Government for
all purposes within the country. Whenever the precious metals are not
required, and for domestic purposes in such a case they are not required,
notes will buy what the Government want, and it can buy to the extent
of its issue. But, like all easy expedients out of a great difficulty, it is
accompanied by the greatest evils; if it had not been so, it would have
been the regular device in such cases, and the difficulty would have
been no difficulty at all; there would have been a known easy way out of
it. As is well known, inconvertible paper issued by Government is sure
to be issued in great quantities, as the American currency soon was; it is
sure to be depreciated as against coin; it is sure to disturb values and to
derange markets; it is certain to defraud the lender; it is certain to give
the borrower more than he ought to have. In the case of America there
was a further evil. Being a new country, she ought in her times of finan-
cial want to borrow of old countries; but the old countries were fright-
ened by the probable issue of unlimited inconvertible paper, and they
would not lend a shilling. Much more than the mercantile credit of
America was thus lost. The great commercial houses in England are the
most natural and most effectual conveyers of intelligence from other
countries to Europe. If they had been financially interested in giving in
a sound report as to the progress of the war, a sound report we should
have had. But as the Northern States raised no loans in Lombard Street
(and could raise none because of their vicious paper money), Lombard
Street did not care about them, and England was very imperfectly in-
formed of the progress of the civil struggle, and on the whole matter,
which was then new and very complex, England had to judge without
having her usual materials for judgment, and (since the guidance of the
“city” on political matters is very quietly and imperceptibly given) with-
out knowing she had not those materials.
Of course, this error might have been committed, and perhaps would
have been committed, under a Parliamentary Government. But if it had,
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tually frustrated. The whole force of the greatest inquiring machine and
the greatest discussing machine which the world has ever known would
have been directed to this subject. In a year or two the American public
would have had it forced upon them in every form till they must have
comprehended it. But under the Presidential form of Government, and
owing to the inferior power of generating discussion, the information
given to the American people has been imperfect in the extreme. And in
consequence, after nearly ten years of painful experience, they do not
now understand how much they have suffered from their inconvertible
currency.
But the mode in which the Presidential Government of America
managed its taxation during the Civil War is even a more striking ex-
ample of its defects. Mr. Wells tells us:
“In the outset all direct or internal taxation was avoided, there hav-
ing been apparently an apprehension on the part of Congress, that inas-
much as the people had never been accustomed to it, and as all machin-
ery for assessment and collection was wholly wanting, its adoption would
create discontent, and thereby interfere with a vigorous prosecution of
hostilities. Congress, therefore, confined itself at first to the enactment
of measures looking to an increase of revenue from the increase of indi-
rect taxes upon imports; and it was not until four months after the actual
outbreak of hostilities that a direct tax of $20,000,000 per annum was
apportioned among the States, and an income tax of 3 per cent on the
excess of all incomes over $800 was provided for; the first being made
to take effect practically eight, and the second ten months after date of
enactment. Such laws, of course, took effect and became immediately
operative in the loyal States only, and produced but comparatively little
revenue; and although the range of taxation was soon extended, the
whole receipts from all sources by the Government for the second year
of the war, from excise, income, stamp, and all other internal taxes,
were less than $42,000,000; and that, too, at a time when the expendi-
tures were in excess $60,000,000 per month, or at the rate of over
$700,000,000 per annum. And as showing how novel was this whole
subject of direct and internal taxation to the people, and how completely
the government officials were lacking in all experience in respect to it,
the following incident may be noted. The Secretary of the Treasury, in
his report for 1863, stated that, with a view of determining his resources,
he employed a very competent person, with the aid of practical men, to
estimate the probable amount of revenue to be derived from each de-40/Walter Bagehot
partment of internal taxation for the previous year. The estimate arrived
at was $85,000,000, but the actual receipts were only $37,000,000.”
Now, no doubt, this might have happened under a Parliamentary
Government. But, then, many members of Parliament, the entire oppo-
sition in Parliament, would have been active to unravel the matter. All
the principles of finance would have been worked and propounded. The
light would have come from above, not from below-it would have come
from Parliament to the nation instead of from the nation to Parliament.
But exactly the reverse happened in America. Mr. Wells goes on to say:
“The people of the loyal States were, however, more determined
and in earnest in respect to this matter of taxation than were their rulers;
and before long the popular discontent at the existing state of things was
openly manifest. Everywhere the opinion was expressed that taxation in
all possible forms should immediately, and to the largest extent, be made
effective and imperative; and Congress spurred up, and rightfully rely-
ing on public sentiment to sustain their action, at last took up the matter
resolutely and in earnest, and devised and inaugurated t system of inter-
nal and direct taxation, which for its universality and peculiarities has
probably no parallel in any thing which has heretofore been recorded in
civil history, or is likely to be experienced hereafter. The one necessity
of the situation was revenue, and to obtain it speedily and in large amounts
through taxation the only principle recognized  if it can be called a
principle — was akin to that recommended to the traditionary Irishman
on his visit to Donnybrook Fair, ‘Wherever you see a head hit it.’ Wher-
ever you find an article, a product, a trade, a profession, or a source of
income, tax it! And so an edict went forth to this effect, and the people
cheerfully submitted. Incomes under $5,000 were taxed 5 per cent, with
an exemption of $600 and house rent actually paid; these exemptions
being allowed on this ground, that they represented an amount sufficient
at the time to enable a small family to procure the bare necessaries of
life, and thus take out from the operation of the law all those who were
dependent upon each day’s earnings to supply each day’s needs. In-
comes in excess of $5,000 and not in excess of $10,000 were taxed 2½
per cent in addition; and incomes over $10,000 5 per cent additional,
without any abeyance or exemptions whatever.”
Now this is all contrary to and worse than what would have hap-
pened under a Parliamentary Government. The delay to tax would not
have occurred under it: the movement by the country to get taxation
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cordingly imposed would not have been permitted under it. The last
point I think I need not labour at length. The evils of a bad tax are quite
sure to be pressed upon the ears of Parliament in season and out of
season: the few persons who have to pay it are thoroughly certain to
make themselves heard. The sort of taxation tried in America, that of
taxing every thing, and seeing what every thing would yield, could not
have been tried under a Government delicately and quickly sensitive to
public opinion.
I do not apologize for dwelling at length upon these points, for the
subject is one of transcendent importance. The practical choice of first-
rate nations is between the Presidential Government and the Parliamen-
tary; no State can be first-rate which has not a Government by discus-
sion, and those are the only two existing species of that Government. It
is between them that a nation which has to choose its Government must
choose. And nothing therefore can be more important than to compare
the two, and to decide upon the testimony of experience, and by facts,
which of them is the better.
The Poplars,
Wimbledon
June 20, 1872.I. The Cabinet.
“On all great subjects,” says Mr. Mill, “much remains to be said,” and
of none is this more true than of the English Constitution. The literature
which has accumulated upon it is huge. But an observer who looks at
the living reality will wonder at the contrast to the paper description. He
will see in the life much which is not in the books; and he will not find in
the rough practice many refinements of the literary theory.
It was natural — perhaps inevitable — that such an under-growth
of irrelevant ideas should gather round the British Constitution. Lan-
guage is the tradition of nations; each generation describes what it sees,
but it uses words transmitted from the past. When a great entity like the
British Constitution has continued in connected outward sameness, but
hidden inner change, for many ages, every generation inherits a series of
inapt words —of maxims once true, but of which the truth is ceasing or
has ceased. As a man’s family go on muttering in his maturity incorrect
phrases derived from a just observation of his early youth, so, in the full
activity of an historical constitution, its subjects repeat phrases true in
the time of their fathers, and inculcated by those fathers, but now true
no longer. Or, if I may say so, an ancient and ever-altering constitution
is like an old man who still wears with attached fondness clothes in the
fashion of his youth: what you see of him is the same; what you do not
see is wholly altered.
There are two descriptions of the English Constitution which have
exercised immense influence, but which are erroneous. First, it is laid
down as a principle of the English polity, that in it the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial powers, are quite divided — that each is
intrusted to a separate person or set of persons — that no one of these
can at all interfere with the work of the other. There has been much
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eloquence expended in explaining how the rough genius of the English
people, even in the middle ages, when it was especially rude, carried
into life and practice that elaborate division of functions which philoso-
phers had suggested on paper, but which they had hardly hoped to see
except on paper.
Secondly, it is insisted that the peculiar excellence of the British
Constitution lies in a balanced union of three powers. It is said that the
monarchical element, the aristocratic element, and the democratic ele-
ment, have each a share in the supreme sovereignty, and that the assent
of all three is necessary to the action of that sovereignty. Kings, lords,
and commons, by this theory, are alleged to be not only the outward
form, but the inner moving essence, the vitality of the constitution. A
great theory, called the theory of “Checks and Balances,” pervades an
immense part of political literature, and much of it is collected from or
supported by English experience. Monarchy, it is said, has some faults,
some bad tendencies, aristocracy others, democracy, again, others; but
England has shown that a government can be constructed in which these
evil tendencies exactly check, balance, and destroy one another — in
which a good whole is constructed not simply in spite of, but by means
of, the counteracting defects of the constituent parts.
Accordingly, it is believed that the principal characteristics of the
English Constitution are inapplicable in countries where the materials
for a monarchy or an aristocracy do not exist. That constitution is con-
ceived to be the best imaginable use of the political elements which the
great majority of States in modern Europe inherited from the mediaeval
period. It is believed that out of these materials nothing better can be
made than the English Constitution; but it is also believed that the es-
sential parts of the English Constitution cannot be made except from
these materials. Now these elements are the accidents of a period and a.
region; they belong only to one or two centuries in human history, and to
a few countries. The United States could not have become monarchical,
even if the Constitutional Convention had decreed it, even if the compo-
nent States had ratified it. The mystic reverence, the religious allegiance,
which are essential to a true monarchy, are imaginative sentiments that
no legislature can manufacture in any people. These semi-filial feelings
in government are inherited just as the true filial feelings in common
life. You might as well adopt a father as make a monarchy; the special
sentiment belonging to the one is as incapable of voluntary creation as
the peculiar affection belonging to the other. If the practical part of the44/Walter Bagehot
English Constitution could only be made out of a curious accumulation
of medieval materials, its interest would be half historical and its
imitability very confined.
No one can approach to an understanding of the English institu-
tions, or of others which, being the growth of many centuries, exercise a
wide sway over mixed populations, unless he divide them into two classes.
In such constitutions there are two parts (not indeed separable with mi-
croscopic accuracy, for the genius of great affairs abhors nicety of divi-
sion) first, those which excite and preserve the reverence of the popula-
tion — the dignified parts, if I may so call them; and next, the efficient
parts — those by which it, in fact, works and rules. There are two great
objects which every constitution must attain to be successful, which
every old and celebrated one must have wonderfully achieved every con-
stitution must first gain authority, and then use authority, it must first
win the loyalty and confidence of mankind, and there employ that hom-
age in the work of government.
There are indeed practical men who reject the dignified parts of
government. They say, we want only to attain results, to do business: a
constitution is a collection of political means for political ends, and if
you admit that any part of a constitution does no business, or that a
simpler machine would do equally well what it does, you admit that this
part of the constitution, however dignified or awful it may be, is never-
theless in truth useless. And other reasoners, who distrust this bare phi-
losophy, have propounded subtle arguments to prove that these digni-
fied parts of old governments are cardinal components of the essential
apparatus, great pivots of substantial utility; and so they manufactured
fallacies which the plainer school have well exposed. But both schools
are in error. The dignified parts of government are those which bring it
force which attract its motive power. The efficient parts only employ
that power. The comely parts of a government have need, for they are
those upon which its vital strength depends. They may not do any thing
definite that a simpler polity would not do better; but they are the pre-
liminaries, the needful prerequisites of all work. They raise the army,
though they do not win the battle.
Doubtless, if all subjects of the same government only thought of
what was useful to them, and if they all thought the same thing useful,
and all thought that same thing could be attained in the same way, the
efficient members of a constitution would suffice, and no impressive
adjuncts would be needed. But the world in which we live is organizedThe English Constitution/45
far otherwise.
The most strange fact, though the most certain in nature, is the
unequal development of the human race. If we look back to the early
ages of mankind, such as we seem in the faint distance to see them — if
we call up the image of those dismal tribes in lake villages, or on wretched
beaches-scarcely equal to the commonest material needs, cutting down
trees slowly and painfully with stone tools, hardly resisting the attacks
of huge, fierce animals — without culture, without leisure, without po-
etry, almost without thought — destitute of morality, with only a sort of
magic for religion; and if we compare that imagined life with the actual
life of Europe now, we are overwhelmed at the wide contrast — we can
scarcely conceive ourselves to be of the same race as those in the far
distance. There used to be a notion — not so much widely asserted as
deeply implanted, rather pervadingly latent than commonly apparent in
political philosophy — that in a little while, perhaps ten years or so, all
human beings might, without extraordinary appliances, be brought to
the same level. But now, when we see by the painful history of mankind
at what point we began, by what slow toil, what favourable circum-
stances, what accumulated achievements, civilized man has become at
all worthy in any degree so to call himself — when we realize the tedium
of history and the painfulness of results — our perceptions are sharp-
ened as to the relative steps of our long and gradual progress. We have
in a great community like England crowds of people scarcely more civi-
lized than the majority of two thousand years ago; we have others, even
more numerous, such as the best people were a thousand years since.
The lower orders, the middle orders, are still, when tried by what is the
standard of the educated “ten thousand,” narrow-minded, unintelligent,
incurious. It is useless to pile up abstract words. Those who doubt should
go out into their kitchens. Let an accomplished man try what seems to
him most obvious, most certain, most palpable in intellectual matters,
upon the housemaid and the footman, and he will find that what he says
seems unintelligible, confused, and erroneous — that his audience think
him mad and wild when he is speaking what is in his own sphere of
thought the dullest platitude of cautious soberness. Great communities
are like great mountains — they have in them the primary, secondary,
and tertiary strata of human progress; the characteristics of the lower
regions resemble the life of old times rather than the present life of the
higher regions. And a philosophy which does not ceaselessly remember,
which does not continually obtrude, the palpable differences of the vari-46/Walter Bagehot
ous parts, will be a theory radically, false, because it has omitted a
capital reality — will be a theory essentially misleading, because it will
lead men to expect what does not exist, and not to anticipate that which
they will find.
Every one knows these plain facts, but by no means every one has
traced their political importance. When a state is constituted thus, it is
not true that the lower classes will be wholly absorbed in the useful; on
the contrary, they do not like any thing so poor. No orator ever made an
impression by appealing to men as to their plainest physical wants, ex-
cept when he could allege that those wants were caused by, some one’s
tyranny. But thousands have made the greatest impression by appealing
to some vague dream of glory, or empire, or nationality. The ruder sort
of men — that is, men at one stage of rudeness — will sacrifice all they
hope for, all they have, themselves, for what is called an idea — for
some attraction which seems to transcend reality, which aspires to el-
evate men by an interest higher, deeper, wider than that of ordinary life.
But this order of men are uninterested in the plain, palpable ends of
government; they do not prize them; they do not in the least comprehend
how they should be attained. It is very natural, therefore, that the most
useful parts of the structure of government should by no means be those
which excite the most reverence. The elements which excite the most
easy reverence will be the theatrical elements — those which appeal to
the senses, which claim to be embodiments of the greatest human ideas,
which boast in some cases of far more than human origin. That which is
mystic in its claims; that which is occult in its mode of action; that
which is brilliant to the eye; that which is seen vividly for a moment, and
then is seen no more; that which is hidden and unhidden; that which is
specious, and yet interesting, palpable in its seeming, and yet professing
to be more than palpable in its results; this, howsoever its form may
change, or however we may define it or describe it, is the sort of thing
— the only sort — which yet comes home to the mass of men. So far
from the dignified parts of a constitution being necessarily the most
useful, they are likely, according to outside presumption, to be the least
so; for they are likely to be adjusted to the lowest orders — those likely
to care least and judge worst about what is useful.
There is another reason which, in an old constitution like that of
England, is hardly less important. The most intellectual of men are moved
quite as much by the circumstances which they are used to as by their
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not economized by a sleepy kind of habit, its results would be null. We
could not do every day out of our own heads all we have to do. We
should accomplish nothing, for all our energies would be frittered away
in minor attempts at petty improvement. One man, too, would go off
from the known track in one direction, and one in another; so that when
a crisis came requiring massed combination, no two men would be near
enough to act together. It is the dull traditional habit of mankind that
guides most men’s actions, and is the steady frame in which each new
artist must set the picture that he paints. And all this traditional part of
human nature is, ex vi termini, most easily impressed and acted on by
that which is handed down. Other things being equal, yesterday’s insti-
tutions are by far the best for to-day; they are the most ready, the most
influential, the most easy to get obeyed, the most likely to retain the
reverence which they alone inherit, and which every other must win.
The most imposing institutions of mankind are the oldest; and yet so
changing is the world, so fluctuating are its needs, so apt to lose inward
force, though retaining outward strength, are its best instruments, that
we must not expect the oldest institutions to be now the most efficient.
We must expect what is venerable to acquire influence because of its
inherent dignity; but we must not expect it to use that influence so well
as new creations apt for the modern world, instinct with its spirit, and
fitting closely to its life.
The brief description of the characteristic merit of the English Con-
stitution is that its dignified parts are very complicated and somewhat
imposing, very old and rather venerable; while its efficient part, at least
when in great and critical action, is decidedly simple and rather modern.
We have made, or rather stumbled on, a constitution which — though
full of every species of incidental defect, though of the worst workman-
ship in all out-of-the-way matters of any constitution in the world- yet
has two capital merits: it contains a simple efficient part which, on oc-
casion, and when wanted, can work more simply and easily, and better,
than any instrument of government that has yet been tried; and it con-
tains likewise historical, complex, august, theatrical parts, which it has
inherited from a long past — which take the multitude which guide by
an insensible but an omnipotent influence the associations of its sub-
jects. Its essence is strong with the strength of modern simplicity; its
exterior is august with the Gothic grandeur of a more imposing age. Its
simple essence may, mutatis mutandis, be transplanted to many very
various countries, but its august outside — what most men think it is —48/Walter Bagehot
is narrowly confined to nations with an analogous history and similar
political materials.
The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as
the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legisla-
tive powers. No doubt by the traditional theory, as it exists in all the
books, the goodness of our constitution consists in the entire separation
of the legislative and executive authorities, but in truth its merit consists
in their singular approximation. The connecting link is the cabinet. By
that new word we mean a committee of the legislative body selected to
be the executive body. The legislature has many committees, but this is
its greatest. It chooses for this, its main committee, the men in whom it
has most confidence. It does not, it is true, choose them directly; but it is
nearly omnipotent in choosing them indirectly. A century ago the Crown
had a real choice of ministers, though it had no longer a choice in policy.
During the long reign of Sir R. Walpole he was obliged not only to
manage parliament, but to manage the palace. He was obliged to take
care that some court intrigue did not expel him from his place. The
nation then selected the English policy, but the Crown chose the English
ministers. They were not only in name, as now, but in fact, the Queen’s
servants. Remnants, important remnants, of this great prerogative still
remain. The discriminating favour of William IV. made Lord Melbourne
head of the Whig party when he was only one of several rivals. At the
death of Lord Palmerston it is very likely that the Queen may have the
opportunity of freely choosing between two, if not three statesmen. But,
as a rule, the nominal prime minister is chosen by the legislature, and
the real prime minister for most purposes — the leader of the House of
Commons — almost without exception is so. There is nearly always
some one man plainly selected by the voice of the predominant party in
the predominant house of the legislature to head that party, and conse-
quently to rule the nation. We have in England an elective first magis-
trate as truly as the Americans have an elective first magistrate. The
Queen is only at the head of the dignified part of the constitution. The
prime minister is at the head of the efficient part. The Crown is accord-
ing to the saying, the “fountain of honour;” but the Treasury is the spring
of business. Nevertheless, our first magistrate differs from the Ameri-
can. He is not elected directly by the people; he is elected by the repre-
sentatives of the people. He is an example of “double election.” The
legislature chosen, in name, to make laws, in fact finds its principal
business in making and in keeping an executive.The English Constitution/49
The leading minister so selected has to choose his associates, but he
only chooses among a charmed circle. The position of most men in par-
liament forbids their being invited to the cabinet; the position of a few
men insures their being invited. Between the compulsory list whom he
must take, and the impossible list whom he cannot take, a prime minister’s
independent choice in the formation of a cabinet is not very large; it
extends rather to the division of the cabinet offices than to the choice of
cabinet ministers. Parliament and the nation have pretty well settled
who shall have the first places; but they have not discriminated with the
same accuracy which man shall have which place. The highest patron-
age of a prime minister is, of course, a considerable power, though it is
exercised under close and imperative restrictions — though it is far less
than it seems to be when stated in theory, or looked at from a distance.
The cabinet, in a word, is a board of control chosen by the legisla-
ture, out of persons whom trusts and knows, to rule the nation. The
particular mode in which the English ministers are selected; the fiction
that they are, in any political sense, the Queen’s servants; the rule which
limits the choice of the cabinet to the members of the legislature — are
accidents unessential to its definition — historical incidents separable
from its nature. Its characteristic is that it should be chosen by the leg-
islature out of persons agreeable to and trusted by the legislature. Natu-
rally these are principally its own members, but they need not be exclu-
sively so. A cabinet which included persons not members of the legisla-
tive assembly might still perform all useful duties. Indeed the Peers,
who constitute a large element in modern cabinets, are members, now-
a-days, only of a subordinate assembly. The House of Lords still exer-
cises several useful functions; but the ruling influence — the deciding
faculty — has passed to what, using the language of old times, we still
call the lower house — to an assembly which, though inferior as a dig-
nified institution, is superior as an efficient institution. A principal ad-
vantage of the House of Lords in the present age indeed consists in its
thus acting as a reservoir of cabinet ministers. Unless the composition
of the House of Commons were improved, or unless the rules requiring
cabinet ministers to be members of the legislature were relaxed, it would
undoubtedly be difficult to find, without the Lords, a sufficient supply
of chief ministers. But the detail of the composition of a cabinet, and the
precise method of its choice, are not to the purpose now. The first and
cardinal consideration is the definition of a cabinet. We must not bewil-
der ourselves with the inseparable accidents until we know the neces-50/Walter Bagehot
sary essence. A cabinet is a combining committee — a hyphen which
joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the
executive part of the state. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its func-
tions it belongs to the other.
The most curious point about the cabinet is that so very little is
known about it. The meetings are not only secret in theory, but secret in
reality. By the present practice, no official minute in all ordinary cases
is kept of them. Even a private note is discouraged and disliked. The
House of Commons, even in its most inquisitive and turbulent moments,
would scarcely permit a note of a cabinet meeting to be read. No minis-
ter who respected the fundamental usages of political practice would
attempt to read such a note. The committee which unites the lawmaking
power to the law-executing power — which, by virtue of that combina-
tion, is, while it lasts and holds together, the most powerful body in the
state — is a committee wholly secret. No description of. it, at once
graphic and authentic, has ever been given. It is said to be sometimes
like a rather disorderly board of directors, where many speak and few
listen — though no one knows.1
But a cabinet, though it is a committee of the legislative assembly,
is a committee with a power which no assembly would — unless for
historical accidents, and after happy experience — have been persuaded
to intrust to any committee. It is a committee which can dissolve the
assembly which appointed it; it is a committee with a suspensive veto a
committee with a power of appeal. Though appointed by one parlia-
ment, it can appeal if it chooses to the next. Theoretically, indeed, the
power to dissolve parliament is intrusted to the sovereign only; and there
are vestiges of doubt whether in all cases a sovereign is bound to dis-
solve parliament when the cabinet asks him to do so. But, neglecting
such small and dubious exceptions, the cabinet which was chosen by
one House of Commons has an appeal to the next House of Commons.
The chief committee of the legislature has the power of dissolving the
predominant part of that legislature — that which at a crisis is the su-
preme legislature. The English system, therefore, is not an absorption of
the executive power by the legislative power; it is a fusion of the two.
Either the cabinet legislates and acts, or else it can dissolve. It is a
creature, but it has the power of destroying its creators. It is an execu-
tive which can annihilate the legislature, as well as an executive which
is the nominee of the legislature. It was made, but it can unmake; it was
derivative in its origin, but it is destructive in its action.The English Constitution/51
This fusion of the legislative and executive functions may, to those
who have not much considered it, seem but a dry and small matter to be
the latent essence and effectual secret of the English Constitution; but
we can only judge of its real importance by looking at a few of its
principal effects, and contrasting it very shortly with its great competi-
tor, which seems likely, unless care be taken, to outstrip it in the progress
of the world. That competitor is the Presidential system. The character-
istic of it is that the President is elected from the people by one process,
and the House of Representatives by another. The independence of the
legislative and executive powers is the specific quality of Presidential
Government, just as their fusion and combination is the precise prin-
ciple of Cabinet Government.
First, compare the two in quiet times. The essence of a civilized age
is, that administration requires the continued aid of legislation. One prin-
cipal and necessary kind of legislation is taxation. The expense of civi-
lized government is continually varying. It must vary if the government
does its duty. The miscellaneous estimates of the English Government
contain an inevitable medley of changing items. Education, prison dis-
cipline, art, science, civil contingencies of a hundred kinds, require more
money one year and less another. The expense of defence — the naval
and military estimates — vary still more as the danger of attack seems
more or less imminent, as the means of retarding such danger become
more or less costly. If the persons who have to do the work are not the
same as those who have to make the laws, there will be a controversy
between the two sets of persons. The tax-imposers are sure to quarrel
with the tax requirers. The executive is crippled by not getting the laws
it needs, and the legislature is spoiled by having to act without responsi-
bility: the executive becomes unfit for its name since it cannot execute
what it decides on; the legislature is demoralized by liberty, by taking
decisions of which others (and not itself) will suffer the effects.
In America so much has this difficulty been felt that a semi-connec-
tion has grown up between the legislature and the executive. When the
Secretary of the Treasury of the Federal Government wants a tax he
consults upon it with the Chairman of the Financial Committee of Con-
gress. He cannot go down to Congress himself and propose what he
wants; he can only write a letter and send it. But he tries to get a chair-
man of the Finance Committee who likes his tax; — through that chair-
man he tries to persuade the committee to recommend such tax; by that
committee he tries to induce the house to adopt that tax. But such a52/Walter Bagehot
chain of communications is liable to continual interruptions; it may suf-
fice for a single tax on a fortunate occasion, but will scarcely pass a
complicated budget — we do not say in a war or a rebellion — we are
now comparing the cabinet system and the presidential system in quiet
times — but in times of financial difficulty. Two clever men never ex-
actly agreed about a budget. We have by present practice an Indian
Chancellor of the Exchequer talking English finance at Calcutta, and an
English one talking Indian finance in England. But the figures are never
the same, and the views of policy are rarely the same. One most angry
controversy has amused the world, and probably others scarcely less
interesting are hidden in the copious stores of our Anglo-Indian corre-
spondence. But relations something like these must subsist between the
head of a finance committee in the legislature, and a finance committee
in the executive.2 They are sure to quarrel, and the result is sure to
satisfy neither. And when the taxes do not yield as they were expected to
yield, who is responsible? Very likely the secretary of the treasury could
not persuade the chairman — very likely the chairman could not per-
suade his committee — very likely the committee could not persuade the
assembly. Whom, then, can you punish- whom can you abolish when
your taxes run short? There is nobody save the legislature, a vast mis-
cellaneous body difficult to punish, and the very persons to inflict the
punishment.
Nor is the financial part of administration the only one which re-
quires in a civilized age the constant support and accompaniment of
facilitating legislation. All administration does so. In England, on a vi-
tal occasion, the cabinet can compel legislation by: the threat of resigna-
tion, and the threat of dissolution; but neither of these can be used in a
presidential state. There the legislature cannot be dissolved by the ex-
ecutive government; and it does not heed a resignation, for it has not to
find the successor. Accordingly, when a difference of opinion arises, the
legislature is forced to fight the executive, and the executive is forced to
fight the legislative; and so very likely they contend to the conclusion of
their respective terms.3 There is, indeed, one condition of things in which
this description, though still approximately true, is, nevertheless, not
exactly true; and that is, when there is nothing to fight about. Before the
rebellion in America, owing to the vast distance of other states, and the
favourable economical condition of the country, there were very few
considerable objects of contention; but if that government had been tried
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of the two powers, whose constant co-operation is essential to the best
government, would have shown itself much more distinctly.
Nor is this the worst. Cabinet government educates the nation; the
presidential does not educate it, and may corrupt it. It has been said that
England invented the phrase, “Her Majesty’s Opposition;” that it was
the first government which made a criticism of administration as much
a part of the polity as administration itself, This critical opposition is
the consequence of cabinet government. The great scene of debate, the
great engine of popular instruction and political controversy, is the leg-
islative assembly. A speech there by an eminent statesman, a party move-
ment by a great political combination, are the best means yet known for
arousing, enlivening, and teaching a people. The cabinet system insures
such debates, for it makes them the means by which statesmen advertise
themselves for future and confirm themselves in present governments. It
brings forward men eager to speak, and gives them occasions to speak.
The deciding catastrophes of cabinet governments are critical divisions
preceded by fine discussions. Every thing which is worth saying, every
thing which ought to be said, most certainly will be said. Conscientious
men think they ought to persuade others; selfish men think they would
like to obtrude themselves. The nation is forced to hear two sides — all
the sides, perhaps, of that which most concerns it. And it likes to hear
— it is eager to know. Human nature despises long arguments which
come to nothing — heavy speeches which precede no motion — ab-
stract disquisitions which leave visible things where they were. But all
men heed great results, and a change of government is a great result. It
has a hundred ramifications; it runs through society; it gives hope to
many, and it takes away hope from many. It is one of those marked
events which, by its magnitude and its melodrama, impress men even
too much. And debates which have this catastrophe at the end of them
—or may so have it — are sure to be listened to, and sure to sink deep
into the national mind.
Travellers even in the Northern States of America, the greatest and
best of presidential countries, have noticed that the nation was “not
specially addicted to politics;” that they have not a public opinion fin-
ished and chastened as that of the English has been finished and chas-
tened. A great many hasty writers have charged this defect on the “Yan-
kee race,” on the Anglo-American character; but English people, if they
had no motive to attend to politics, certainly would not attend to poli-
tics. At present there is business in their attention. They assist at the54/Walter Bagehot
determining crisis; they assist or help it. Whether the government will
go out or remain is determined by the debate, and by the division in
parliament. And the opinion out of doors, the secret pervading disposi-
tion of society, has a great influence on that division. The nation feels
that its judgment is important, and it strives to judge. It succeeds in
deciding because the debates and the discussions give it the facts and the
arguments. But under a presidential government a nation has, except at
the electing moment, no influence; it has not the ballot box before it; its
virtue is gone, and it must wait till its instant of despotism again returns.
It is not incited to form an opinion like a nation under a cabinet govern-
ment; nor is it instructed like such a nation. There are doubtless debates
in the legislature, but they are prologues without a play. There is noth-
ing of a catastrophe about them; you cannot turn out the government.
The prize of power is not in the gift of the legislature, and no one cares
for the legislature. The executive, the great centre of power and place,
sticks irremovable; you cannot change it in any event. The teaching
apparatus which has educated our public mind, which prepares our reso-
lutions, which shapes our opinions, does not exist. No presidential country
needs to form daily, delicate opinions, or is helped in forming them.
It might be thought that the discussions in the press would supply
the deficiencies in the constitution; that by a reading people especially,
the conduct of their government would be as carefully watched, that
their opinions about it would be as consistent, as accurate, as well con-
sidered, under a presidential as under a cabinet polity. But the same
difficulty oppresses the press which oppresses the legislature. It can do
nothing. It cannot change the administration; the executive was elected
for such and such years, and for such and such years it must last. People
wonder that so literary a people as the Americans — a people who read
more than any people who ever lived, who read so many newspapers
should have such bad newspapers. The papers are not so good as the
English, because they have not the same motive to be good as the En-
glish papers. At a political “crisis,” as we say — that is, when the fate
of an administration is unfixed, when it depends on a few votes, yet
unsettled, upon a wavering and veering opinion — effective articles in
great journals become of essential moment. The Times has made many
ministries. When, as of late, there has been a long continuance of di-
vided parliaments, of governments which were without “brute voting
power,” and which depended on intellectual strength, the support of the
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a Washington newspaper could have turned out Mr. Lincoln, there would
have been good writing and fine argument in the Washington newspa-
pers. But the Washington newspapers can no more remove a president
during his term of place than the Times can remove a lord mayor during
his year of office. Nobody cares for a debate in Congress which “comes
to nothing,” and no one reads long articles which have no influence on
events. The Americans glance at the heads of news, and through the
paper. They do not enter upon a discussion. They do not think of enter-
ing upon a discussion which would be useless.
After saying that the division of the legislature and the executive in
presidential governments weakens the legislative power, it may seem a
contradiction to say that it also weakens the executive power. But it is
not a contradiction. The division weakens the whole aggregate force of
government — the entire imperial power; and therefore it weakens both
its halves. The executive is weakened in a very plain way, In England a
strong cabinet can obtain the concurrence of the legislature in all acts
which facilitate its administration; it is itself, so to say, the legislature.
But a president may be hampered by the parliament, and is likely to be
hampered. The natural tendency of the members of every legislature is
to make themselves conspicuous. They wish to gratify an ambition laud-
able or blamable; they wish to promote the measures they think best for
the public welfare; they wish to make their will felt in great affairs. All
these mixed motives urge them to oppose the executive. They are em-
bodying the purposes of others if they aid; they are advancing their own
opinions if they defeat: they are first if they vanquish; they are auxilia-
ries if they support.
The weakness of the American executive used to be the great theme
of all critics before the Confederate rebellion. Congress and committees
of Congress of course impeded the executive when there was no coer-
cive public sentiment to check and rule them. But the presidential sys-
tem not only gives the executive power an antagonist in the legislative
power, and so makes it weaker; it also enfeebles it by impairing its
intrinsic quality. A cabinet is elected by a legislature; and when that
legislature is composed of fit persons, that mode of electing the execu-
tive is the very best. It is a case of secondary election, under the only
conditions in which secondary election is preferable to primary. Gener-
ally speaking, in an electioneering country (I mean in a country full of
political life, and used to the manipulation of popular institutions), the
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lege of America is so. It was intended that the deputies when assembled
should exercise a real discretion, and by independent choice select the
president. But the primary electors take too much interest. They only
elect a deputy to vote for Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Breckinridge, and the
deputy only takes a ticket, and drops that ticket in an urn. He never
chooses or thinks of choosing. He is but a messenger — a transmitter:
the real decision is in those who chose him — who chose him because
they knew what he would do.
It is true that the British House of Commons is subject to the same
influences. Members are mostly, perhaps, elected because they will vote
for a particular ministry, rather than for purely legislative reasons. But
— and here is the capital distinction — the functions of the House of
Commons are important and continuous. It does not, like the Electoral
College in the United States, separate when it has elected its ruler; it
watches, legislates, seats and unseats ministries, from day to day. Ac-
cordingly it is a real electoral body. The parliament of 1857, which,
more than any other parliament of late years, was a parliament elected
to support a particular premier — which was chosen, as Americans
might say, upon the “Palmerston ticket” — before it had been in exist-
ence two years, dethroned Lord Palmerston. Though selected in the in-
terest of a particular ministry, it in fact destroyed that ministry.
A good parliament, too, is a capital choosing body. If it is fit to
make laws for a country, its majority ought to represent the general
average intelligence of that country; its various members ought to rep-
resent the various special interests, special opinions, special prejudices,
to be found in that community. There ought to be an advocate for every
particular sect, and a vast neutral body of no sect — homogeneous and
judicial, like the nation itself. Such a body, when possible, is the best
selecter of executives that can be imagined. It is full of political activity;
it is close to political life; it feels the responsibility of affairs which are
brought as it were to its threshold; it has as much intelligence as the
society in question chances to contain. It is, what Washington and
Hamilton strove to create, an electoral college of the picked men of the
nation.
The best mode of appreciating its advantages is to look at the alter-
native. The competing constituency is the nation itself, and this is, ac-
cording to theory and experience, in all but the rarest cases, a bad con-
stituency. Mr. Lincoln, at his second election, being elected when all the
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untarily re-elected by an actually choosing nation. He embodied the object
in which every one was absorbed. But this is almost the only presiden-
tial election of which so much can be said. In almost all cases the Presi-
dent is chosen by a machinery of caucuses and combinations too com-
plicated to be perfectly known, and too familiar to require description.
He is not the choice of the nation, he is the choice of the wire-pullers. A
very large constituency in quiet times is the necessary, almost the legiti-
mate, subject of electioneering management: a man cannot know that he
does not throw his vote away except he votes as part of some great
organization; and if he votes as a part, he abdicates his electoral func-
tion in favour of the managers of that association. The nation, even if it
chose for itself, would, in some degree, be an unskilled body; but when
it does not choose for itself, but only as latent agitators wish, it is like a
large, lazy man, with a small, vicious mind, — it moves slowly and
heavily, but it moves at the bidding of a bad intention; it “means little,
but it means that little ill.”
And, as the nation is less able to choose than a parliament, so it has
worse people to choose out of. The American legislators of the last
century have been much blamed for not permitting the ministers of the
President to be members of the Assembly; but, with reference to the
specific end which they had in view, they saw clearly and decided wisely.
They wished to keep ‘the legislative branch absolutely distinct from the
executive branch’; they believed such a separation to be essential to a
good constitution; they believed such a separation to exist in the En-
glish, which the wisest of them thought the best constitution. And, to the
effectual maintenance of such a separation, the exclusion of the
President’s ministers from the legislature is essential. If they are not
excluded they become the executive, they eclipse the President himself.
A legislative chamber is greedy and covetous; it acquires as much, it
concedes as little as possible. The passions of its members are its rulers;
the law-making faculty, the most comprehensive of the imperial facul-
ties, is its instrument; it will take the administration if it can take it.
Tried by their own aims, the founders of the United States were wise in
excluding the ministers from Congress.
But though this exclusion is essential to the presidential system of
government, it is not for that reason a small evil. It causes the degrada-
tion of public life. Unless a member of the legislature be sure of some-
thing more than speech, unless he is incited by the hope of action, and
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to take the place, and will not do much if he does take it. To belong to a
debating society adhering to an executive (and this is no inapt descrip-
tion of a congress under a presidential constitution) is not an object to
stir a noble ambition, and is a position to encourage idleness. The mem-
bers of a parliament excluded from office can never be comparable,
much less equal, to those of a parliament not excluded from office. The
presidential government, by its nature, divides political life into two
halves, an executive half and a legislative half; and, by so dividing it,
makes neither half worth a man’s having —worth his making it a con-
tinuous career — worthy to absorb, as cabinet government absorbs, his
whole soul. The statesmen from whom a nation chooses under a presi-
dential system are much inferior to those from whom it chooses under a
cabinet system, while the selecting apparatus is also far less discerning.
All these differences are more important at critical periods, because
government itself is more important. A formed public opinion, a re-
spectable, able, and disciplined legislature, a well-chosen executive, a
parliament and an administration not thwarting each other, but co-oper-
ating with each other, are of greater consequence when great affairs are
in progress than when small affairs are in progress — when there is
much to do than when there is little to do. But in addition to this, a
parliamentary or cabinet constitution possesses an additional and spe-
cial advantage in very dangerous times. It has what we may call a re-
serve of power fit for and needed by extreme exigencies.
The principle of popular government is that the supreme power, the
determining efficacy in matters political, resides in the people — not
necessarily or commonly in the whole people, in the numerical majority,
but in a chosen people, a picked and selected people. It is so in England;
it is so in all free countries. Under a cabinet constitution at a sudden
emergency this people can choose a ruler for the occasion. It is quite
possible and even likely that he would not be ruler before the occasion.
The great qualities, the imperious will, the rapid energy, the eager na-
ture fit for a great crisis are not required are impediments — in common
times. A Lord Liverpool is better in every-day politics than a Chatham
— a Louis Philippe far better than a Napoleon. By the structure of the
world we often want, at the sudden occurrence of a grave tempest, to
change the helmsman — to replace the pilot of the calm by the pilot of
the storm. In England we have had so few catastrophes since our consti-
tution attained maturity, that we hardly appreciate this latent excellence.
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man above all men fit for a great occasion, and by a natural, legal mode
brought into rule. But even in England, at what was the nearest to a
great sudden crisis which we have had of late years — at the Crimean
difficulty — we used this inherent power. We abolished the Aberdeen
cabinet, the ablest we have had, perhaps, since the Reform Act — a
cabinet not only adapted, but eminently adapted, for every sort of diffi-
culty save the one it had to meet — which abounded in pacific discre-
tion, and was wanting only in the “demonic element;” we chose a states-
man who had the sort of merit then wanted, who, when he feels the
steady power of England behind him, will advance without reluctance,
and will strike without restraint. As was said at the time, “We turned out
the Quaker, and put in the pugilist.”
But under a presidential government you can do nothing of the kind.
The American government calls itself a government of the supreme
people; but at a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign power is most
needed, you cannot find the supreme people. You have got a Congress
elected for one fixed period, going out perhaps by fixed instalments,
which cannot be accelerated or retarded — you have a President chosen
for a fixed period, and immovable during that period: all the arrange-
ments are for stated times. There is no elastic element, every thing is
rigid, specified, dated. Come what may, you can quicken nothing and
retard nothing. You have bespoken your government in advance, and
whether it suits you or not, whether it works well or works ill, whether
it is what you want or not, by law you must keep it. In a country of
complex foreign relations it would mostly happen that the first and most
critical year of every war would be managed by a peace premier, and
the first and most critical years of peace by a war premier. In each case
the period of transition would be irrevocably governed by a man se-
lected not for what he was to introduce, but what he was to change —
for the policy he was to abandon, not for the policy he was to adminis-
ter.
The whole history of the American civil war — a history which has
thrown an intense light on the working of a presidential government at
the time when government is most important — is but a vast continuous
commentary on these reflections. It would, indeed, be absurd to press
against presidential government as such the singular defect by which
Vice-President Johnson has become President — by which a man elected
to a sinecure is fixed in what is for the moment the most important
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acteristic of the expectations4 of the framers of the constitution and of
its working, is but an accident of this particular case of presidential
government, and no necessary ingredient in that government itself. But
the first election of Mr. Lincoln is liable to no such objection. It was a
characteristic instance of the natural working of such a government upon
a great occasion. And what was that working? It may be summed up —
it was government by an unknown quantity. Hardly any one in America
had any living idea what Mr. Lincoln was like, or any definite notion
what he would do. The leading statesmen under the system of cabinet
government are not only household words, but household ideas. A con-
ception, not, perhaps, in all respects a true but a most vivid conception,
what Mr. Gladstone is like, or what Lord Palmerston is like, runs through
society. We have simply no notion what it would be to be left with the
visible sovereignty in the hands of an unknown man. The notion of em-
ploying a man of unknown smallness at a crisis of unknown greatness is
to our minds simply ludicrous. Mr. Lincoln, it is true, happened to be a
man if not of eminent ability, yet of eminent justness. There was an
inner depth of Puritan nature which came out under suffering, and was
very attractive. But success in a lottery is no argument for lotteries.
What were the chances against a person of Lincoln’s antecedents, elected
as he was, proving to be what he was? Such an incident is, however,
natural to a presidential government. The President is elected by pro-
cesses which forbid the election of known men, except at peculiar con-
junctures, and in moments when public opinion is excited and despotic;
and consequently, if a crisis comes upon us soon after he is elected,
inevitably we have government by an unknown quantity — the superin-
tendence of that crisis by what our great satirist would have called “
Statesman X.” Even in quiet times, government by a president is, for the
several various reasons which have been stated, inferior to government
by a cabinet; but the difficulty of quiet times is nothing as compared
with the difficulty of unquiet times. The comparative deficiencies of the
regular, common operation of a presidential government are far less
than the comparative deficiencies in time of sudden trouble — the want
of elasticity, the impossibility of a dictatorship, the total absence of a
revolutionary reserve. This contrast explains why the characteristic qual-
ity of cabinet governments — the fusion of the executive power with the
legislative power — is of such cardinal importance. I shall proceed to
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II. The Monarchy.
The use of the Queen, in a dignified capacity, is incalculable. Without
her in England, the present English Government would fail and pass
away. Most people when they read that the Queen walked on the slopes
at Windsor — that the Prince of Wales went to the Derby —have imag-
ined that too much thought and prominence were given to little things.
But they have been in error; and it is nice to trace how the actions of a
retired widow and an unemployed youth become of such importance.
The best reason why Monarchy is a strong government is, that it is
an intelligible government. The mass of mankind understand it, and they
hardly anywhere in the world understand any other. It is often said that
men are ruled by their imaginations; but it would be truer to say they are
governed by the weakness of their imaginations. The nature of a consti-
tution, the action of an assembly, the play of parties, the unseen forma-
tion of a guiding opinion, are complex facts, difficult to know, and easy
to mistake. But the action of a single will, the fiat of a single mind, are
easy ideas: anybody can make them out, and no one can ever forget
them. When you put before the mass of mankind the question, “Will you
be governed by a king, or will you be governed by a constitution?” the
inquiry comes out thus — “Will you be governed in a way you under-
stand, or will you be governed in a way you do not understand?” The
issue was put to the French people; they were asked, “Will you be gov-
erned by Louis Napoleon, or will you be governed by an assembly?”
The French people said, “We will be governed by the one man we can
imagine, and not by the many people we cannot imagine.”
The best mode of comprehending the nature of the two governments
is to look at a country in which the two have within a comparatively
short space of years succeeded each other.
“The political condition,” says Mr. Grote, “which Grecian legend
everywhere presents to us, is in its principal features strikingly different
from that which had become universally prevalent among the Greeks in
the time of the Peloponnesian war. Historical oligarchy, as well as de-
mocracy, agreed in requiring a certain established system of govern-
ment, comprising the three elements of specialized functions, temporary
functionaries, and ultimate responsibility (under some forms or other)
to the mass of qualified citizens — either a Senate or an Ecclesia, or
both. There were, of course, many and capital distinctions between one
government and another, in respect to the qualification of the citizen, the
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power, &c.; and men might often be dissatisfied with the way in which
these questions were determined in their own city. But in the mind of
every man, some determining rule or system — something like what in
modern times is called a constitution — was indispensable to any gov-
ernment entitled to be called legitimate) or capable of creating in the
mind of a Greek a feeling of moral obligation to obey it. The functionar-
ies who exercise authority under it might be more or less competent or
popular; but his personal feelings towards them were commonly lost in
his attachment or aversion to the general system. If any energetic man
could by audacity or craft break down the constitution, and render him-
self permanent ruler according to his own will and pleasure, even though
he might govern well, he could never inspire the people with any senti-
ment of duty towards him: his sceptre was illegitimate from the begin-
ning, and even the taking of his life, far from being interdicted by that
moral feeling which condemned the shedding of blood in other cases,
was considered meritorious: he could not even be mentioned in the lan-
guage except by a name (tÚannoj, despot) which branded him as an
object of mingled fear and dislike.
“If we carry our eyes back from historical to legendary Greece, we
find a picture the reverse of what has been here sketched. We discern a
government in which there is little or no scheme or system, still less any
idea of responsibility to the governed, but in which the mainspring of
obedience on the part of the people consists in their personal feeling and
reverence towards the chief. We remark, first and foremost, the King;
next, a limited number of subordinate kings or chiefs; afterwards, the
mass of armed freemen, husbandmen, artisans, freebooters, &c.; lowest
of all, the free labourers for hire and the bought slaves. The King is not
distinguished by any broad, or impassable boundary from the other chiefs,
to each of whom the title Basileus is applicable as well as to himself: his
supremacy has been inherited from his ancestors, and passes by inherit-
ance, as a general rule, to his eldest son, having been conferred upon the
family as a privilege by the favour of Zeus. In war, he is the leader,
foremost in personal prowess, and directing all military movements; in
peace, he is the general protector of the injured and oppressed; he offers
up moreover those public prayers and sacrifices which are intended to
obtain for the whole people the favour of the gods. An ample domain is
assigned to him as an appurtenance of his lofty position, and the pro-
duce of his fields and his cattle is consecrated in part to an abundant,
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his enmity, to conciliate his favour, or to buy off his exactions; and
when plunder is taken from the enemy, a large previous share, compris-
ing probably the most alluring female captive, is reserved for him apart
from the general distribution.
“Such is the position of the King in the heroic times of Greece —
the only person (if we except the heralds and priests, each both special
and subordinate) who is then presented to us as clothed with any indi-
vidual authority — the person by whom all the extensive functions then
few in number, which the society requires, are either performed or di-
rected. His personal ascendancy — derived from divine countenance
bestowed both upon himself individually and upon his race, and prob-
ably from accredited divine descent — is the salient feature in the pic-
ture: the people hearken to his voice, embrace his propositions, and
obey his orders: not merely resistance, but even criticism upon his acts,
is generally exhibited in an odious point of view, and is indeed never
heard of except from some one or more of the subordinate princes.”
The characteristic of the English Monarchy is that it retains the
feelings by which the heroic kings governed their rude age, and has
added the feelings by which the constitutions of later Greece ruled in
more refined ages. We are a more mixed people than the Athenians, or
probably than any political Greeks. We have progressed more unequally.
The slaves in ancient times were a separate order; not ruled by the same
laws, or thoughts, as other men. It was not necessary to think of them in
making a constitution: it was not necessary to improve them in order to
make a constitution possible. The Greek legislator had not to combine
in his polity men like the labourers of Somersetshire, and men like Mr.
Grote. He had not to deal with a community in which primitive barbar-
ism lay as a recognized basis to acquired civilization. We have. We have
no slaves to keep down by special terrors and independent legislation.
But we have whole classes unable to comprehend the idea of a constitu-
tion unable to feel the least attachment to impersonal laws. Most do
indeed vaguely know that there are some other institutions besides the
Queen, and some rules by which she governs. But a vast number like
their minds to dwell more upon her than upon any thing else, and there-
fore she is inestimable. A Republic has only difficult ideas in govern-
ment; a Constitutional Monarchy has an easy idea too; it has a compre-
hensible element for the vacant many, as well as complex laws and no-
tions for the inquiring few.
A family on the throne is an interesting idea also. It brings down the64/Walter Bagehot
pride of sovereignty to the level of petty life. No feeling could seem
more childish than the enthusiasm of the English at the marriage of the
Prince of Wales. They treated as a great political event what, looked at
as a matter of pure business, was very small indeed. But no feeling
could be more like common human nature as it is, and as it is likely to
be. The women — one half the human race at least- care fifty times
more for a marriage than a ministry. All but a few cynics like to see a
pretty novel touching for a moment the dry scenes of the grave world. A
princely marriage is the brilliant edition of a universal fact, and as such,
it rivets mankind. We smile at the Court Circular; but remember how
many people read the Court Circular! Its use is not in what it says, but
in those to whom it speaks, They say that the Americans were more
pleased at the Queen’s letter to Mrs. Lincoln, than at any act of the
English Government. It was a spontaneous act of intelligible feeling in
the midst of confused and tiresome business. Just so a royal family
sweetens politics by the seasonable addition of nice and pretty events. It
introduces irrelevant facts into the business of government, but they are
facts which speak to “men’s bosoms” and employ their thoughts.
To state the matter shortly, Royalty is a government in which the
attention of the nation is concentrated on one person doing interesting
actions. A Republic is a government in which that attention is divided
between many, who are all doing uninteresting actions. Accordingly, so
long as the human heart is strong and the human reason weak, Royalty
will be strong because it appeals to diffused feeling, and Republics weak
because they appeal to the understanding.
Secondly. The English Monarchy strengthens our government with
the strength of religion. It, is not easy to say why it should be so. Every
instructed theologian would say that it was the duty of a person born
under a Republic as much to obey that Republic as it is the duty of one
born under a Monarch to obey the monarch. But the mass of the English
people do not think so i they agree ewith the oath of allegiance; they say
it is their duty to obey the “ Queen;” and they have but hazy notions as
to obeying laws without a queen. In former times, when our constitution
was incomplete, this notion of local holiness in one part was mischie-
vous. All parts were struggling, and it was necessary each should have
its full growth. But superstition said one should grow where it would,
and no other part should grow without its leave. The whole cavalier
party said it was their duty to obey the King, whatever the kirg did.
There was to be “passive obedience” to him, and there was no religiousThe English Constitution/65
obedience due to any one else. He was the “Lord’s anointed,” and no
one else ha(c been anointed at all. The parliament, the laws, the press,
were human institutions; but the Monarchy was a Divine institution. An
undue advantage was given to a part of the constitution, and therefore
the progress of the whole was stayed.
After the Revolution this mischievous sentiment was much weaker.
The change of the line of sovereigns was at first conclusive. If there was
a mystic right in any one, that right was plainly in James II; if it was an
English duty to obey any one whatever he did, he was the person to be
so obeyed; if there was an inherent inherited claim in any king, it was in
the Stuart king to whom the crown had come by descent, and not in the
Revolution king to whom it had come by vote of Parliament. All through
the reign of William III there was (in common speech) one king whom
man had made, and another king whom God had madle The king who
ruled had no consecrated loyalty to build upon; although he ruled in
fact, according to sacred hr theory there was a king in France who ought
to rule. But it was very hard for the English people, with their plain
sense and slow imagination, to keep up a strong sentiment of veneration
for a foreign adventurer. He lived under the protection of a French king;
what he did was commonly stupid, and what he left undone was very
often wise. As soon as Queen Anne began to reign there was a change of
feeling; the old sacred sentiment began to cohere about her. There were
indeed difficulties which would have baffled most people; but an En-
glishman whose heart is in a matter is not easily baffled. Queen Anne
had a brother living and a father living, and by every rule of descent
their right was better than hers. But many people evaded both claims.
They said James II had “run away,” and so abdicated, though he only
ran away because he was in duresse and was frightened, and though he
claimed the allegiance of his subjects day by day. The Pretender, it was
said, was not legitimate, though the birth was proved by evidence which
any Court of Justice would have accepted. The English people were
“out of” a sacred monarch, and so they tried very hard to make a new
one. Events, however, were too strong for them. They were ready and
eager to take Queen Anne as the stock of a new dynasty; they were
ready to ignore the claims of her father and the claims of her brother,
but they could not ignore the fact that at the critical period she had no
children. She had once had thirteen, but they all died in her lifetime, and
it was necessary either to revert to the Stuarts or to make a new king by
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According to the Act of Settlement passed by the Whigs, the crown
was settled on the descendants of the “Princess Sophia” of Hanover, a
younger daughter of a daughter of James I. There were before her James
II, his son, the descendants of a daughter of Charles I, and elder children
of her own mother. But the Whigs passed these over because they were
Catholics, and selected the Princess Sophia, who, if she was any thing,
was a Protestant. Certainly this selection was statesmanlike, but it could
not be very popular. It was quite imlpossible to say that it was the duty
of the English people to obey the House of Hanover upon any principles
which do not concede the right of the people to choose their rulers, and
which do not degrade monarchy from its solitary pinnacle of majestic
reverence, and make it one only among many expedient institutions. If a
king is a useful public functionary who may be.changed, and in whose
place you may make another, you cannot regard him with mystic awe
and wonder: and if you are bound to worship him, of course you cannot
change him, Accordingly, during the whole reigns of George I and George
II the sentiment of religious loyalty altogether ceased to support the
Crown. The prerogative of the king had no strong party to support it;
the Tories, who naturally would support it, dislikec the actual kin; and
the Whigs, according to their creed, disliked the king’s office. Until the
accession of George III the most vigorous opponents of the Crown were
the country gentlemen, its natural friends, and the representatives of
quiet rural districts, where loyalty is mostly to be found, if anywhere.
But after the accession of George III the common feeling.came back to
the same point as in Queen Anne’s time. The English were ready to take
the new young prince as the beginning of a sacred line of sovereigns,
just as they had been willing to take an old lady who was the second
cousin of his great-great-grandmother. So it is now. If you ask the im-
mense majority of the Queen’s subjects by what right she rules, they
would never tell you that she rules by Parliamentary right, by virtue of
6 Anne, c. 7. They will say she rules by “God’s grace;” they believe that
they have a mystic obligation to obey her. When her family came to the
Crown it was a sort of treason to maintain the inalienable right of lineal
sovereignty, for it was equivalent to saying that the claim of another
family was better than hers; but now, in the strange course of human
events, that very sentiment has become her surest and best support.
But it would be a great mistake to believe that at the accession of
George III the instinctive sentiment of hereditary loyalty at once became
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useful. There was so much harm done by it as well as so much good,
that it is quite capable of being argued whether on the whole it was
beneficial or hurtful. Throughout the greater part of his life George III
was a kind of “consecrated obstruction.” Whatever he did had a sanctity
different from what any one else did, and it perversely happened that he
was commonly wrong. He had as good intentions as any one need have,
and he attended to the business of his country, as a clerk with his bread
to get attends to the business of his office. But his mind was small, his
education limited, and he lived in a changing time. Accordingly he was
always resisting what ought to be, and prolonging what ought not to be.
He was the sinister but sacred assailant of half his ministries; and when
the French revolution excited the horror of the world, and proved de-
mocracy to be ‘impious,’ the piety of England concentrated upon him,
and gave him tenfold strength. The monarchy by its religious sanction
now confirms all our political order; in George III’s time it confirmed
little except itself. It gives now a vast strength to the entire constitution,
by enlisting on its behalf the credulous obedienice.of enormous masses;
then it lived aloof, absorbed all the holiness into itself, and turned over
all the rest of the polity to the coarse justification of bare expediency.
A principal reason why the monarchy so well consecrates our whole
state is to be sought in the peculiarity many Americans and many utili-
tarians smile at. They laugh at this “extra,” as the Yankee called it, at
the solitary transcendent element. They quote Napoleon’s saying, “that
he did not wish to be fatted in idleness,” when he refused to be grand
elector in Sièyes’ constitution, which was an office copied, and M. Thiers
says well copied, from constitutional monarchy. But such objections are
wholly wrong. No doubt it was absurd enough in the Abbé Sièyes to
propose that a new institution, inheriting no reverence, and muade holy
by no religion, should be created to fill the sort of post occupied by a
constitutional king in nations of monarchical history. Such an institu-
tion, far from being so august as to spread reverence around it, is too
novel and artificial to get reverence for itself; if, too, the absurdity could
anyhow be augmentel, it was so by offering an office of inactive use-
lessness and pretended sanctity to Napoleon, the most active man in
France, with the greatest genius for business, only not sacred, and ex-
clusively fit for action. But the blunder of Sieyes brings the excellence
of real monarchy to the best light. When a monarch can bless, it is best
that he should not be touched. It should be evident that he does no wrong.
He should not be brought too closely to real measurement. He should be68/Walter Bagehot
aloof and solitary. As the functions of English royalty are for the most
part latent, it fulfils this condition. It seems to order, but it never seems
to struggle. It is commonly hidden like a mystery, and sometimes pa-
raded like a pageant, but in neither case is it contentious. The nation is
tivided into parties, but the Crown is of no party. Its apparent separa-
tion from business is that which removes it both from enmities and from
desecration, which preserves its mystery, which enables it to combine
the affection of conflicting parties — to be a visible symbol of unity to
tose still so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol.
Thirdly. The Queen is the head of our society. If she did not exist the
Prime Minister would be the first person in the country. He and his wife
would have to receive foreign ministers, and occasionally foreign princes,
to give the first parties in the country; he and she would be at the head of
the pageant of life; they would represent England in the eyes of foreign
nations; they would represent the Government of England in the eyes of
the English.
It is very easy to imagine a world in which this change would not be
a great evil. In a country where people did not care for the outward
show of life, where the genius of the people was untheatrical, and they
exclusively regarded the substance of things, this matter would be tri-
fling. Whether Lord and Lady Derby received the foreign ministers, or
Lord and Lady Palmerston, would be a matter of indclifference; whether
they gave the nicest parties would be important only to the persons at
those parties. A nation of unimpressible philosophers would not care at
all how the externals of life were managed. Who is the showman is not
material unless you care about the show.
But of all nations in the world the English are perhaps the least a
nation of pure philosophers. It would be a very serious matter to us to
chalnge every four or five years the visible head of our world. We are
not now remarkable for the highest sort of ambition; but we are remark-
able for having a great deal of the lower sort of ambition and envy. The
House of Commons is thronged with people who get there merely for
“social purposes,” as the phrase goes; that is, that they and their fami-
lies may go to parties else impossible. Members of Parliament are en-
vied by thousands merely for this frivolous glory, as a thinker calls it. If
the highest post in conspicuous life were thrown open to public compe-
tition, this low sort of ambition and envy would be fearfully increased.
Politics would offer a prize too dazzling for mankind; clever base people
would strive for it, and stupid base people would envy it. Even now aThe English Constitution/69
dangerous distinction is given by what is exclusively called public life.
The newspapers describe daily and incessantly a certain conspicuous
existence; they comment on its characters, recount its details, investi-
gate its motives, anticipate its course. They give a precedent and a dig-
nity to that world which they do not give to any other. The literary
world, the scientific world, the philosophic world, not only are not com-
parable in dignity to the political world, but in comparison are hardly
worlds at all. The newspaper makes no mention of them, and could not
mention them. As are the papers, so are the readers; they, by irresistible
sequence and association, believe that those people who constantly fig-
ure in the papers are cleverer, abler, or at any rate somehow higher, than
other people. “I wrote books,” we heard of a man saying, “for twenty
years, and I was nobody; I got into Parliament, and before I had taken
my seat I had become somebody.” English politicians are the men who
fill the thoughts of the English public; they are the actors on the scene,
and it is hard for the admiring spectators not to believe that the admired
actor is greater than themselves. In this present age and country it would
be very dangerous to give the slightest addition to a force already peril-
ously great. If the highest social rank was to be scrambled for in the
House of Commons, the number of social adventurers there would be
incalculably more numerous, and indefinitely more eager.
A very peculiar combination of causes has made this characteristic
one of the most prominent in English society. The middle ages left all
Europe with a social system headed by Courts. The government was
made the head of all society, all intercourse, and all life; every thing paid
allegiance to the sovereign, and every thing ranged itself round the sov-
ereign what was next to be greatest, and what was farthest least. The
idea that the head of the government is the head of society is so fixed in
the ideas of mankind that only a few philosophers regard it as historical
and accidental, though, when the matter is examined, that conclusion is
certain and even obvious.
In the first place society as society does not naturally need a head at
all. Its constitution, if left to itself, is not monarchical, but aristocratical
Society, in the sense we are now talking of, is the union of people for
amusement and conversation. The making of marriages goes on in it, as
it were, incidentally, but its common and main concern is talking and
pleasure. There is nothing in this which needs a single supreme head;it
is a pursuit in which a single person does not of necessity dominate. By
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and families possessed of equal culture, and equal faculties, and equal
spirit, get to be on a level — and that level a high level. By boldness, by
cultivation, by “social science” they raise themselves above others; they
become the “first families,” and all the rest come to be below them. But
they tend to be much about a level among one another; no one is recog-
nized by all or by many others as superior to them all. This is society as
it grew up in Greece or Italy, as it grows up now in any American or
colonial town. So far from the notion of a “head of society” being a
necessary notion, in many aoes it would scarcely have been an intelli-
gible notion. You could not have made Socrates understand it. He would
have said, “If you tell me that one of my fellows is chief magistrate, and
that I am bound to obey him, I understand you, and you speak well; or
that another is a priest, and that he ought to offer sacrifices to the gods
which I or any one not a priest olight not to offer, again I understand and
agree with you. But if you tell me that there is in some citizen a hidden
charm by which his words become better than my words, and his house
better than my house, I do not follow you, and should be pleased if you
will explain yourself.”
And even if a head of society were a natural idea, it certainly would
not follow that the head of the civil government should be that head.
Society as such has no more to do with civil polity than with ecclesias-
tical. The organization of men and women for the purpose of amuse-
ment is not necessarily identical with their organization for political
purposes, any more than with their organization for religious purposes,it
has of itself no more to do with the State than it has with the Church.
The faculties which fit a man to be a great ruler are not those of society
some great rulers have been unintelligible like Cromwell, or brusque
like Napoleon, or coarse and barbarous like Sir Robert Walpole. The
light nothings of the drawing-room and the grave things of office are as
different from one another as two human occupations can be. There is
no naturalness in uniting the two; the end of it always is, that you put a
man at the head of society who very likely is remarkable for social
defects, and is not eminent for social merits.
The best possible commentary on these remarks is the “History of
English Royalty.” It has not been sufficiently remarked that a change
has taken place in the structure of our society exactly analogous to the
change in our polity. A Republic hlis insinuated itself beneath the folds
of a Monarchy. Charles II was really the head of society. Whitehall, in
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curious love affairs of the age. He did not contribute good morality to
society, but he set an example of infinite agreeableness. He concentrated
around him all the light part of the high world of London, and London
concentrated around it all the light part of the high world of England.
The Court was the focus where every thing fascinating gathered, and
where every thing exciting centred. Whitehall was an unequalled club,
with female society of a very clever and sharp sort superadded. All this,
as we know, is now altered. Buckingham Palace is as unlike a club as
any place is likely to be. The Court is a separate part, which stands
aloof from the rest of the London world, and which has but slender
relations with the more amusing part of it. The two first Georges were
men ignorant of English, and wholly unfit to guide and lead English
society. They both preferred one or two German ladies of bad character
to all else in London. George III had no social vices, but he had no social
pleasures. He was a family man, and a man of business, and sincerely
preferred a leg of mutton and turnips after a good day’s work, to the
best fashion and the most exciting talk. In consequence, society in Lon-
don, though still in form under the domination of a Court, assumed in
fact its natural and oligarchical structure. It, too, has become an “upper
ten thousand;” it is no more monarchical in fact than the society of New
York. Great ladies give the tone to it with little reference to the particu-
lar Court world. The peculiarly masculine world of the clubs and their
neighborhood has no more to do in daily life with Buckingham Palace
than with the Tuileries. Formal ceremonies of presentation and atten-
dance are retained. The names of levée and drawing-room still sustain
the memory of the time when the king’s bed-chamber and the queen’s
“withdrawing room” were the centres of London life, but they no longer
make a part of social enjoyment: they are a sort of ritual in which now-
a-days almost every decent person can if he likes take part. Even Court
balls, where pleasure is at least supposed to be possible, are lost in a
London July. Careful observers have long perceived this, but it was
made palpable to every one by the death of the Prince Consort. Since
then the Court has been always in a state of suspended animation, and
for a time it was quite annihilated. But every thing went on as usual. A
few people who had no daughters and little money made it an excuse to
give fewer parties, and if very poor, stayed in the country, but upon the
whole the difference was not perceptible. The queen bee was taken away,
but the hive went on.
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alty that it is not splendid enough. They have compared it with the French
Court, which is better in show, which comes to the surface everywhere
so that you cannot help seeing it, which is infinitely and beyond ques-
tion tle most splendid thing in France. They have said ‘that in old times
the English Court took too much of the nation’s money, and spent it ill;
but now, when it could be trusted to spend well, it does not take enough
of the nation’s money. There are arguments for not having a Court, and
there are arguments for having a splendid Court; but there are no argu-
ments for having a mean Court. lt is better to spend a million in dazzling
when you wish to dazzle, than threequarters of a million in trying to
dazzle and yet not dazzling.’ There may be something in this theory; it
may be that the Court of England is not quite as gorgeous as we might
wish to see it. But no comparison must ever be made between it and the
French Court. The Emperor represents a different idea from the Queen.
He is not the head of the State; he is the State. The theory of his govern-
ment is that every onein France is equal, and that the Emperor embodies
the principle of equality. The greater you make him, the less, and there-
fore the more equal, you make all others. He is magnified that others
may be dwarfed. The very contrary is the principle of English royalty.
As in politics it would lose its principal use if it came forward into the
public arena, so in society, if it advertised itself, it would be pernicious.
We have voluntary show enough already in London; we do not wish to
have it encouraged and intensified but quieted and mitigated. Our Court
is but the head of an unequal, competing, aristocratic society: its splen-
dor would not keep others down, but incite others to come on. It is of use
so long as it keeps others out of the frst place, and is guarded and retired
in that place. But it would do evil if it added a new example to our many
examples of showy wealth — if it gave the sanction of its dignity to the
race of expenditure.
Fourthly. We have come to regard the Crown as the headfof our
morality. The virtues of Queen Victoria and the virtues of George III
have sunk deep into the popular heart. We have come to believe that it is
natural to have a virtuous sovereign, and that the domestic virtues are
as likely to be found on thrones as they are eminent when there. But a
little experience and less thought show that royalty cannot take credit
for domestic excellence. Neither George I, nor George II, nor William
IV were patterns of family merit; George IV was a model of family
demerit. The plain fact is, that to the disposition of all others most likely
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king has greater temptations than almost any others and fewer suitable
occupations than almost any other. All the world and all the glory of it,
whatever is most attractive, whatever is most seductive, has always been
offered to the Prince of Wales of the day, and always will be. It is not
rational to expect the best virtue where temptation is applied in the most
trying form at the frailest time of human life. The occupations of a
constitutional monarch are grave, formal, important, but never excit-
ing; they have nothing to stir eager blood, awaken high imagination,
work off wild thoughts. On men like George III, with a predominant
taste for business occupations, the routine duties of constitutional roy-
alty have doubtless a calm and chastening effect. The insanity with which
he struggled, and in many cases struggled very successfully, during many
years, would probably have burst out much oftener but for the sedative
effect of sedulous employment. But how few princes have ever felt the
anomalous impulse for real work; how uncommon is that impulse any-
where; how little are the circumstances of princes calculated to foster it;
how little can it be relied on as an ordinary breakwater to their habitual
temptations! Grave and careful men may have domestic virtues on a
constitutional throne, but even these fail sometimes, and to imagine that
men of more eager temperaments will commonly produce them, is to
expect grapes from thorns and figs from thistles.
Lastly. Constitutional royalty has the function which I insisted on at
length in my last essay, and which, though it is by far the greatest, I need
not now enlarge upon again. It acts as a disguise. It enables our real
rulers to change without heedless people knowing it. The masses of
Englishmen are not fit for an elective government; if they knew how
near they were to it, they would be surprised, and almost tremble.
Of a like nature is the value of constitutional royalty in times of
transition. The greatest of all helps to the substitution of a cabinet gov-
ernment for a preceding absolute monarchy is the accession of a king
favorable to such a government, and pledged to it. Cabinet government,
when new, is weak in time of trouble. The prime minister — the chief on
whom every thing cepends, who must take responsibility if any one is to
take it, who must use force if any one is to use it — is not fixed in power.
He holds his place, by the essence of the government, with some uncer-
tainty. Among a people well accustomed to such a government such a
functionary may be bold; he may rely, if not on the parliament, on the
nation which understands and values him. But when that government
has only recently been introduced, it is difficult for such a minister to be74/Walter Bagehot
as bold as he ought to be. His power rests too much on human reason,
and too little on human instinct. The traditional strength of the heredi-
tary monarch is at these times of incalculable use. It would have been
impossible for England to get through the first years after 1688 but for
the singular ability of William III. It would have been impossible for
Italy to have attained and kept her freedom without the help of Victor
Emmanuel; neither the work of Cavour nor the work of Garibaldi were
more necessary than his. But the failure of Louis Philippe to use his
reserve power as constitutional monarch is the most instructive proof
how great that reserve power is. In February, 1848, Guizot was weak
because his tenure of office was insecure. Louis Philippe should have
made that tenure certain. Parliamentary reform might afterwards have
been conceded to instructed opinion, but nothing ought to have been
conceded to the mob. The Parisian populace ought to have been put
down, as Guizot wished. If Louis Philippe had been a fit king to intro-
duce free government, he would have strengthened his ministers when
they were the instruments of order, even if he afterwards discarded them
when order was safe, and policy could be discussed. But he was one of
the cautious men who are “noted” to fail in old age: though of the largest
experience, and of great ability, he failed and lost his crown for want of
petty and momentary energy, which at such a crisis a plain man would
have at once put forth.
Such are the principal modes in which the institution of royalty by
its august aspect influences mankind, and in the English state of civili-
zation they are invaluable. Of the actual business of the sovereign —
the real work the Queen does — I shall speak in my next paper.
II.
The House of Commons has inquired into most things, but has never
had a committee on “the Queen.” There is no authentic blue-book to say
what she does. Such an investigation cannot take place; but if it could, it
would probably save her much vexatious routine, and many toilsome
and unnecessary hours.
The popular theory of the English Constitution involves two errors
as to the sovereign. First, in its oldest form at least, it considers him as
an “Estate of the Realm,” a separate co-ordinate authority with the House
of Lords and the House of Commons. This and much else the sovereign
once was, but this he is no longer. What authority could only be exer-
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bills, if not as the House of Commons rejects them, at least as the House
of Peers rejects them. But the Queen has no such veto. She must sign
her own death-warrant if the two Houses unanimously send it up to her.
It is a fiction of the past to ascribe to her legislative power. She has long
ceased to have any. Secondly, the ancient theory holds that the Queen is
the executive. The American Constitution was made upon a most care-
ful argument, and most of that argument assumes the king to be the
administrator of the English Constitution, and an unhereditary substi-
tute for hirm viz., a president — to be peremptorily necessary. Living
across the Atlantic, and misled by accepted doctrines, the acute framers
of the Federal Constitution, even after the keenest attention, did not
perceive the Prime Minister to be the principal executive of the British
Constitution, and the sovereign a cog in the mechanism. There is, in-
deed, much excuse for the American legislators in the history of that
time. They took their idea of our constitution from the time when they
encountered it. But in the socalled government of Lord North, George
III was the government. Lord North was not only his appointee, but his
agent. The minister carried on a war which he disapproved and hated,
because it was a war which his sovereign approved and liked. Inevita-
bly, therefore, the American Convention believed the king, from whom
they had suffered, to be the real executive, and not the minister, from
whom they had not suffered.
If we leave literary theory, and look to our actual old law, it is won-
derful how much the sovereign can do. A few years ago the Queen very
wisely attempted to make life Peers, and the House of Lords very un-
wisely, and contrary to its own best interests, refused to admit her claim.
They said her power had decayed into non-existence; she once had it,
they allowed, but it had ceased by long disuse. If any one will run over
the pages of Comyn’s “Digest,” or any other such book, title “Preroga-
tive,” he will find the Queen has a hundred such powers which waver
between reality and desuetude:and which would cause a protracted and
very interesting legal argument if she tried to exercise them. Some good
lawyer ought to write a careful book to say which of these powers are
really usable, and which are obsolete. There is no authentic explicit
information as to what the Queen can do, any more than of what she
does.
In the bare superficial theory of free institutions this is undoubtedly
a defect. Every power in a popular government ought to be known. The
whole notion of such a government is that the political people — the76/Walter Bagehot
governing people — rules as it thinks fit. All the acts of every adminis-
tration are to be canvassed by it; it is to watch if such acts seem good,
and in some manner or other to interpose if they seem not good. But it
cannot judge if it is to be kept in ignorance; it cannot interpose if it does
not know. A secret prerogative is an anomaly- perhaps the greatest of
anomalies. That secrecy is, however, essential to the utility of English
royalty as it now is. Above all things our royalty is to be reverenced,
and if you begin to poke about it you cannot reverence it. When there is
a select committee on the Queen, the charm of royalty will be gone. Its
mystery is its life. We must not let in daylight upon magic. We must not
bring the Queen into the combat of politics, or she will cease to be
reverenced by all combatants; she will become one combatant among
many. The existence of this secret power is, according to abstract theory,
a defect in our constitutional polity, but it is a defect incident to a civili-
zation such as ours, where august and therefore unknown powers are
needed, as well as known and serviceable powers.
If we attempt to estimate the working of this inner power by the
evidence of those, whether dead or living, who have been brought in
contact with it, we shall find a singular difference. Both the courtiers of
George III and the courtiers of Queen Victoria are agreed as to the mag-
nitude of the royal influence. It is with both an accepted secret doctrine
that the Crown does more than it seems. But there is a wide discrepancy
in opinion as to the quality of that action. Mr. Fox did not scruple to
describe the hidden influence of George III as the undetected agency of
“an infernal spirit.” The action of the Crown at that period was the
dread and terror of Liberal politicians. But now the best Liberal politi-
cians say, “We shall never know, but when history is written our chil-
dren may know, what we owe to the Queen.and Prince Albert.” The
mystery of the constitution, which used to be hated by our calmest, most
thoughtful, and instructed statesmen, is now loved and reverenced by
them. Before we try to account for this change, there is one part of the
duties of the Queen which should be struck out of the discussion. I mean
the formal part. The Queen has to assent to and sign countless formal
documents, which contain no matter of policy of which the purport is
insignificant, which any clerk could sign as well. One great class of
documents George III used to read before he signed them, till Lord
Thurlow told him, “It was nonsense his looking at them, for he could
not understand them.” But the worst case is that of commissions in the
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all military commissions, and she still signs all fresh commissions. The
inevitable and natural consequence is that such commissions were, and
to some extent still are, in arrears by thousands. Men have often been
known to receive their commissions for the first time years after they
have left the service. If the Queen had been an ordinary officer she would
long since have complained, and long since have been relieved of this
slavish labour. A cynical statesman is said to have defended it on the
ground “that you may have a fool for a sovereign, and then it would be
desirable he should have plenty of occupation in which he can do no
harm.” But it is in truth childish to heap formal duties of business upon
a person who has of necessity so many formal duties of society. It is a
remnant of the old days when George III would know every thing, how-
ever trivial, and assent to every thing, however insignificant. These la-
bors of routine may be dismissed from the discussion. It is not by them
that the sovereign acquires his authority either for evil or for good.
The best mode of testing what we owe to the Queen is to make a
vigorous effort of the imagination, and see how we should get on with-
out her. Let us strip cabinet government of all its accessories, let us
reduce it to its two necessary constituents — a representative assembly
(a House of Commons) and a cabinet appointed by that assembly —
and examine how we should manage with them only. We are so little
accustomed to analyze the constitution; we are so used to ascribe the
whole effect of the constitution to the whole constitution, that a great
many people will imagine it to be impossible that a nation should thrive
or even live with only these two simple elements. But it is upon that
possibility that the general imitability of the English Government de-
pends. A monarch that can be truly reverenced, a House of Peers that
can be really respected, are historical accidents nearly peculiar to this
one island, and entirely peculiar to Europe. A new country, if it is to be
capable of a cabinet government, if it is not to degrade itself to Presi-
dential government, must create that cabinet out of its native resources
— must not rely on these old world debris.
Many modes might be suggested by which a parliament might do in
appearance what our parliament does in reality, viz., appoint a premier.
But I prefer to select the simplest of all modes. We shall then see the
bare skeleton of this polity, perceive in what it differs from the royal
form, and be quite free from the imputation of having selected an un-
duly charming and attractive substitute.
Let us suppose the House of Commons — existing alone and by78/Walter Bagehot
itself — to appoint the premier quite simply, just as the shareholders of
a railway choose a director. At each vacancy, whether caused by death
or resignation, let any member or members have the right of nominating
a successor; after a proper interval, such as the time now commonly
occupied by a ministerial crisis, ten days or a fortnight, let the members
present vote for the candidate they prefer; then let the Speaker count the
votes, and the candidate with the greatest number be premier. This mode
of election would throw the whole choice into the hands of party organi-
zation, just as our present mode does, except in so far as the Crown
interferes with it; no outsider would ever be appointed, because the im-
mense number of votes which every great party brings into the field
would far outnumber every casual and petty minority. The premier should
not be appointed for a fixed time, but during good behaviour or the
pleasure of parliament. Mutatis mutandis, subject to the differences now
to be investigated, what goes on now would go on then. The premier
then, as now, must resign upon a vote of want of confidence, but the
volition of parliament would then be the overt and single force in the
selection of a successor, whereas it is now the predominant though la-
tent force.
It will help the discussion very much if we divide it into three parts.
The whole course of a representative government has three stages —
first, when a ministry is appointed; next, during its continuance; last,
when it ends. Let us consider what is the exact use of the Queen at each
of these stages, and how our present form of government differs in each,
whether for good or for evil, from that simpler form of cabinet govern-
ment which might exist without her.
At the beginning of an administration there would not be much dif-
ference between the royal and unroyal species of cabinet governments
when there were only two great parties in the State, and when the greater
of those parties was thoroughly agreed within itself who should be its
parliamentary leader, and who therefore should be its premier. The sov-
ereign must now accept that recognized leader; and if the choice were
directly made by the House of Commons, the House must also choose
him; its supreme section, acting compactly and harmoniously, would
sway its decisions without substantial resistance, and perhaps without
even apparent competition. A predominant party, rent by no intestine
demarcation, would be despotic. In such a case cabinet government would
go on without friction whether there was a Queen or whether there was
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effect no harm.
But the difficulties are far greater when the predominant party is
not agreed who should be its leader. In the royal form of cabinet govern-
ment the sovereign then has sometimes a substantial selection; in the
unroyal, who would choose. There must be a meeting at “Willis’s
Rooms;” there must be that sort of interior despotism of the majority
over the minority within the party, by which Lord. John Russell in 1859
was made to resign his pretensions to the supreme government, and to
be content to serve as a subordinate to Lord Palmerston. The tacit com-
pression which a party anxious for office would exercise over leaders
who divided its strength, would be used and must be used. Whether
such a party would always choose precisely the best man may well be
doubted. In a party once divided it is very difficult to secure unanimity
in favour of the very person whom a disinterested bystander would rec-
ommend. All manner of jealousies and enmities are immediately awak-
ened, and it is always difficult, often impossible, to get them to sleep
again. But though such a party might not select the very best leader,
they have the strongest motives to select a very good leader. The main-
tenance of their rule depends on it. Under a presidential constitution the
preliminary caucuses which choose the president need not care as to the
ultimate fitness of the man they choose. They are solely concerned with
his attractiveness as a candidate; they need not regard his efficiency as a
ruler. If they elect a man of weak judgment, he will reign his stated term;
even though he show the best judgment, at the end of that term there will
be by constitutional destiny another election. But under a ministerial
government there is no such fixed destiny. The government is a remov-
able government; its tenure depends upon its conduct. If a party in power
were so foolish as to choose a weak man for its head, it would cease to
be in power. Its judgment is its life. Suppose in 1859 that the Whig
party had determined to set aside both Earl Russell and Lord Palmerston,
and to choose for its head an incapable nonentity, the Whig party would
probably have been exiled from office at the Schleswig-Holstein diffi-
culty. The nation would have deserted them, and Parliament would have
deserted them, too; neither would have endured to see a secret negotia-
tion, on which depended the portentous alternative of war or peace, in
the hands of a person who was thought to be weak — who had been
promoted because of his mediocrity — whom his own friends did not
respect. A ministerial government, too, is carried on in the face of day.
Its life is in debate. A president may be a weak man; yet if he keep good80/Walter Bagehot
ministers to the end of his administration, he may not be found out it
may still be a dubious controversy whether he is wise or foolish. But a
prime minister must show what he is. He must meet the House of Com-
mons in debate; he must be able to guide that assembly in the manage-
ment of its business, to gain its ear in every emergency, to rule it in its
hours of excitement. He is conspicuously submitted to a searching test,
and if he fails he must resign.
Nor would any party like to trust to a weak man the great power
which a cabinet government commits to its premier. The premier, though
elected by parliament, can dissolve parliament. Members would be natu-
rally anxious that the power which might destroy their coveted dignity
should be lodged in fit hands. They dare not place in unfit hands a
power which, besides hurting the nation, might altogether ruin them. We
may be sure, therefore, that whenever the predominant party is divided,
the un-royal form of cabinet government would secure for us a fair and
able parliamentary leader — that it would give us a good premier, if not
the very best. Can it be said that the royal form does more?
In one case I think it may. If the constitutional monarch be a man of
singular discernment, of unprejudiced disposition, and great political
knowledge, he may pick out from the ranks of the divided party its very
best leader, even at a time when the party, if left to itself, would not
nominate him. If the sovereign be able to play the part of that thor-
oughly intelligent but perfectly disinterested spectator who is so promi-
nent in the works of certain moralists, he may be able to choose better
for his subjects than they would choose for themselves. But if the mon-
arch be not so exempt from prejudice, and have not this nearly miracu-
lous discernment, it is not likely that he will be able to make a wiser
choice than the choice of the party itself. He certainly is not under the
same motive to choose wisely. His place is fixed whatever happens, but
the failure of an appointing party depends on the capacity of their ap-
pointee.
There is great danger, too, that the judgment of the sovereign may
be prejudiced. For more than forty years the personal antipathies of
George III materially impaired successive administrations. Almost at
the beginning of his career he discarded Lord Chatham: almost at the
end he would not permit Mr. Pitt to coalesce with Mr. Fox. He always
preferred mediocrity; he generally disliked high ability; he always dis-
liked great ideas. If constitutional monarchs be ordinary men of restricted
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by miracle they will be more), the judgment of the sovereign will often
be worse than the judgment of the party, and he will be very subject to
the chronic danger of preferring a respectful commonplace man, such
as Addington, to an independent first-rate man, such as Pitt.
We shall arrive at the same sort of mixed conclusion if we examine
the choice of a premier under both systems in the critical case of cabinet
government — the case of three parties. This is the case in which that
species of government is most sure to exhibit its defects, and least likely
to exhibit its merits. The defining characteristic of that government is
the choice of the executive ruler by the legislative assembly; but when
there are three parties a satisfactory choice is impossible. A really good
selection is a selection by a large majority which trusts those it chooses,
but when there are three parties there is no such trust. The numerically
weakest has the casting vote; it can determine which candidate shall be
chosen. But it does so under a penalty. It forfeits the right of voting for
its own candidate. It settles which of other people’s favourites shall be
chosen, on condition of abandoning its own favourite. A choice based
on such self-denial can never be a firm choice — it is a choice at any
moment liable to be revoked. The events of 1858, though not a perfect
illustration of what I mean, are a sufficient illustration. The Radical
party, acting apart from the moderate Liberal party, kept Lord Derby in
power. The ultra-movement party thought it expedient to combine with
the non-movement party. As one of them coarsely but clearly put it,
“We get more of our way under these men than under the other men;” he
meant that, in his judgment, the Tories would be more obedient to the
Radicals than the Whigs. But it is obvious that a union of opposites so
marked could not be durable. The Radicals bought it by choosing the
men whose principles were most adverse to them; the Conservatives
bought it by agreeing to measures whose scope was most adverse to
them. After a short interval the Radicals returned to their natural alli-
ance and their natural discontent with the moderate Whigs. They used
their determining vote first for a government of one opinion and then for
a government of the contrary opinion.
I am not blaming this policy. I am using it merely as an illustration.
I say that if we imagine this sort of action greatly exaggerated and greatly
prolonged parliamentary government becomes impossible. If there are
three parties, no two of which will steadily combine for mutual action,
but of which the weakest gives a rapidly oscillating preference to the
two others, the primary condition of a cabinet polity is not satisfied. We82/Walter Bagehot
have not a parliament fit to choose; we cannot rely on the selection of a
sufficiently permanent executive, because there is no fixity in the thoughts
and feelings of the choosers.
Under every species of cabinet government, whether the royal or
the unroyal, this defect can be cured in one way only. The moderate
people of every party must combine to support the government which,
on the whole, suits every party best. This is the mode in which Lord
Palmerston’s administration has been lately maintained: a ministry in
many ways defective, but more beneficially vigorous abroad, and more
beneficially active at home, than the vast majority of English ministries.
The moderate Conservatives and the moderate Radicals have maintained
a steady government by a sufficiently coherent union with the moderate
Whigs. Whether there is a king or no king, this preservative self-denial
is the main force on which we must rely for the satisfactory continuance
of a parliamentary government at this its period of greatest trial. Will
that moderation be aided or impaired by the addition of a sovereign?
Will it be more effectual under the royal sort of ministerial government,
or will it be less effectual?
If the sovereign has a genius for discernment, the aid which he can
give at such a crisis will be great. He will select for his minister, and if
possible maintain as his minister, the statesman upon whom the moder-
ate party will ultimately fix their choice, but for whom at the outset it is
blindly searching; being a man of sense, experience, and tact, he will
discern which is the combination of equilibrium, which is the section
with whom the milder members of the other sections will at last ally
themselves. Amid the shifting transitions of confused parties, it is prob-
able that he will have many opportunities of exercising a selection. It
will rest with him to call either on A B to form an administration or
upon X Y, and either may have a chance of trial. A disturbed state of
parties is inconsistent with fixity, but it abounds in momentary toler-
ance. Wanting something, but not knowing with precision what, parties
will accept for a brief period any thing, to see whether it may be that
unknown something — to see what it will do. During the long succes-
sion of weak governments which begins with the resignation of the Duke
of Newcastle in 1762 and ends with the accession of Mr. Pitt in 1784,
the vigorous will of George III was an agency of the first magnitude. If
at a period of complex and protracted division of parties, such as are
sure to occur often and last long in every enduring parliamentary gov-
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discreetly, it would be a political benefit of incalculable value.
But will it be so exercised? A constitutional sovereign must in the
common course of government be a man of but common ability. I am
afraid, looking to the early acquired feebleness of hereditary dynasties,
that we must expect him to be a man of inferior ability. Theory and
experience both teach that the education of a prince can be but a poor
education, and that a royal family will generally have less ability than
other families. What right have we then to expect the perpetual entail on
any family of an exquisite discretion, which, if it be not a sort of genius,
is at least as rare as genius?
Probably in most cases the greatest wisdom of a constitutional king
would show itself in well considered inaction. In the confused interval
between 1857 and 1859 the Queen and Prince Albert were far too wise
to obtrude any selection of their own. If they had chosen, perhaps they
would not have chosen Lord Palmerston. But they saw, or may be be-
lieved to have seen, that the world was settling down without them, and
that by interposing an extrinsic agency, they would but delay the benefi-
cial crystallization of intrinsic forces. There is, indeed, a permanent
reason which would make the wisest king, and the king who feels most
sure of his wisdom, very slow to use that wisdom. The responsibility of
parliament should be felt by parliament. So long as parliament thinks it
is the sovereign’s business to find a government, it will be sure not to
find a government itself. The royal form of ministerial government is
the worst of all forms if it erect the subsidiary apparatus into the princi-
pal force, if it induce the assembly which ought to perform paramount
duties to expect some one else to perform them.
It should be observed, too, in fairness to the unroyal species of cabi-
net government, that it is exempt from one of the greatest and most
characteristic defects of the royal species. Where there is no court there
can be no evil influence from a court. What these influences are every
one knows; though no one, hardly the best. and closest observer, can say
with confidence and precision how great their effect is. Sir Robert
Walpole, in language too coarse for our modern manners, declared after
the death of Queen Caroline, that he would pay no attention to the king’s
daughters (“those girls,” as he called them), but would rely exclusively
on Madame de Walmoden, the king’s mistress. “The king,” says a writer
in George IV’s time, “is in our favour, and what is more to the purpose,
the Marchioness of Conyngham is so too.” Everybody knows to what
sort of influences several Italian changes of government since the unity84/Walter Bagehot
of Italy have been attributed. These sinister agencies are likely to be
most effective just when every thing else is troubled, and when, there-
fore, they are particularly dangerous. The wildest and wickedest king’s
mistress would not plot against an invulnerable administration. But very
many will intrigue when parliament is perplexed, when parties are di-
vided, when alternatives are many, when many evil things are possible,
when cabinet government must be difficult.
It is very important to see that a good administration can be started
without a sovereign, because some colonial statesmen have doubted it.
“I can conceive,” it has been said, “that a ministry would go on well
enough without a governor when it was launched, but I do not see how
to launch it.” It has even been suggested that a colony which broke
away from England, and had to form its own government, might not
unwisely choose a governor for life, and solely trusted with selecting
ministers, something like the Abbé Sièyes’ grand elector. But the intro-
duction of such an officer into such a colony would in fact be the volun-
tary erection of an artificial encumbrance to it. He would inevitably be
a party man. The most dignified post in the State must be an object of
contest to the great sections into which every active political community
is divided. These parties mix in every thing and meddle in every thing;
and they neither would nor could permit the most honoured and con-
spicuous of all stations to be filled, except at their pleasure. They know,
too, that the grand elector, the great chooser of ministries, might be, at a
sharp crisis, either a good friend or a bad enemy. The strongest party
would select some one who would be on their side when he had to take
a side, who would; incline to them when he did incline, who should be a
constant auxiliary to them and a constant impediment to their adversar-
ies. It is absurd to choose by contested party election an impartial chooser
of ministers.
But it is during the continuance of a Ministry rather than at its
creation, that the functions of the sovereign will mainly interest most
persons, and that most people will think them to be of the gravest impor-
tance. I own I am myself of that opinion. I think it may be shown that the
post of sovereign over an intelligent and political people under a consti-
tutional monarchy is the post which a wise man would choose above
any other — where he would find the intellectual impulses best stimu-
lated and the worst intellectual impulses best controlled.
On the duties of the Queen during an administration we have an
invaluable fragment from her own hand. In 1851 Louis Napoleon hadThe English Constitution/85
his coup d’état; in 1852 Lord John Russell had his — he expelled Lord
Palmerston. By a most instructive breach of etiquette he read in the
House a royal memorandum on the duties of his rival. It is as follows:
“The Queen requires, first, that Lord Palmerston will distinctly state
what he proposes in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as
distinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction. Secondly, having
once given her sanction to such a measure, that it be not arbitrarily
altered or modified by the minister. Such an act she must consider as
failing in sincerity towards the Crown, and justly to be visited by the
exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that minister. She ex-
pects to be kept informed of what passes between him and foreign min-
isters before important decisions are taken based upon that intercourse;
to receive the foreign despatches in good time; and to have the drafts for
her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted
with their contents before they must be sent off.”
In addition to the control over particular ministers, and especially
over the foreign minister, the Queen has a certain control over the Cabi-
net. The first minister, it is understood, transmits to her authentic infor-
mation of all the most important decisions, together with what the news-
papers would do equally well, the more important votes in Parliament.
He is bound to take care that she knows every thing which there is to
know as to the passing politics of the nation. She has by rigid usage a
right to complain if she does not know of every great act of her ministry,
not only before it is done, but while there is yet time to consider it —
while it is still possible that it may not be done.
To state the matter shortly, the sovereign has, under a constitutional
monarchy such as ours, three rights — the right to be consulted, the
right to encourage, the right to warn. And a king of great sense and
sagacity would want no others. He would find that his having no others
would enable him to use these with singular effect. He would say to his
minister: “The responsibility of these measures is upon you. Whatever
you think best must be done. Whatever you think best shall have my full
and effectual support. But you will observe that for this reason and that
reason what you propose to do is bad; for this reason and that reason
what you do not propose is better. I do not oppose, it is my duty not to
oppose; but observe that I warn.” Supposing the king to be right, and to
have what kings often have, the gift of effectual expression, he could not
help moving his minister. He might not always turn his course, but he
would always trouble his mind.86/Walter Bagehot
In the course of a long reign a sagacious king would acquire an
experience with which few ministers could contend. The king could say:
“Have you referred to the transactions which happened during such and
such an administration, I think about fourteen years ago? They afford
an instructive example of the bad results which are sure to attend the
policy which you propose. You did not at that time take so prominent a
part in public life as you now do, and it is possible you do not fully
remember all the events. I should recommend you to recur to them, and
to discuss them with your older colleagues who took part in them. It is
unwise to recommence a policy which so lately worked so ill.” The king
would indeed have the advantage which a permanent under-secretary
has over his superior the parliamentary secretary — that of having shared
in the proceedings of the previous parliamentary secretaries. These pro-
ceedings were part of his own life; occupied the best of his thoughts,
gave him perhaps anxiety, perhaps pleasure, were commenced in spite
of his dissuasion, or were sanctioned by his approval. The parliamen-
tary secretary vaguely remembers that something was done in the time
of some of his predecessors, when he very likely did not know the least
or care the least about that sort of public business. He has to begin by
learning painfully and imperfectly what the permanent secretary knows
by clear and instant memory. No doubt a parliamentary secretary al-
ways can, and sometimes does, silence his subordinate by the tacit might
of his superior dignity. He says: “I do not think there is much in all that.
Many errors were committed at the time you refer to which we need not
now discuss.” A pompous man easily sweeps away the suggestions of
those beneath him. But though a minister may so deal with his subordi-
nate, he cannot so deal with his king. The social force of admitted supe-
riority by which he overturned his under-secretary is now not with him,
but against him. He has no longer to regard the deferential hints of an
acknowledged inferior, but to answer the arguments of a superior to
whom he has himself to be respectful. George III in fact knew the forms
of public business as well or better than any statesman of his time. If, in
addition to his capacity as a man of business and to his industry, he had
possessed the higher faculties of a discerning statesman, his influence
would have been despotic. The old Constitution of England undoubt-
edly gave a sort of power to the Crown which our present Constitution
does not give. While a majority in parliament was principally purchased
by royal patronage, the king was a party to the bargain either with his
minister or without his minister. But even under our present constitutionThe English Constitution/87
a monarch like George III, with high abilities, would possess the great-
est influence. It is known to all Europe that in Belgium King Leopold
has exercised immense power by the use of such means as I have de-
scribed.
It is known, too, to every one conversant with the real course of the
recent history of England, that Prince Albert really did gain great power
in precisely the same way. He had the rare gifts of a, constitutional
monarch. If his life had been prolonged twenty years, his name would
have been known to Europe as that of King Leopold is known. While he
lived he was at a disadvantage. The statesmen who had most power in
England were men of far greater experience than himself. He might, and
no doubt did, exercise a great, if not a commanding influence over Lord
Malmesbury, but he could not rule Lord Palmerston. The old statesman
who governed England, at an age when most men are unfit to govern
their own families, remembered a whole generation of statesmen who
were dead before Prince Albert was born. The two were of different
ages and different natures. The elaborateness of the German prince —
an elaborateness which has been justly and happily compared with that
of Goethe — was wholly alien to the half-Irish, half-English statesman.
The somewhat boisterous courage in minor dangers, and the obtrusive
use of an always effectual, but not always refined, commonplace, which
are Lord Palmerston’s defects, doubtless grated on Prince Albert, who
had a scholar’s caution and a scholar’s courage. The facts will be known
to our children’s children, though not to us. Prince Albert did much, but
he died ere he could have made his influence felt on a generation of
statesmen less experienced than he was, and anxious to learn from him.
It would be childish to suppose that a conference between a minister
and his sovereign can ever be a conference of pure argument. “The
divinity which doth hedge a king” may have less sanctity than it cad, but
it still has much sanctity. No one, or scarcely any one, can argue with a
cabinet minister in ais own room as well as he would argue with another
man in another room. He cannot make his own points as well; he cannot
unmake as well the points presented to him. A monarch’s room is worse.
The best instance is Lord Chatham, the most dictatorial and imperious
of English statesmen, and almost the first English statesman who was
borne into power against the wishes of the king and against the wishes
of the nobility the first popular minister. We might have expected a
proud tribune of the people to be dictatorial to his sovereign to be to the
king what he was to all others. On the contrary, he was the slave of his88/Walter Bagehot
own imagination; there was a kind of mystic enchantment in vicinity to
the monarch which divested him of his ordinary nature. “The last peep
into the king’s closet,” said Mr. Burke, “intoxicates him, and will to the
end of his life.” A wit said that, even at the levee, he bowed so low that
you could see the tip of his hooked nose between his legs. He was in the
habit of kneeling at the bedside of George III while transacting business.
Now no man can argue on his knees. The same superstitious feeling
which keeps him in that physical attitude will keep him in a correspond-
ing mental attitude. He will not refute the bad arguments of the king as
he will refute another man’s bad arguments. He will not state his own
best argument effectively and incisively when he knows that th king
would not like to hear them. In a nearly balanced argument the king
must always have the bet ter, and in politics many most important argu-
ment; are nearly balanced. Whenever there was much to be said for the
king’s opinion it would have its full weight; whatever was said for the
minister’s opinion; would only have a lessened and enfeebled weight..
The king, too, possesses a power, according to theory, for extreme
use on a critical occasion, but which he can in law use on any occasion.
He can dissolve he can say to his minister in fact, if not in words “This
parliament sent you here, but I will see if I cannot get another parlia-
ment to send some one else here.” George III well understood that it was
best to take his stand at times and on points when it was perhaps likely,
or at any rate not unlikely, the nation would support him. He always
made a minister that he did not like tremble at the shadow of a possible
successor. He had a cunning in such matters like the cunning of insanity.
He had conflicts with the ablest men of his time, and he was hardly ever
baffled. He understood how to help a feeble argument by a tacit threat,
and how best to address it to an habitual deference.
Perhaps such powers as these are what a wise man would most seek
to exercise and least fear to possess. To wish to be a despot, “to hunger
after tyranny,” as the Greek phrase had it, marks in our day an unculti-
vated mind. A person who so wishes cannot have weighed what Butler
calls the “doubtfulness things are involved in.” To be sure you are right
to impose Sour will, or to wish to impose it, with violence upon others;
to see your own ideas vividly and fixedly, nd to be tormented till you can
apply them in life and practice, not to like to hear the opinions of others,
to be unable to sit down and weigh the truth they have, are but crude
states of intellect in our present civilization. We know, at least, that
facts are many; that progress is complicated; that burning ideas (suchThe English Constitution/89
as young men have) are mostly false and always incomplete. The notion
of a far-seeing and despotic statesman, who can lay down plans for ages
yet unborn, is a fancy generated by the pride of the human intellect to
which facts give no support. The plans of Charlemagne died with him;
those of Richelieu were mistaken; those of Napoleon gigantesque and
frantic. But a wise and great constitutional monarch attempts no such
vanities. His career is not in the air; he labours in the world of sober
fact; he deals with schemes which can be effected schemes which are
desirable — schemes which are worth the cost. He says to the ministry
his people send to him, to ministry after ministry, “I think so and so; do
you see if there is any thing in it. I have put down my reasons in a
certain memorandum, which I will give you. Probably it does not ex-
haust the subject, but it will suggest materials for your consideration.”
By years of discussion with ministry after ministry, the best plans of the
wisest king would certainly be adopted, and the inferior plans, the im-
practicable plans, rooted out and rejected. He could not be uselessly
beyond his time, for he would have been obliged to convince the repre-
sentatives, the characteristic men of his time. He would have the best
means of proving that he was right on al new and strange matters, for he
would have won to his side probably, after years of discussion, the cho-
sen agents of the common-place world — men who were where they
were, because they had pleased the mei of the existing age, who will
never be much disposed, to new conceptions or profound thoughts. A
sagacious and original constitutional monarch might go to his grave in
peace if any man could. He would know that his best laws were in
harmony with his age; that they suited the people who were to work
them, the people who were to be benefited by them. And he would have
passed a happy life. He would have passed a life in which he could
always get his arguments heard, in which he could always make those
who had the responsibility of action think of them before they acted —
in which he could know that the schemes which he had set at work in the
world were not the casual accidents of an individual idiosyncrasy, which
are mostly much wrong, but the likeliest of all things to be right — the
ideas of one very intelligent man at last accepted and acted on by the
ordinary intelligent many.
But can we expect such a king, or, for that is the material point, can
we expect a lineal series of such kings? Every one has heard the reply of
the Emperor Alexander to Madame de Staël, who favoured him with a
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only a happy accident.” He well knew that the great abilities and the
good intentions necessary to make an efficient and good despot never
were continuously combined in any line of rulers. He knew that they
were far out of reach of hereditary human nature. Can it be said that the
characteristic qualities of a constitutional monarch ire more within its
reach? I am afraid it cannot. We found just now that the characteristic
use of an hereditary constitutional monarch, at the outset of m adminis-
tration, greatly surpassed the ordinary competence of hereditary facul-
ties. I fear that an impartial investigation will establish the same conclu-
sion as to his uses during the continuance of an administration.
If we look at history, we shall find that it is only luring the period of
the present reign that in England the duties of a constitutional sovereign
have ever been well performed. The first two Georges were ignorant of
English affairs, and wholly unable to guide them, whether well or ill; for
many years in their time the Prime Minister had, over and above the
labour of managing parliament, to manage the woman — sometimes the
queen, sometimes the mistress — who managed the sovereign; George
III interfered unceasingly, but he did harm unceasingly; George IV and
William IV gave no steady continuing guidance, and were unfit to give
it. On the Continent, in first-class countries, constitutional royalty has
never lasted out of one generation. Louis Philippe, Victor Emmanuel,
and Leopold are the founders of their dynasties; we must not reckon in
constitutional monarchy any more than in despotic monarchy on the
permanence in the descendants of the peculiar genius which founded the
race. As far as experience goes, there is no reason to expect an heredi-
tary series of useful limited monarchs.
If we look to theory, there is even less reason to expect it. A mon-
arch is useful when he gives al effectual and beneficial guidance to his
ministers But these ministers are sure to be among the ablest men of
their time. They will have had to conduce the business of parliament so
as to satisfy it: they will have to speak so as to satisfy it. The two
together cannot be done save by a man of very great and varied ability.
The exercise of the two gifts is sure to teach a man much of the world;
and if it did not, a parliamentary leader has to pass through a magnifi-
cent training before he becomes a leader. He has to gain a seat in parlia-
ment; to gain the ear of parliament to gain the confidence of parliament;
to gain the confidence of his colleagues. No one can achieve these — no
one, still more, can both achieve them and retain them — without a
singular ability, nicely trained ir the varied detail of life. What chanceThe English Constitution/91
has an hereditary monarch such as nature forces him to be, suck as
history shows he is, against men so educated and so born? He can but be
an average man to begin with; sometimes he will be clever, but some-
times he will be stupid; in the long run he will be neither clever nor
stupid: he will be the simple, common man who plods the plain routine
of life from the cradle to the grave. His education will be that of one who
has never had to struggle; who has always felt that he has nothing fo
gain; who has had the first dignity given him; who has never seen com-
mon life as in truth it is. It is idle to expect an ordinary man born in the
purple to have greater genius than an extraordinary man born out of the
purple; to expect a man whose place has always been fixed to have a
better judgment than one who has lived by his judgment; to expect a
man whose career will be the same whether he is discreet or whether he
is indiscreet to have the nice discretion of one who has risen by his
wisdom, who will fall if he ceases to be wise.
The characteristic advantage of a constitutional king is the perma-
nence of his place. This gives him the opportunity of acquiring a con-
secutive knowledge of complex transactions, but it gives only an oppor-
tunity. The king must use it. There is no royal road to political affairs:
their detail is vast, disagreeable, complicated, and miscellaneous. A king,
to be the equal of his ministers in discussion, must work as they work;
he must be a man of business as they are men of business. Yet a consti-
tutional prince is the man who is most tempted to pleasure, and the least
forced to business. A despot must feel that he is the pivot of the State.
The stress of his kingdom is upon him. As he is, so are his affairs. He
may be seduced into pleasure; he may neglect all else; but the risk is
evident. He will hurt himself; he may cause a revolution. If he becomes
unfit to govern, some one else who is fit may conspire against him. But
a constitutional king need fear nothing. He may neglect his duties, but
he will not be injured. His place will be as fixed, his income as perma-
nent, his opportunities of selfish enjoyment as full as ever. Why should
he work? It is true he will lose the quiet and secret influence which in the
course of years industry would gain for him; but an eager young man,
on whom the world is squandering its luxuries and its temptations, will
not be much attracted by the distant prospect of a moderate influence
over dull matters. He may form good intentions; he may say “Next year
I will read these papers; I will try ant ask more questions; I will not let
these women tall to me so.” But they will talk to him. The most hopeless
idleness is that most smoothed with excellent plans. “The Lord Trea-92/Walter Bagehot
surer,” says Swift, “promised he will settle it to-night, and so he will say
a hundred nights.” We may depend upon it, the ministry whose power
will be lessened by the prince’s attention will not be too eager to get him
to attend.
So it is if the prince come young to the throne; but the case is worse
when he comes to it old or middle-aged. He is then unfit to work. He will
then have spent the whole of youth and the first part of manhood in
idleness, and it is unnatural to expect him to labour. A pleasure-loving
lounger in middle life will not begin to work as George III worked, or as
Prince Albert worked. The only fit material for a constitutional king is a
prince who begins early to reign who in his youth is superior to pleasure
— who in his youth is willing to labour — who has by nature a genius
for discretion. Such kings are among God’s greatest gifts, but they are
also among His rarest.
An ordinary idle king on a constitutional throne will leave no mark
on his time; he will do little good and as little harm; the royal form of
cabinet government will work in his time pretty much as the unroyal.
The addition of a cypher will not matter though it take precedence of the
significant figures. But corruptio optima pessima. The most evil case
of the royal form is far worse than the most evil case of the unroyal. It is
easy to imagine, upon a constitutional throne, an active and meddling
fool who always acts when he should not, who never acts when he should,
who warns his ministers against their judicious measures, who encour-
ages them in their injudicious measures. It is easy to imagine that such a
king should be the tool of others; that favourites should guide him; that
mistresses should corrupt him; that the atmosphere of a bad court should
be used to degrade free government.
We have had an awful instance of the dangers of constitutional roy-
alty. We have had the case of a meddling maniac. During great part of
his life George III’s reason was half upset by every crisis. Throughout
his life he had an obstinacy akin to that of insanity. He was an obstinate
and an evil influence; he could not be turned from what was inexpedi-
ent; by the aid of his station he turned truer but weaker men from what
was expedient. He gave an excellent moral example to his contemporar-
ies, but he is an instance of those whose good dies with them, while their
evil lives after them. He prolonged the American war, — perhaps he
caused the American war, so we inherit the vestiges of an American
hatred; he forbade Mr. Pitt’s wise plans, so we inherit an Irish difficulty.
He would not let us do right in time, so now our attempts at right are outThe English Constitution/93
of time and fruitless. Constitutional royalty under an active and half-
insane king is one of the worst of governments. There is in it a secret
power which is always eager, which is generally obstinate, which is
often wrong, which rules ministers more than they know themselves,
which overpowers them much more than the public believe, which is
irresponsible because it is inscrutable, which cannot be prevented be-
cause it cannot be seen. The benefits of a good monarch are almost
invaluable, but the evils of a bad monarch are almost irreparable.
We shall find these conclusions confirmed if we examine the pow-
ers and duties of an English monarch at the break-up of an administra-
tion. But the power of dissolution and the prerogative of creating peers,
the cardinal powers of that moment, are too important and involve too
many complex matters to be sufficiently treated at the very end of a
paper as long as this.
III. The House of Lords.
In my last essay I showed that it was possible for a constitutional mon-
arch to be, when occasion served, of first-rate use both at the outset and
during the continuance of an administration; but that in matter of fact it
was not likely that he would be useful. The requisite ideas, habits, and
faculties far surpass the usual competence of an average man, educated
in the common manner of sovereigns. The same arguments are entirely
applicable at the close of an administration. But at that conjuncture the
two most singular prerogatives of an English king — the power of cre-
ating new peers and the power of dissolving the Commons — come into
play; and we cannot duly criticise the use or misuse of these powers till
we know what the peers are and what the House of Commons is.
The use of the House of Lords — or, rather, of the Lords, in its
dignified capacity — is very great. It does not attract so much reverence
as the Queen, but it attracts very much. The office of an order of nobil-
ity is to impose on the common people — not necessarily to impose on
them what is untrue, yet less what is hurtful; but still to impose on their
quiescent imaginations what would not otherwise be there. The fancy of
the mass of men is incredibly weak; it can see nothing without a visible
symbol, and there is much that it can scarcely make out with a symbol.
Nobility is the symbol of mind. It has the marks from which the mass of
men always used to infer mind, and often still infer it. A common clever
man who goes into a country place will get no reverence; but the “old
squire” will get reverence. Even after he is insolvent, when every one94/Walter Bagehot
knows that his ruin is but a question of time, he will get five times as
much respect from the common peasantry as the newly made rich man
who sits beside him. The common peasantry will listen to his nonsense
more submissively than to the new man’s sense. An old lord will get
infinite respect. His very existence is so far useful that it awakens the
sensation of obedience to a sort of mind in the coarse, dull, contracted
multitude, who could neither appreciate or perceive any other.
The order of nobility is of great use, too, not only in what it creates,
but in what it prevents. It prevents the rule of wealth — the religion of
gold. This is the obvious and natural idol of the Anglo-Saxon. He is
always trying to make money; he reckons every thing in coin; he bows
down before a great heap, and sneers as he passes a little heap. He has
a “natural instinctive admiration of wealth for its own sake.” And within
good limits the feeling is quite right. So long as we play the game of
industry vigorously and eagerly (and I hope we shall long play it, for we
must be very different from what we are if we do any thing better), we
shall of necessity respect and admire those who play successfully, and a
little despise those who play unsuccessfully. Whether this feeling be
right or wrong, it is useless to discuss; to a certain degree, it is involun-
tary: it is not for mortals to settle whether we will have it or not; nature
settles for us that, within moderate limits, we must have it. But the
admiration of wealth in many countries goes far beyond this; it ceases to
regard in any degree the skill of acquisition; it respects wealth in the
hands of the inheritor just as much as in the hands of the maker; it is a
simple envy and love of a heap of gold as a heap of gold. From this our
aristocracy preserves us. There is no country where a “poor devil of a
millionnaire is so ill off as in England.” The experiment is tried every
day, and every day it is proved that money alone — money pur et simple
— will not buy “London Society.” Money is kept down, and, so to say,
cowed by the predominant authority of a different power.
But it may be said that this is no gain; that worship for worship, the
worship of money is as good as the worship of rank. Even granting that
it were so, it is a great gain to society to have two idols; in the competi-
tion of idolatries, the true worship gets a chance. But it is not true that
the reverence for rank — at least, for hereditary rank — is as base as
the reverence for money. As the world has gone, manner has been half-
hereditary in certain castes, and manner is one of the fine arts. It is the
style of society; it is in the daily spoken intercourse of human beings
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course. In reverencing wealth we reverence not a man, but an appendix
to a man; in reverencing inherited nobility, we reverence the probable
possession of a great faculty — the faculty of bringing out what is in
one. The unconscious grace of life may be in the middle classes: finely
mannered persons are born everywhere; but it ought to be in the aristoc-
racy; and a man must be born with a hitch in his nerves if he has not
some of it. It is a physiological possession of the race, though it is some-
times wanting in the individual.
There is a third idolatry from which that of rank preserves us, and
perhaps it is the worst of any — that of office. The basest deity is a
subordinate employee, and yet just now in civilized governments it is
the commonest. In France and all the best of the Continent it rules like a
superstition. It is to no purpose that you prove that the pay of petty
officials is smaller than mercantile pay; that their work is more monoto-
nous than mercantile work; that their mind is less useful and their life
more tame. They are still thought to be greater and better. They are
decorés; they have a little red on the left breast of their coat, and no
argument will answer that. In England, by the odd course of our society,
what a theorist would desire has in fact turned up. The great offices,
whether permanent or parliamentary, which require mind now give so-
cial prestige, and almost only those. An Under-Secretary of State with
£2,000 a-year is a much greater man than the director of a finance com-
pany with £5,000, and the country saves the difference. But except in a
few offices like the Treasury, which were once filled with aristocratic
people, and have an odor of nobility at second-hand, minor place is of
no social use. A big grocer despises the exciseman; and what in many
countries would be thought impossible, the exciseman envies the grocer.
Solid wealth tells where there is no artificial dignity given to petty pub-
lic functions. A clerk in the public service is “nobody;” and you could
not make a common Englishman see why he should be anybody.
But it must be owned that this turning of society into a political
expedient has half spoiled it. A great part of the “best” English people
keep their mind in a state of decorous dulness. They maintain their dig-
nity; they get obeyed; they are good and charitable to their dependants.
But they have no notion of play of mind; no conception that the charm
of society depends upon it. They think cleverness an antic, and have a
constant though needless horror of being thought to have any of it. So
much does this stiff dignity give the tone, that the few Englishmen ca-
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whom they can trust, and whom they know to be capable of appreciat-
ing its nuances. But a good government is well worth a great deal of
social dulness. The dignified torpor of English society is inevitable if we
give precedence, not to the cleverest classes, but to the oldest classes,
and we have seen how useful that is.
The social prestige of the aristocracy is, as every one knows, im-
mensely less than it was a hundred years or even fifty years since. Two
great movements — the two greatest of modern society — have been
unfavourable to it. The rise of industrial wealth in countless forms has
brought in a competitor which has generally more mind, and which would
be supreme were it not for awkwardness and intellectual gene. Every
day our companies, our railways, our debentures, and our shares, tend
more and more to multiply these surroundings of the aristocracy, and in
time they will hide it. And while this undergrowth has come up, the
aristocracy have come down. They have less means of standing out than
they used to have. Their power is in their theatrical exhibition, in their
state. But society is every day becoming less stately. As our great sati-
rist has observed, “The last Duke of St. David’s used to cover the north
road with his carriages; landladies and waiters bowed before him. The
present Duke sneaks away from a railway station, smoking a cigar, in a
brougham.” The aristocracy cannot lead the old life if they would; they
are ruled by a stronger power. They suffer from the tendency of all
modern society to raise the average, and to lower — comparatively, and
perhaps absolutely, to lower — the summit. As the picturesqueness, the
featureliness, of society diminishes, aristocracy loses the single instru-
ment of its peculiar power.
If we remember the great reverence which used to be, paid to nobil-
ity as such, we shall be surprised that the House of Lords, as an assem-
bly, has always been inferior; that it was always just as now, not the
first, but the second of our assemblies. I am not, of course, now speak-
ing of the middle ages; I am not dealing with the embryo or the infant
form of our Constitution; I am only speaking of its adult form. Take the
times of Sir R. Walpole. He was Prime Minister because he managed
the House of Commons; he was turned out because he was beaten on an
election petition in that House; he ruled England because he ruled that
House. Yet the nobility were then the governing power in England. In
many districts the word of some lord was law. The “wicked Lord
Lowther,” as he was called, left a name of terror in Westmoreland dur-
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bers and a great part of the county members were their nominees; an
obedient, unquestioning deference was paid them. As individuals the
peers were the greatest people; as a House the collected peers were but
the second House. Several causes contributed to create this anomaly,
but the main cause was a natural one. The House of Peers has never
been a House where the most important peers were most important. It
could not be so. The qualities which fit a man for marked eminence, in
a deliberative assembly, are not hereditary, and are not coupled with
great estates. In the nation, in the provinces, in his own province, a
Duke of Devonshire, or a Duke of Bedford, was a much greater man
than Lord Thurlow. They had great estates, many boroughs, innumer-
able retainers, followings like a court. Lord Thurlow had no boroughs,
no retainers; he lived on his salary. Till the House of Lords met, the
dukes were not only the greatest, but immeasurably the greatest. But as
soon as the House met, Lord Thurlow became the greatest. He could
speak, and the others could not speak. He could transact business in half
an hour which they could not have transacted in a day, or could not have
transacted at all. When some foolish peer, who disliked his domination,
sneered at his birth, he had words to meet the case: he said it was better
for any one to owe his place to his own exertions than to owe it to
descent, to being the “accident of an accident.” But such a House as this
could not be pleasant to great noblemen. They could not like to be sec-
ond in their own assembly (and yet that was their position from age to
age) to a lawyer who was of yesterday, — whom everybody could re-
member without briefs, — who had talked for “hire,” who had “hun-
gered after six-and-eightpence.” Great peers did not gain glory from the
House; on the contrary, they lost glory when they were in the House.
They devised two expedients to get out of this difficulty; they invented
proxies which enabled them to vote without being present, without be-
ing offended by vigour and invective, — without being vexed by ridi-
cule, — without leaving the rural mansion or the town palace where
they were demigods. And what was more effectual still, they used their
influence in the House of Commons instead of the House of Lords. In
that indirect manner a rural potentate, who half returned two county
members, and wholly returned two borough members, — who perhaps
gave seats to members of the Government, who possibly seated the leader
of the Opposition, — became a much greater man than by sitting on his
own bench, in his own House, hearing a chancellor talk. The House of
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force, because the greatest peers, those who had the greatest social im-
portance, did not care for their own House, or like it, but gained great
part of their political power by a hidden but potent influence in the
competing House.
When we cease to look at the House of Lords under its dignified
aspect, and come to regard it under its strictly useful aspect, we find the
literary theory of the English Constitution wholly wrong, as usual. This
theory says that the House of Lords is a co-ordinate estate of the realm,
of equal rank with the House of Commons; that it is the aristocratic
branch, just as the Commons is the popular branch; and that by the
principle of our Constitution the aristocratic branch has equal authority
with the popular branch. So utterly false is this doctrine that it is a
remarkable peculiarity, a capital excellence of the British Constitution,
that it contains a sort of Upper House, which is not of equal authority to
the Lower House, yet still has some authority. The evil of two co-equal
Houses of distinct natures is obvious. Each House can stop all legisla-
tion, and yet some legislation may be necessary. At this moment we
have the best instance of this which could be conceived. The Upper
House of our Victorian Constitution, representing the rich woolgrowers,
has disagreed with the Lower Assembly, and most business is suspended.
But for a most curious stratagem the machine of government would
stand still. Most constitutions have committed this blunder. The two
most remarkable Republican institutions in the world commit it. In both
the American and the Swiss Constitutions the Upper House has as much
authority as the second; it could produce the maximum of impediment
— the deadlock, if it liked; if it does not do so, it is owing not to the
goodness of the legal constitution, but to the discreetness of the mem-
bers of the Chamber. In both these constitutions this dangerous division
is defended by a peculiar doctrine with which I have nothing to do now.
It is said that there must be in a Federal Government some institution,
some authority, some body possessing a veto in which the separate States
composing the Confederation are all equal. I confess this doctrine has to
me no self-evidence, and it is assumed, but not proved. The State of
Delaware is not equal in power or influence to the State of New York,
and you cannot make it so by giving it an equal veto in an Upper Cham-
ber. The history of such an institution is indeed most natural. A little
State will like, and must like, to see some token, some memorial mark of
its old independence preserved in the Constitution by which that inde-
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natural, and another for it to be expedient. If indeed it be that a Federal
Government compels the erection of an Upper Chamber of conclusive
and co-ordinate authority, it is one more in addition to the many other
inherent defects of that kind of government. It may be necessary to have
the blemish, but it is a blemish just as much.
There ought to be in every Constitution an available authority some-
where. The sovereign power must be come-at-able. And the English
have made it so. The House of Lords, at the passing of the Reform Act
of 1832, was as unwilling to concur with the House of Commons as the
Upper Chamber at Victoria to concur with the Lower Chamber. But it
did concur. The Crown has the authority to create new peers; and the
king of the day had promised the ministry of the day to create them. The
House of Lords did not like the precedent, and they passed the Bill. The
power was not used, but its existence was as useful as its energy. Just as
the knowledge that his men can strike makes a master yield in order that
they may not strike, so the knowledge that their House could be swamped
at the will of the king — at the will of the people — made the Lords
yield to the people.
From the Reform Act the function of the House of Lords has been
altered in English history. Before that Act it was, if not a directing Cham-
ber, at least a Chamber of Directors. The leading nobles, who had most
influence in the Commons, and swayed the Commons, sat there. Aristo-
cratic influence was so powerful in the House of Commons, that there
never was any serious breach of unity. When the Houses quarrelled, it
was, as in the great Aylesbury case, about their respective privileges,
and not about the national policy. The influence of the nobility was then
so potent, that it was not necessary to exert it. The English Constitution,
though then on this point very different from what it now is, did not even
then contain the blunder of the Victorian or of the Swiss Constitution. It
had not two Houses of distinct origin; it had two Houses of common
origin — two Houses in which the predominant element was the same.
The danger of discordance was obviated by a latent unity.
Since the Reform Act the House of Lords has become a revising
and suspending House. It can alter Bills; it can reject Bills on which the
House of Commons is not yet thoroughly in earnest — upon which the
nation is not yet determined. Their veto is a sort of hypothetical veto.
They say, We reject your Bill for this once, or these twice, or even these
thrice; but if you keep on sending it up, at last we won’t reject it. The
House has ceased to be one of latent directors, and has become one of100/Walter Bagehot
temporary rejectors and palpable alterers. It is the sole claim of the
Duke of Wellington to the name of a statesman that he presided over this
change. He wished to guide the Lords to their true position, and he did
guide them. In 1846, in the crisis of the Corn-Law struggle, and when it
was a question whether the House of Lords should resist or yield, he
wrote a. very curious letter to the late Lord Derby: —
“For many years, indeed from the year 1830, when I retired from
office, I have endeavoured to manage the House of Lords upon the prin-
ciple on which I conceive that the institution exists in the Constitution of
the country, that of Conservatism. I have invariably objected to all vio-
lent and extreme measures, which is not exactly the mode of acquiring
influence in a political party in England, particularly one in opposition
to Government. I have invariably supported Government in Parliament
upon important occasions, and have always exercised my personal in-
fluence to prevent the mischief of any thing like a difference or division
between the two Houses, of which there are some remarkable instances,
to which I will advert here, as they will tend to show you the nature of
my management, and possibly, in some degree, account for the extraor-
dinary power which I have for so many years exercised, without any
apparent claim to it.
“Upon finding the difficulties in which the late King William was
involved by a promise made to create peers, the number, I believe, in-
definite, I determined myself, and I prevailed upon others, the number
very large, to be absent from the House in the discussion of the last
stages of the Reform Bill, after the negotiations had failed for the for-
mation of a new Administration. This course gave at the time great
dissatisfaction to the party; notwithstanding that I believe it saved the
existence of the House of Lords at the time and the Constitution of the
country.
“Subsequently, throughout the period from 1835 to 1841, I pre-
vailed upon the House of Lords to depart from many principles and
systems which they as well as I had adopted and voted on Irish tithes,
Irish corporations, and other measures, much to the vexation and an-
noyance of many. But I recollect one particular measure, the union of
the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, in the early stages of which
I had spoken in opposition to the measure, and had protested against it;
and in the last stages of it I prevailed upon the House to agree to, and
pass it, in order to avoid the injury to the public interests of a dispute
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ported the measures of the Government, and protected the servant of the
Government, Captain Elliot, in China. All of which tended to weaken
my influence with some of the party; others, possibly a majority, might
have approved of the course which I took. It was at the same time well
known that, from the commencement at least of Lord Melbourne’s Gov-
ernment, I was in constant communication with it, upon all military
matters, whether occurring at home or abroad, at all events. But like-
wise upon many others.
“All this tended, of course, to diminish my influence in the Conser-
vative party, while it tended essentially to the ease and satisfaction of
the Sovereign, and to the maintenance of good order. At length came the
resignation of the Government by Sir Robert Peel, in the month of De-
cember last, and the Queen desiring Lord John Russell to form an Ad-
ministration. On the 12th of December the Queen wrote to me the letter
of which I enclose the copy, and the copy of my answer of the same
date; of which it appears that you have never seen copies, although I
communicated them immediately to Sir Robert Peel. It was impossible
for me to act otherwise than is indicated in my letter to the Queen. I am
the servant of the Crown and people. I have been paid and rewarded,
and I consider myself retained; and that I can’t do otherwise than serve
as required, when I can do so without dishonour, that is to say, as long
as I have health and strength to enable me to serve. But it is obvious that
there is, and there must be, an end of all connection and counsel between
party and me. I might with consistency, and some may think that I ought
to, have declined to belong to Sir Robert Peel’s Cabinet on the night of
the 20th of December. But my opinion is, that if I had, Sir Robert Peel’s
Government would not have been framed; that we should have had —
— and —— in office next morning.
“But, at all events, it is quite obvious that when that arrangement
comes, which sooner or later must come, there will be an end to all
influence on my part over the Conservative party, if I should be so indis-
creet as to attempt to exercise any. You will see, therefore, that the stage
is quite clear for you, and that you need not apprehend the consequences
of differing in opinion from me when you will enter upon it; as in truth
I have, by my letter to the Queen of the 12th of December, put an end to
the connection between the party and me, when the party will be in
opposition to her Majesty’s Government.
“My opinion is, that the great object of all is that you should as-
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cised in the House of Lords. The question is, how is that object to be
attained? By guiding their opinion and decision, or by following it? You
will see that I have endeavoured to guide their opinion, and have suc-
ceeded upon some most remarkable occasions. But it has been by a
good deal of management.
“Upon the important occasion and question now before the House,
I propose to endeavour to induce them to avoid to involve the country in
the additional difficulties of a difference of opinion, possibly a dispute
between the Houses, on a question in the decision of which it has been
frequently asserted that their lordships had a personal interest; which
assertion, however false as affecting each of them personally, could not
be denied as affecting the proprietors of land in general. I am aware of
the difficulty, but I don’t despair of carrying the Bill through. You must
be the best judge of the course which you ought to take, and of the
course most likely to conciliate the confidence of the House of Lords.
My opinion is, that you should advise the House to vote that which
would tend most to public order, and would be most beneficial to the
immediate interests of the country.”
This is the mode in which the House of Lords came to be what it
now is, a chamber with (in most cases) a veto of delay, with (in most
cases) a power of revision, but with no other rights or powers. The
question we have to answer is, “The House of Lords being such, what is
the use of the Lords?”
The common notion evidently fails, that it is a bulwark against im-
minent revolution. As the Duke’s letter in every line evinces, the wisest
members, the guiding members of the House, know that the House must
yield to the people if the people is determined. The two cases that of the
Reform Act and the Corn Laws were decisive cases. The great majority
of the Lords thought Reform revolution, Free-trade confiscation, and
the two together ruin. If they could ever have been trusted to resist the
people, they would then have resisted it. But in truth it is idle to expect
a second chamber — a chamber of notables — ever to resist a popular
chamber, a nation’s chamber, when that chamber is vehement and the
nation vehement too. There is no strength in it for that purpose. Every
class chamber, every minority chamber, so to speak, feels weak and
helpless when the nation is excited. In a time of revolution there are but
two powers, the sword and the people. The executive commands the
sword; the great lesson which the First Napoleon taught the Parisian
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18th Brumaire — is now well known. Any strong soldier at the head of
the army can use the army. But a second chamber cannot use it. It is a
pacific assembly, composed of timid peers, aged lawyers, or, as abroad,
clever litterateurs. Such a body has no force to put down the nation, and
if the nation will have it do something it must do it.
The very nature, too, as has been seen, of the Lords in the English
Constitution, shows that it cannot stop revolution. The constitution con-
tains an exceptional provision to prevent its stopping it. The executive,
the appointee of the popular chamber and the nation, can make new
peers, and so create a majority in the peers; it can say to the Lords, “Use
the powers of your House as we like, or you shall not use them at all. We
will find others to use them; your virtue shall go out of you if it is not
used as we like, and stopped when we please.” An assembly under such
a threat cannot arrest, and could not be intended to arrest, a determined
and insisting executive.
In fact the House of Lords, as a House, is not a. bulwark that will
keep out revolution, but an index that revolution is unlikely. Resting as
it does upon old deference, and inveterate. homage, it shows that the
spasm of new forces, the outbreak of new agencies, which we call revo-
lution, is for the time simply impossible. So long as many old leaves
linger on the November trees, you know that there has been little frost
and no wind: just so while the House of Lords retains much power, you
may know that there is no desperate discontent in the country, no wild
agency likely to cause a great demolition.
There used to be a singular idea that two chambers — a revising
chamber and a suggesting chamber were essential to a free government.
The first person who threw a hard stone — an effectually hitting stone
— against the theory was one very little likely to be favourable to demo-
cratic influence, or to be blind to the use of aristocracy; it was the present
Lord Grey. He had to look at the matter practically. He was the first
great colonial minister of England who ever set himself to introduce
representative institutions into all her capable colonies, and the diffi-
culty stared him in the face that in those colonies there were hardly
enough good people for one assembly, and not near enough good people
for two assemblies. It happened — and most naturally happened — that
a second assembly was mischievous. The second assembly was either
the nominee of the Crown, which in such places naturally allied itself
with better instructed minds, or was elected by people with a higher
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choosers choose the best men in the colony, and put them into the second
assembly. But thus the popular assembly was left without those best
men. The popular assembly was denuded of those guides and those leaders
who would have led and guided it best. Those superior men were put
aside to talk to one another, and perhaps dispute with one another; they
were a concentrated instance of high but neutralized forces. They wished
to do good, but they could do nothing. The Lower House, with all the
best people in the colony extracted, did what it liked. The democracy
was strengthened rather than weakened by the isolation of its best oppo-
nents in a weak position. As soon as experience had shown this, or
seemed to show it, the theory that two chambers were essential to a good
and free government vanished away.
With a perfect Lower House it is certain that an Upper House would
be scarcely of any value. If we had an ideal House of Commons per-
fectly representing the nation, always moderate, never passionate,
abounding in men of leisure, never omitting the slow and steady forms
necessary for good consideration, it is certain that we should not need a
higher chamber. The work would be done so well that we should not
want any one to look over or revise it. And whatever is unnecessary in
government is pernicious. Human life makes so much complexity nec-
essary that an artificial addition is sure to do harm: you cannot tell
where the needless bit of machinery will catch and clog the hundred
needful wheels; but the chances are conclusive that it will impede them
somewhere, so nice are they and so delicate. But though beside an ideal
House of Commons the Lords would be unnecessary, and therefore per-
nicious, beside the actual House a revising and leisured legislature is
extremely useful, if not quite necessary.
At present the chance majorities on minor questions in the House of
Commons are subject to no effectual control. The nation never attends
to any but the principal matters of policy and state. Upon these it forms
that rude, rough, ruling judgment which we call public opinion; but
upon other things it does not think at all, and it would be useless for it to
think. It has not the materials for forming a judgment: the detail of Bills,
the instrumental part of policy, the latent part of legislation, are wholly
out of its way. It knows nothing about them, and could not find time or
labour for the careful investigation by which alone they can be appre-
hended. A casual majority of the House of Commons has therefore domi-
nant power: it can legislate as it wishes. And though the whole House of
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and though its judgment upon minor questions is, from some secret ex-
cellencies in its composition, remarkably sound and good; yet, like all
similar assemblies, it is subject to the sudden action of selfish combina-
tions. There are said to be two hundred “members for the railways” in
the present Parliament. If these two hundred choose to combine on a
point which the public does not care for, and which they care for be-
cause it affects their purse, they are absolute. A formidable sinister in-
terest may always obtain the complete command of a dominant assem-
bly by some chance and for a moment, and it is therefore of great use to
have a second chamber of an opposite sort, differently composed, in
which that interest in all likelihood will not rule.
The most dangerous of all sinister interests is that of the executive
Government, because it is the most powerful. It is perfectly possible —
it has happened, and will happen again that the Cabinet, being very
powerful in the Commons, may inflict minor measures on the nation
which the nation did not like, but which it did not understand enough to
forbid. If, therefore, a tribunal of revision can be found in which the
executive, though powerful, is less powerful, the government will be the
better; the retarding chamber will impede minor instances of parliamen-
tary tyranny, though it will not prevent or much impede revolution.
Every large assembly is, moreover, a fluctuating body; it is not one
house, so to say, but a set of houses; it is one set of men to-night and
another to-morrow night. A certain unity is doubtless preserved by the
duty which the executive is supposed to undertake, and does undertake,
of keeping a house; a constant element is so provided about which all
sorts of variables accumulate and pass away. But even after due allow-
ance for the full weight of this protective machinery, our House of Com-
mons is, as all such chambers must be, subject to sudden turns and
bursts of feeling, because the members who compose it change from
time to time. The pernicious result is perpetual in our legislation; many
acts of Parliament are medleys of different motives, because the major-
ity which passed one set of its clauses is different from that which passed
another set.
But the greatest defect of the House of Commons is that it has no
leisure. The life of the House is the worst of all lives — a life of distract-
ing routine. It has an amount of business brought before it such as no
similar assembly ever has had. The British empire is a miscellaneous
aggregate, and each bit of the aggregate brings its bit of business to the
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China, and then Schleswig-Holstein. Our legislation touches on all sub-
jects, because our country contains all ingredients. The mere questions
which are asked of the ministers run over half human affairs; the Private
Bill Acts, the mere previlegia of our Government — subordinate as
they ought to be — probably give the House of Commons more abso-
lute work than the whole business, both national and private, of any
other assembly which has ever sat. The whole scene is so encumbered
with changing business, that it is hard to keep your head in it.
Whatever, too, may be the case hereafter, when a better system has
been struck out, at present the House does all the work of legislation, all
the detail, and all the clauses itself. One of the most helpless exhibitions
of helpless ingenuity and wasted mind is a committee of the whole House
on a Bill of many clauses which eager enemies are trying to spoil, and
various friends are trying to mend. An Act of Parliament is at least as
complex as a marriage settlement; and it is made much as a settlement
would be if it were left to the vote and settled by the major part of
persons concerned, including the unborn children. There is an advocate
for every interest, and every interest clamours for every advantage. The
executive Government by means of its disciplined forces, and the few
invaluable members who sit and think, preserves some sort of unity. But
the result is very imperfect. The best test of a machine is the work it
turns out. Let any one who knows what legal documents ought to be,
read first a will he has just been making ana then an Act of Parliament;
he will certainly say, “ I would have dismissed my attorney if he had
done my business as the legislature has done the nation’s business.”
While the House of Commons is what it is, a good revising, regulating,
and retarding House would be a benefit of great magnitude.
But is the House of Lords such a chamber? Does it do this work?
This is almost an undiscussed question. The House of Lords, for thirty
years at least, has been in popular discussion an accepted matter. Popu-
lar passion has not crossed the path, and no vivid imagination has been
excited to clear the matter up.
The House of Lords has the greatest merit which such a chamber
can have; it is possible. It is incredibly difficult to get a revising assem-
bly, because it is difficult to find a class of respected revisers. A federal
senate, a second House, which represents State Unity, has this advan-
tage; it embodies a feeling at the root of society — a feeling which is
older than complicated politics, which is stronger a thousand times over
than common political feelings — the local feeling. “My shirt,” said theThe English Constitution/107
Swiss state-right patriot, “is dearer to me than my coat.” Every State in
the American Union would feel that disrespect to the Senate was disre-
spect to itself. Accordingly, the Senate is respected whatever may be the
merits or demerits of its action, it can act; it is real, independent, and
efficient. But in common governments it is fatally difficult to make an
unpopular entity powerful in a popular government.
It is almost the same thing to say that the House of Lords is inde-
pendent. It would not be powerful, it would not be possible, unless it
were known to be independent. The Lords are in several respects more
independent than the Commons; their judgment may not be so good a
judgment, but it is emphatically their own judgment. The House of Lords,
as a body, is accessible to no social bribe. And this, in our day, is no
light matter. Many members of the House of Commons, who are to be
influenced by no other manner of corruption, are much influenced by
this its most insidious sort. The conductors of the press and the writers
for it are worse — at least the more influential who come near the temp-
tation; for “position,” as they call it, for a certain intimacy with the
aristocracy, some of them would do almost any thing and say almost
any thing. But the Lords are those who give social bribes, and not those
who take them. They are above corruption because they are the corrup-
tors. They have no constituency to fear or wheedle; they have the best
means of forming a disinterested and cool judgment of any class in the
country. They have, too, leisure to form it. They have no occupations to
distract them which are worth the name. Field sports are but plaything’s,
though some Lords put an Englishman’s seriousness into them. Few
Englishmen can bury themselves in science or literature; and the aris-
tocracy have less, perhaps, of that impetus than the middle classes. Soci-
ety is too correct and dull to be an occupation, as in other times and ages
it has been. The aristocracy live in the fear of the middle classes — of
the grocer and the merchant. They dare not frame a society of enjoy-
ment as the French aristocracy once formed it. Politics are the only
occupation a peer has worth the name. He may pursue them
undistractedly. The House of Lords, besides independence to revise ju-
dicially and position to revise effectually, has leisure to revise intellectu-
ally.
These are great merits; and, considering how difficult it is to get a
good second chamber, and how much with our present first chamber we
need a second, we may well be thankful for them. But we must not
permit them to blind our eyes. Those merits of the Lords have faults108/Walter Bagehot
close beside them which go far to make them useless. With its wealth,
its place, and its leisure, the House of Lords would, on the very surface
of the matter, rule us far more than it does if it had not secret defects
which hamper and weaken it.
The first of these defects is hardly to be called secret, though, on the
other hand, it is not well known. A severe though not unfriendly critic of
our institutions said that “the cure for admiring the House of Lords was
to go and look at it” — to look at it not on a great party field-day, or at
a time of parade, but in the ordinary transaction of business. There are
perhaps ten peers in the House, possibly only six; three is the quorum
for transacting business. A few more may dawdle in or not dawdle in;
those are the principal speakers, the lawyers (a few years ago when
Lyndhurst, Brougham, and Campbell were in vigour, they were by far
the predominant talkers) and a few statesmen whom every one knows.
But the mass of the House is nothing. This is why orators trained in the
Commons detest to speak in the Lords. Lord Chatham used to call it the
“Tapestry.” The House of Commons is a scene of life if ever there was
a scene of life. Every member in. the throng, every atom in the medley,
has his own. objects (good or bad), his own purposes (great or petty);
his own notions, such as they are, of what is; his own notions, such as
they are, of what ought to be. There is a motley confluence of vigorous
elements, but the result is one and good. There is a “feeling the House,”
a “sense” of the House, and no one who knows any thing of it can
despise it. A very shrewd man of the world went so far as to say that
“the House of Commons has more sense than any one in it.” But there is
no, such “sense” in the House of Lords, because there is no life. The
Lower Chamber is a chamber of eager politicians; the Upper (to say the
least) of not eager ones.
This apathy is not, indeed, as great as the outside show would indi-
cate. The committees of the Lords (as is well known) do a great deal of
work, and do it very well. And such as it is, the apathy is very natural.
A House composed of rich men who can vote by proxy without coming
will not come very much.5 But after every abatement the real indiffer-
ence to their duties of most peers is a great defect, and the apparent
indifference is a dangerous defect. As far as politics go there is pro-
found truth in Lord Chesterfield’s axiom, that “the world must judge of
you by what you seem, not by what you are.” The world knows what
you seem; it does not know what you are. An assembly —a revising
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does not care how it revises, is defective in a main political ingredient. It
may be of use, but it will hardly convince mankind that it is so.
The next defect is even more serious; it affects not simply the ap-
parent work of the House of Lords, but the real work. For a revising
legislature, it is too uniformly made up. Errors are of various kinds; but
the constitution of the House of Lords only guards against a single error
— that of too quick change. The Lords — leaving out a few lawyers and
a few outcasts — are all land-owners of more or less wealth. They all
have more or less the opinions, the merits, the faults of that one class.
They revise legislation, as far as they do revise it, exclusively according
to the supposed interests, the predominant feelings, the inherited opin-
ions, of that class. Since the Reform Act, this uniformity of tendency
has been very evident. The Lords have felt — it would be harsh to say
hostile, but still dubious, as to the new legislation. There was a spirit in
it alien to their spirit, and which when they could they have tried to cast
out. That spirit is what has been termed the “modern spirit.” It is not
easy to concentrate its essence in a phrase: it lives in our life, animates
our actions, suggests our thoughts. We all know what it means, though
it would take an essay to limit it and define it. To this the Lords object;
wherever it is concerned, they are not impartial revisers, but biassed
revisers.
This singleness of composition would be no fault, it would be, or
might be, even a merit, if the criticism of the House of Lords, though a
suspicious criticism, were yet a criticism of great understanding. The
characteristic legislation of every age must have characteristic defects;
it is the outcome of a character, of necessity faulty and limited. It must
mistake some kind of things; it must overlook some other. If we could
get hold of a complemental critic, a critic who saw what the age did not
see, and who saw rightly what the age mistook, we should have a critic
of inestimable value. But is the House of Lords that critic? Can it be
said that its unfriendliness to the legislation of the age is founded on a
perception of what the age does not see, and a rectified perception of
what the age does see? The most extreme partisan, the most warm ad-
mirer of the Lords, if of fair and tempered mind, cannot say so. The
evidence is too strong. On free trade, for example, no one can doubt that
the Lords-in opinion, in what they wished to do, and would have done, if
they had acted on their own minds — were utterly wrong. This is the
clearest test of the “modern spirit.” It is easier here to be sure it is right
than elsewhere. Commerce is like war; its result is patent. Do you make110/Walter Bagehot
money or do you not make it? There is as little appeal from figures as
from battle. Now no one can doubt that England is a great deal better off
because of free trade; that it has more money, and that its money is
diffused more as we should wish it diffused. In the one case in which we
can unanswerably test the modern spirit, it was right, and the dubious
Upper House — the House which would have rejected it, if possible —
was wrong.
There is another reason. The House of Lords, being an hereditary
chamber, cannot be of more than common ability. It may contain — it
almost always has contained, it almost always will contain extraordi-
nary men. But its average born law-makers cannot be extraordinary.
Being a set of eldest sons picked out by chance and history, it cannot be
very wise. It would be a standing miracle if such a chamber possessed a
knowledge of its age superior to the other men of the age; if it possessed
a superior and supplemental knowledge; if it descried what they did not
discern, and saw truly that which they saw, indeed, but saw untruly.
The difficulty goes deeper. The task of revising, of adequately re-
vising the legislation of this age, is not only that which an aristocracy
has no facility in doing, but one which it has a difficulty in doing. Look
at the statute book for 1865 the statutes at large for the year. You will
find, not pieces of literature, not nice and subtle matters, but coarse
matters, crude heaps of heavy business. They deal with trade, with fi-
nance, with statute law reform, with common law reform; they deal
with various sorts of business, but with business always. And there is
no educated human being less likely to know business, worse placed for
knowing business, than a young lord. Business is really more agreeable
than pleasure; it interests the whole mind, the aggregate nature of man
more continuously, and more deeply. But it does not look as if it did. It
is difficult to convince a young man, who can have the best of pleasure,
that it will. A young lord just come into £30,000 a year will not, as a
rule, care much for the law of patents, for the law of “passing tolls,” or
the law of prisons. Like Hercules, he may choose virtue, but hardly
Hercules could choose business. He has every thing to allure him from
it, and nothing to allure him to it. And even if he wish to give himself to
business, he has indifferent means. Pleasure is near him, but business is
far from him. Few things are more amusing than the ideas of a well-
intentioned young man, who is born out of the business world, but who
wishes to take to business, about business. He has hardly a notion in
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equally certain particular ends. But hardly any young man destitute of
experience is able to separate end and means. It seems to him a kind of
mystery; and it is lucky if he do not think that the forms are the main
part, and that the end is but secondary. There are plenty of business
men, falsely so called, who will advise him so. The subject seems a kind
of maze. “What would you recommend me to read?” the nice youth
asks; and it is impossible to explain to him that reading has nothing to
do with it, that he has not yet the original ideas in his mind to read
about; that administration is an art as painting is an art; and that no
book can teach the practice of either.
Formerly this defect in the aristocracy was hidden by their other
advantages. Being the only class at ease for money and cultivated in
mind they were without competition; and though they might not be, as a
rule, and extraordinary ability excepted, excellent in State business, they
were the best that could be had. Even in old times, however, they shel-
tered themselves from the greater pressure of coarse work. They ap-
pointed a manager a Peel or a Walpole, any thing but an aristocrat in
manner or in nature to act for them and manage for them. But now a
class is coming up trained to thought, full of money, and yet trained to
business. As I write, two members of this class have been appointed to
stations considerable in themselves, and sure to lead (if any thing is sure
in politics) to the Cabinet and power. This is the class of highly culti-
vated men of business who, after a few years, are able to leave business
and begin ambition. As yet these men are few in public life, because
they do not know their own strength. It is like Columbus and the egg
once again; a few original men will show it can be done, and then a
crowd of common men will follow. These men know business partly
from tradition, and this is much. There are University families — fami-
lies who talk of fellowships, and who invest their children’s ability in
Latin verses as soon as they discover it; there used to be Indian families
of the same sort, and probably will be again when the competitive sys-
tem has had time to foster a new breed. Just so there are business fami-
lies to whom all that concerns money, all that concerns administration,
is as familiar as the air they breathe. All Americans, it has been said,
know business; it is in the air of their country. Just so certain classes
know business here; and a lord can hardly know it. It is as great a
difficulty to learn business in a palace as it is to learn agriculture in a
park.
To one kind of business, indeed, this doctrine does not apply. There112/Walter Bagehot
is one kind of business in which our aristocracy have still, and are likely
to retain long, a certain advantage. This is the business of diplomacy.
Napoleon, who knew men well, would never, if he could help it, employ
men of the Revolution in missions to the old courts; he said, “They
spoke to no one, and no one spoke to them;” and so they sent home no
information. The reason is obvious. The old-world diplomacy of Eu-
rope was largely carried on in drawing-rooms, and, to a great extents of
necessity still is so. Nations touch at-their summits. It is always the
highest class which travels most, knows most of foreign nations, has the
least of the territorial sectarianism which calls itself patriotism, and is
often thought to be so. Even here, indeed, in England the new trade-
class is in real merit equal to the aristocracy. Their knowledge of for-
eign things is as great, and their contact with them often more. But,
notwithstanding, the new race is not as serviceable for diplomacy as the
old race. An ambassador is not simply an agent; he is also a spectacle.
He is sent abroad for show as well as for substance; he is to represent
the Queen among foreign courts and foreign sovereigns. An aristocracy
is in its nature better suited to such work: it is trained to the theatrical
part of life; it is fit for that if it is fit for any thing.
But, with this exception, an aristocracy is necessarily inferior in
business to the classes nearer business; and it is not, therefore, a suit-
able class, if we had our choice of classes, out of which to frame a
chamber for revising matters of business. It is indeed a singular ex-
ample how natural business is to the English race, that the House of
Lords works as well as it does.. The common appearance of the “whole
House” is a jest — a dangerous anomaly, which Mr. Bright will some-
times use; but a great deal of substantial work is done in “Committees,”
and often very well done. The great majority of the Peers do none of
their appointed work, and could do none of it; but a minority -a minority
never so large and never so earnest as in this age — do it, and do it well.
Still no one, who examines the matter without prejudice, can say that
the work is done perfectly. In a country so rich in mind as England, far
more intellectual power can be, and ought to be, applied to the revision
of our laws.
And not only does the House of Lords do its work imperfectly, but
often, at least, it does it timidly. Being only a section of the nation, it is
afraid of the nation. Having been used for years and years, on the great-
est matters to act contrary to its own judgment, it hardly knows when to
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earnest young Peer is at times ridiculous. “When the Corn Laws are
gone, and the rotten boroughs, why tease about Clause IX. in the Bill to
regulate Cotton Factories?” is the latent thought of many Peers. A word
from the leaders, from “the Duke,” or Lord Derby, or Lord Lyndhurst,
will rouse on any matters the sleeping energies; but most Lords are
feeble and forlorn.
These grave defects would have been at once lessened, and in the
course of years nearly effaced, if the House of Lords had not resisted the
proposal of Lord Palmerston’s first government to create peers for life.
The expedient was almost perfect. The difficulty of reforming an old
institution like the House of Lords is necessarily great; its possibility
rests on continuous caste and ancient deference. And if you begin to
agitate about it, to bawl at meetings about it, that deference is gone, its
peculiar charm lost, its reserved sanctity gone. But, by an odd fatality,
there was in the recesses of the Constitution an old prerogative which
would have rendered agitation needless — which would have effected,
without agitation, all that agitation could have effected. Lord Palmerston
was — now that he is dead, and his memory can be calmly viewed — as
firm a friend to an aristocracy, as thorough an aristocrat, as any in
England; yet he proposed to use that power. If the House of Lords had
still been under the rule of the Duke of Wellington, perhaps they would
have acquiesced. The Duke would not indeed have reflected on all the
considerations which a philosophic statesman would have set out before
him; but he would have been brought right by one of his peculiarities.
He disliked, above all things, to oppose the Crown. At a great crisis, at
the crisis of the Corn Laws, what he considered was not what other
people were thinking of, the economical issue under discussion, the
welfare of the country hanging in the balance, but the Queen’s ease. He
thought the Crown so superior a part in the Constitution, that, even on
vital occasions, he looked solely -or said he looked solely — to the
momentary comfort of the present sovereign. He never was comfortable
in opposing a conspicuous act of the Crown. It is very likely that, if the
Duke had still been the President of the House of Lords, they would
have permitted the Crown to prevail in its well-chosen scheme. But the
Duke was dead, and his authority -or some of it — had fallen to a very
different person. Lord Lyndhurst had many great qualities; he had a
splendid intellect — as great a faculty of finding truth as any one in his
generation; but he had no love of truth. With this great faculty of finding
truth, he was a believer in error — in what his own party now admit to114/Walter Bagehot
be error — all his life through. He could have found the truth as a
statesman just as he found it when a judge; but he never did find it. He
never looked for it. He was a great partisan, and he applied a capacity of
argument, and a faculty of intellectual argument rarely equalled, to sup-
port the tenets of his party. The proposal to create life-peers was pro-
posed by the antagonistic party — was at the moment likely to injure his
own party. To him this was a great opportunity. The speech he delivered
on that occasion lives in the memory of those who heard it. His eyes did
not at that time let him read, so he repeated by memory, and quite accu-
rately, all the black-letter authorities bearing on the question. So great
an intellectual effort has rarely been seen in an English assembly. But
the result was deplorable. Not by means of his black-letter authorities,
but by means of his recognized authority and his vivid impression, he
induced the House of Lords to reject the proposition of the Government.
Lord Lyndhurst said the Crown could not now create life-peers, and so
there are no life-peers. The House of Lords rejected the inestimable, the
unprecedented opportunity of being tacitly reformed. Such a chance does
not come twice. The life-peers who would have been then introduced
would have been among the first men in the country. Lord Macaulay
was to have been among the first; Lord Wensleydale — the most learned
and not the least logical of our lawyers — to be the very first. Thirty or
forty such men, added judiciously and sparingly as years went on, would
have given to the House of Lords the very element which, a! a criticising
Chamber, it needs so much. It would have given it critics. The most
accomplished men in each department might then, without irrelevant
considerations of family and of fortune, have been added to the Cham-
ber of Review. The very element which was wanted to the House of
Lords was, as it were, by a constitutional providence, offered to the
House of Lords, and they refused it. By what species of effort that error
can be repaired, I cannot tell; but, unless it is repaired, the intellectual
capacity can never be what it would have been, will never be what it
ought to be, will never be sufficient for its work.
Another reform ought to have accompanied the creation of life-peers.
Proxies ought to have been abolished. Some time or other the slack
attendance of the House of Lords will destroy the House of Lords. There
are occasions in which appearances are realities, and this is one of them.
The House of Lords on most days looks so unlike what it ought to be,
that most people will not believe it is what it ought to be. The attendance
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longer be overpowered by the non-attendance, by the commissioned votes
of inconsiderate peers. The abolition of proxies would have made the
House of Lords a real House; the addition of life-peers would have
made it a good House.
The greater of these changes would have most materially aided the
House of Lords in the performance of its subsidiary functions. It always
perhaps happens in a great nation, that certain bodies of sensible men
posted prominently in its constitution, acquire functions, and usefully
exercise functions, which, at the outset, no one expected from them, and
which do not identify themselves with their original design. This has
happened to the House of Lords especially. The most obvious instance
is the judicial function. This is a function which no theorist would as-
sign to a second chamber in a new constitution, and which is matter of
accident in ours. Gradually, indeed, the unfitness of the second chamber
for judicial functions has made itself felt. Under our present arrange-
ments this function is not intrusted to the House of Lords, hut to a Com-
mittee of the House of Lords. On one occasion only, the trial of O’Connell,
the whole House, or some few in the whole House, wished to vote, and
they were told they could not, or they would destroy the judicial pre-
rogative. No one, indeed, would venture really to place the judicial func-
tion in the chance majorities of a fluctuating assembly: it is so by a
sleepy theory; it is not so in living fact. As a legal question, too, it is a
matter of grave doubt whether there ought to be two supreme courts in
this country — the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and (what
is in fact though not in name) the Judicial Committee of the House of
Lords. Up to a very recent time one committee might decide that a man
was sane as to money, and the other committee might decide that he was
insane as to land. This absurdity has been cured; but the error from
which it arose has not been cured — the error of having two supreme
courts, to both of which, as time goes on, the same question is sure often
enough to be submitted, and each of which is sure every now and then to
decide it differently. I do not reckon the judicial function of the House of
Lords as one of its true subsidiary functions, first because it does not in
fact exercise it, next because I wish to see it in appearance deprived of
it. The supreme court of the English people ought to be a great con-
spicuous tribunal, ought to rule all other courts, ought to have no com-
petitor, ought to bring our law into unity, ought not to be hidden beneath
the robes of a legislative assembly.
The real subsidiary functions of the House of Lords are, unlike its116/Walter Bagehot
judicial functions, very analogous to its substantial nature. The first is
the faculty of criticising the executive. An assembly in which the mass
of the members have nothing to lose, where most have nothing to gain,
where every one has a social position firmly fixed, where no one has a
constituency, where hardly any one cares for the minister of the day, is
the very assembly in which to look for, from which to expect, indepen-
dent criticism. And in matter of fact, we find it. The criticism of the acts
of late administrations by Lord Grey has been admirable. But such criti-
cism, to have its full value, should be many-sided. Every man of great
ability puts his own mark on his own criticism; it will be full of thought
and feeling, but then it is of idiosyncratic thought and feeling. We want
many critics of ability and knowledge in the Upper House — not equal
to Lord Grey, for they would be hard to find but like Lord Grey. They
should resemble him in impartiality; they should resemble him in clear-
ness; they should most of all resemble him in taking the supplemental
view of a subject. There is an actor’s view of a subject which (I speak of
mature and discussed action — of Cabinet action) is nearly sure to
include every thing old and new — every thing ascertained and determi-
nate. But there is also a bystander’s view, which is likely to omit some
one or more of these old and certain elements, but also to contain some
new or distant matter which the absorbed and occupied actor could not
see. There ought to be many life-peers in our secondary chamber ca-
pable of giving us this higher criticism. I am afraid we shall not soon see
them, but as a first step we should learn to wish for them.
The second subsidiary action of the House of Lords is even more
important. Taking the House of Commons, not after possible but most
unlikely improvements, but in matter of fact and as it stands, it is over-
whelmed with work. The task of managing it falls upon the Cabinet, and
that task is very hard. Every member of the Cabinet in the Commons
has to “attend the House;” to contribute by his votes, if not by his voice,
to the management of the House. Even in so small a matter as the educa-
tion department, Mr. Lowe, a consummate observer, spoke of the desir-
ability of finding a chief “not exposed to the prodigious labour of at-
tending the House of Commons.” It is all but necessary that certain
members of the Cabinet should be exempt from its toil, and untouched
by its excitement. But it is also necessary that they should have the
power of explaining their views to the nation; of being heard as other
people are heard. There are various plans for so doing, which I may
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evident: the House of Lords, for its own members, attains this object; it
gives them a voice; it gives them what no competing plan does give them
position. The leisured members of the Cabinet speak in the Lords with
authority and power. They are not administrators with a right to speech
— clerks (as is sometimes suggested) brought down to lecture a House,
but not to vote in it; but they are the equals of those they speak to; they
speak as they like, and reply as they choose; they address the House, not
with the “bated breath” of subordinates, but with the force and dignity
of sure rank. Life-peers would enable us to use this faculty of our Con-
stitution more freely and more variously. It would give us a larger com-
mand of able leisure; it would improve the Lords as a political pulpit,
for it would enlarge the list of its select preachers. The danger of the
House of Commons is, perhaps, that it will be reformed too rashly; the
danger of the House of Lords certainly is, that it may never be reformed.
Nobody asks that it should be so; it is quite safe against rough destruc-
tion, but it is not safe against inward decay. It may lose its veto as the
Crown has lost its veto. If most of its members neglect their duties, if all
its members continue to be of one class, and that not quite the best; if its
doors are shut against genius that cannot found a family, and ability
which has not five thousand a year, its power will be less year by year,
and at last be gone, as so much kingly power is gone — no one knows
how. Its danger is not in assassination, but atrophy; not abolition, but
decline.
IV. The House of Commons.
[I reprint this chapter substantially as it was first written. It is too soon, as I
have explained in the introduction, to say what changes the late Reform Act
will make in the House of Commons.]
The dignified aspect of the House of Commons is altogether secondary
to its efficient use. It is dignified: in a government in which the most
prominent parts are good because they are very stately, any prominent
part, to be good at all, must be somewhat stately. The human imagina-
tion exacts keeping in government as much as in art; it will not be at all
influenced by institutions which do not match with those by which it is
principally influenced. The House of Commons needs to be impressive,
and impressive it is; but its use resides not in its appearance, but in its
reality. Its office is not to win power by awing mankind, but to use
power in governing mankind.
The main function of the House of Commons is one which we know118/Walter Bagehot
quite well, though our common constitutional speech does not recognize
it. The House of Commons is an electoral chamber; it is the assembly
which chooses our president. Washington and his fellow-politicians con-
trived an electoral college, to be composed (as was hoped) of the wisest
people in the nation, which, after due deliberation, was to choose for
President the wisest man in the nation. But that college is a sham; it has
no independence and no life. No one knows, or cares to know, who its
members are. They never discuss, and never deliberate. They were cho-
sen to vote that Mr. Lincoln be President, or that Mr. Breckinridge be
President; they do so vote, and they go home. But our House of Com-
mons is a real choosing body; it elects the people it likes. And it dis-
misses whom it likes too. No matter that a few months since it was
chosen to support Lord Aberdeen or Lord Palmerston; upon a sudden
occasion it ousts the statesman to whom it at first adhered, and selects
an opposite statesman whom it at first rejected. Doubtless in such cases
there is a tacit reference to probable public opinion; but certainly also
there is much free will in the judgment of the Commons. The House
only goes where it thinks in the end the nation will follow; but it takes its
chance of the nation following or not following; it assumes the initia-
tive, and acts upon its discretion or its caprice.
When the American nation has chosen its President, its virtue goes
out of it, and out of the Transmissive College through which it chooses.
But because the House of Commons has the power of dismissal in addi-
tion to the power of election, its relations to the Premier are incessant.
— They guide him, and he leads them. He is to them what they are to the
nation. He only goes where he believes they will go after him. But he has
to take the lead; he must choose his direction, and begin the journey.
Nor must he flinch. A good horse likes to feel the rider’s bit; and a great
deliberative assembly likes to feel that it is under worthy guidance. A
minister who succumbs to the House, — who ostentatiously seeks its
pleasure, — who does not try to regulate it, — who will not boldly point
out plain errors to it, seldom thrives. The great leaders of Parliament
have varied much, but they have all had a certain firmness. A great
assembly is as soon spoiled by over-indulgence as a little child. The
whole life of English politics is the action and reaction between the
Ministry and the Parliament. The appointees strive to guide, and the
appointors surge under the guidance.
The elective is now the most important function of the House of
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our tradition ignores it. At the end of half the sessions of Parliament,
you will read in the newspapers, and you will hear even from those who
have looked close at the matter and should know better, “Parliament has
done nothing this session. Some things were promised in the Queen’s
speech, but they were only little things; and most of them have not
passed.” Lord Lyndhurst used for years to recount the small outcomings
of legislative achievement; and yet those were the days of the first Whig
Governments, who had more to do in legislation, and did more, than any
Government. The true answer to such harangues as Lord Lyndhurst’s
by a Minister should have been in the first person. He should have said
firmly, “Parliament has maintained ME, and that was its greatest duty;
Parliament has carried on what, in the language of traditional respect,
we call the Queen’s Government; it has maintained what wisely or un-
wisely it deemed the best Executive of the English nation.”
The second function of the House of Commons is what I may call
an expressive function. It is its office to express the mind of the English
people on all matters which come before it. Whether it does so well or ill
I shall discuss presently. The third function of Parliament, is what I may
call — preserving a sort of technicality even in familiar matters for the
sake of distinctness — the teaching function. A great and open council
of considerable men cannot be placed in the middle of a society without
altering that society. It ought to alter it for the better. It ought to teach
the nation what it does not know. How far the House of Commons can
so teach, and how far it does so teach, are matters for subsequent dis-
cussion.
Fourthly the House of Commons has what may be called an inform-
ing function — a function which though its present form quite modern
is singularly analogous to a mediaeval function. In old times one office
of the House of Commons was to inform the Sovereign what was wrong.
It laid before the Crown the grievances and complaints of particular
interests. Since the publication of the Parliamentary debates a corre-
sponding office of Parliament is to lay these same grievances, these
same complaints, before the nation, which is the present sovereign. The
nation needs it quite as much as the king ever needed it. A free people is
indeed mostly fair, liberty practises men in a give-and-take, which is the
rough essence of justice. The English people, possibly even above other
free nations, is fair. But a free nation rarely can be — and the English
nation is not — quick of apprehension. It only comprehends what is
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its own thoughts. “I never heard of such a thing in my life,” the middle-
class Englishman says, and he thinks he so refutes an argument. The
common disputant cannot say in reply that his experience is but limited,
and that the assertion may be true, though he had never met with any
thing at all like it. But a great debate in Parliament does bring home
something of this feeling. Any notion, any creed, any feeling, any griev-
ance which can get a decent number of English members to stand up for
it, is felt by almost all Englishmen to be perhaps a false and pernicious
opinion, but at any rate possible — an opinion within the intellectual
sphere, an opinion to be reckoned with. And it is an immense achieve-
ment. Practical diplomatists say that a free government is harder to deal
with than a despotic government: you may be able to get the despot to
hear the other side; his ministers, men of trained intelligence, will be
sure to know what makes against them; and they may tell him. But a
free nation never hears any side save its own. The newspapers only
repeat the side their purchasers like: the favourable arguments are set
out, elaborated, illustrated; the adverse arguments maimed, misstated,
confused. The worst judge, they say, is a deaf judge; the most dull gov-
ernment is a free government on matters its ruling classes will not hear.
I am disposed to reckon it as the second function of Parliament in point
of importance, that to some extent it makes us hear what otherwise we
should not.
Lastly, there is the function of legislation, of which of course it
would be preposterous to deny the great importance, and which I only
deny to be as important as the executive management of the whole state,
or the political education given by Parliament to the whole nation. There
are, I allow, seasons when legislation is more important than either of
these. The nation may be misfitted with its laws, and need to change
them: some particular corn law may hurt all industry, and it may be
worth a thousand administrative blunders to get rid of it. But generally
the laws of a nation suit its life; special adaptations of them are but
subordinate; the administration and conduct of that life is the matter
which presses most. Nevertheless, the statute-book of every great na-
tion yearly contains many important new laws, and the English statute-
book does so above any. An immense mass, indeed, of the legislation is
not, in the proper language of jurisprudence, legislation at all. A law is
a general command applicable to many cases. The “special acts” which
crowd the statute-book and weary parliamentary committees are appli-
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railways shall be made, they enact that such a railway shall be made
from this place to that place, and they have no bearing upon any other
transaction. But after every deduction and abatement, the annual legis-
lation of Parliament is a result of singular importance; were it not so, it
could not be, as it often is considered, the sole result of its annual as-
sembling.
Some persons will perhaps think that I ought to enumerate a sixth
function of the House of Commons — a financial function. But I do not
consider that. upon broad principle, and omitting legal technicalities,
the House of Commons has any special function with regard to finan-
cial different from its functions with respect to other legislation. It is to
rule in both, and to rule in both through the Cabinet. Financial legisla-
tion is of necessity a yearly recurring legislation; but frequency of oc-
currence does not indicate a diversity of nature or compel an antago-
nism of treatment.
In truth, the principal peculiarity of the House of Commons in fi-
nancial affairs is now-a-days not a special privilege, but an exceptional
disability. On common subjects any member can propose any thing, but
not on money — the minister only can propose to tax the people. This
principle is commonly involved in mediaeval metaphysics as to the pre-
rogative of the Crown, but it is as useful in the nineteenth century as in
the fourteenth, and rests on as sure a principle. The House of Commons
-now that it is the true sovereign, and appoints the real executive — has
long ceased to be the checking, sparing, economical body it once was. It
now is more apt to spend money than the minister of the day. I have
heard a very experienced financier say, “If you want to raise a certain
cheer in the House of Commons, make a general panegyric on economy;
if you want to invite a sure defeat, propose a particular saving,” The
process is simple. Every expenditure of public money has some appar-
ent public object; those who wish to spend the money expatiate on that
object; they say, “What is £50,000 to this great country? Is this a time
for cheese-paring objection? Our industry was never so productive; our
resources never so immense. What is £50,000 in comparison with this
great national interest?” The members who are for the expenditure al-
ways come down; perhaps a constituent or a friend who will profit by
the outlay, or is keen on the object, has asked them to attend; at any rate,
there is a popular vote to be given, on which the newspapers — always
philanthropic, and sometimes talked over — will be sure to make enco-
miums. The members against the expenditure rarely come down of them-122/Walter Bagehot
selves; why should they become unpopular without reason? The object
seems decent; many of its advocates are certainly sincere: a hostile vote
will make enemies, and be censured by the journals. If there were not
some check, the “people’s house” would soon outrun the people’s money.
That check is the responsibility of the Cabinet for, the national fi-
nance. If any one could propose a tax, they might let the House spend it
as it would, and wash their hands of the matter; but now, for whatever
expenditure is sanctioned — even when it is sanctioned against the
ministry’s wish — the ministry must find the money. Accordingly, they
have the strongest motive to oppose extra outlay. They will have to pay
the bill for it; they will have to impose taxation, which is always dis-
agreeable, or suggest loans which, under ordinary circumstances, are
shameful. The ministry is (so to speak) the breadwinner of the political
family, and has to meet the cost of philanthropy and glory, just as the
head of a family has to pay for the charities of his wife and the toilette of
his daughters. In truth, when a Cabinet is made the sole executive, it
follows it must have the sole financial charge, for all action costs money,
all policy depends on money, and it is in adjusting the relative goodness
of action and policies that the executive is employed.
From a consideration of these functions, it follows that we are ruled
by the House of Commons; we are, indeed, so used to be so ruled, that
it does not seem to be at all strange. But of all odd forms of government,
the oddest really is government by a public meeting. Here are six hun-
dred and fifty-eight persons, collected from all parts of England, differ-
ent in nature, different in interests, different in look and language. If we
think what an empire the English is, how various are its components,
how incessant its concerns, how immersed in history its policy: if we
think what a vast information, what a nice discretion, what a consistent
will ought to mark the rulers of that empire, — we shall be surprised
when we see them. We see a changing body of miscellaneous persons,
sometimes few, sometimes many, never the same for an hour; some-
times excited, but mostly dull and half weary, — impatient of eloquence,
catching at any joke as an alleviation. These are the persons who rule
the British empire, — who rule England, who rule Scotland, — who
rule Ireland, — who rule a great deal of Asia, — who rule a great deal
of Polynesia, — who rule a great deal of America and scattered frag-
ments everywhere.
Paley said many shrewd things, but he never said a better thing than
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the explanation of it. The key to the difficulties of most discussed and
unsettled questions is commonly in their undiscussed parts; they are like
the background of a picture which looks obvious, easy, just what any
one might have painted, but which, in fact, sets the figures in their right
position, chastens them, and makes them what they are. Nobody will
understand parliament government who fancies it an easy thing, a natu-
ral thing, a thing not needing explanation. You have not a perception of
the first elements in this matter till you know that government by a club
is a standing wonder. There has been a capital illustration lately how
helpless many English gentlemen are when called together on a sudden.
The Government, rightly or wrongly, thought fit to intrust the quarter-
sessions of each county with the duty of combatting its cattle plague;
but the scene in most “shire halls” was unsatisfactory. There was the
greatest difficulty in getting, not only a right decision, but any decision.
I saw one myself which went thus. The chairman proposed a very com-
plex resolution, in which there was much which every one liked, and
much which every one disliked, though, of course, the favorite parts of
some were the objectionable parts to others. This resolution got, so to
say, wedged in the meeting; everybody suggested amendments; one
amendment was carried which none were satisfied with, and so the mat-
ter stood over. It is a saying in England, “a big meeting never does any
thing; “and yet we are governed by the House of Commons — by a big
meeting.”
It may be said that the House of Commons does not rule, it only
elects the rulers. But there must be something special about it to enable
it to do that. Suppose the Cabinet were elected by a London club, what
confusion there would be, what writing and answering! “Will you speak
to So-and-So, and ask him to vote for my man? “would be heard on
every side. How the wife of A. and the wife of B. would plot to con-
found the wife of C. Whether the club elected under the dignified shadow
of a queen, or without the shadow, would hardly matter at all; if the
substantial choice was in them, the confusion and intrigue would be
there too. I propose to begin this paper by asking, not why the House of
Commons governs well? but the fundamental — almost unasked-ques-
tion — how the House of Commons continues to be able to govern, at
all?
The House of Commons can do work which the quarter-sessions or
clubs cannot do, because it is an organized body, while quarter-sessions
and clubs are unorganized. Two of the greatest orators in England —124/Walter Bagehot
Lord Brougham and Lord Bolingbroke spent much eloquence in attack-
ing party government. Bolingbroke probably knew what he was doing;
he was a consistent opponent of the power of the Commons; he wished
to attack them in a vital part. But Lord Brougham does not know; he
proposes to amend parliamentary government by striking out the very
elements which make parliamentary government possible. At present
the majority of Parliament obey certain leaders; what those leaders pro-
pose they support, what those leaders reject they reject. An old Secre-
tary of the Treasury used to say, “This is a bad case, an indefensible
case. We must apply our majority to this question.” That secretary lived
fifty years ago, before the Reform Bill, when majorities were very blind,
and very “applicable.” Now-a-days, the power of leaders over their fol-
lowers is strictly and wisely limited: they can take their followers but a
little way, and that only in certain directions. Yet still there are leaders
and followers. On the Conservative side of the House there are vestiges
of the despotic leadership even now. A cynical politician is said to have
watched the long row of county members, so fresh and respectable-
looking, and muttered, “By Jove, they are the finest brute votes in Eu-
rope!” But all satire apart, the principle of Parliament is obedience to
leaders. Change your leader if you will, take another if you will, but
obey Number One while you serve Number One, and obey Number
Two when you have gone over to Number Two. The penalty of not
doing so, is the penalty of impotence. It is not that you will not be able
to do any good, but you will not be able to do any thing at all. If every-
body does what he thinks right, there will be six hundred and fifty-seven
amendments to every motion, and none of them will be carried or the
motion either.
The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that the House of
Commons is mainly and above all things an elective assembly, we at
once perceive that party is of its essence. There never was an election
without a party. You cannot get a child into an asylum without a combi-
nation. At such places you may see “Vote for orphan A.” upon a plac-
ard, and “Vote for orphan B. (also an idiot!!!) “upon a banner, and the
party of each is busy about its placard and banner. What is true at such
minor and momentary elections must be much more true in a great and
constant election of rulers. The House of Commons lives in a state of
perpetual potential choice: at any moment it can choose a ruler and
dismiss a ruler. And therefore party is inherent in it, is bone of its bone,
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Secondly, though the leaders of party no longer have the vast pa-
tronage of the last century with which to bribe, they can coerce by a
threat far more potent than any allurement — they can dissolve. This is
the secret which keeps parties together. Mr. Cobden most justly said,
“He had never been able to discover what was the proper moment, ac-
cording to members of Parliament, for a dissolution. He had heard them
say they were ready to vote for every thing else, but he had never heard
them say they were ready to vote for that.” Efficiency in an assembly
requires a solid mass of steady votes; and these are collected by a defer-
ential attachment to particular men, or by a belief in the principles those
men represent, and they are maintained by fear of those men — by the
fear that if you vote against them, you may yourself soon not have a
vote at all.
Thirdly, it may seem odd to say so, just after inculcating that party.
organization is the vital principle of representative government, but that
organization is permanently efficient, because it is not composed of warm
partisans. The body is eager, but the atoms are cool. If it were other-
wise, parliamentary government would become the worst of govern-
ments — a sectarian government. The party in power would go all the
lengths their orators proposed — all that their formula enjoined, as far
as they had ever said they would go. But the partisans of the English
Parliament are not of such a temper. They are Whigs, or Radicals, or
Tories, but they are much else too. They are common Englishmen, and,
as Father Newman complains, “hard to be worked up to the dogmatic
level.” They are not eager to press the tenets of their party to impossible
conclusions. On the contrary, the way to lead them — the best and
acknowledged way — is to affect a studied and illogical moderation.
You may hear men say, “Without committing myself to the tenet that 3
- 2 make 5, though I am free to admit that the honourable member for
Bradford has advanced very grave arguments in behalf of it, I think I
may, with the permission of the Committee, assume that 2 + 3 do not
make 4, which will be a sufficient basis for the important propositions
which I shall venture to submit on the present occasion.” This language
is very suitable to the greater part of the House of Commons. Most men
of business love a sort of twilight. They have lived all their lives in an
atmosphere of probabilities and of doubt, where nothing is very clear,
where there are some chances for many events, where there is much to
be said for several courses, where nevertheless one course must be de-
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suited to this intellectual haze. So far from caution or hesitation in the
statement of the argument striking them as an indication of imbecility, it
seems to them a sign of practicality. They got rich themselves by trans-
actions of which they could not have stated the argumentative ground
— and all they ask for is a distinct, though moderate conclusion, that
they can repeat when asked; something which they feel not to be ab-
stract argument, but abstract argument diluted and dissolved in real life.
“There seem to me,” an impatient young man once said, “to be no stays
in Peel’s arguments.” And that was why Sir Robert Peel was the best
leader of the Commons in our time; we like to have the rigidity taken out
of an argument, and the substance left.
Nor indeed, under our system of government, are the leaders them-
selves of the House of Commons, for the most part, eager to carry party
conclusions too far. They are in contact with reality. An Opposition, on
coming into power, is often like a speculative merchant whose bills be-
come due. Ministers have to make good their promises, and they find a
difficulty in so doing. They have said the state of things is so and so, and
if you give us the power we will do thus and thus. But when they come
to handle the official documents, to converse with the permanent under-
secretary — familiar with disagreeable facts, and though in manner
most respectful, yet most imperturbable in opinion — very soon doubts
intervene. Of course, something must be done: the speculative merchant
cannot forget his bills; the late Opposition cannot, in office, forget those
sentences which terrible admirers in the country still quote. But just as
the merchant asks his debtor, “Could you not take a bill at four months?”
so the new minister says to the permanent under-secretary, “Could you
not suggest a middle course? I am of course not bound by mere sen-
tences used in debate; I have never been accused of letting a false ambi-
tion of consistency warp my conduct; but,” &c. And the end always is,
that a middle course is devised which looks as much as possible like
what was suggested in opposition, but which is as much as possible
what patent facts — facts which seem to live in the office, so teasing
and unceasing are they — prove ought to be done.
Of all modes of enforcing moderation on a party, the best is to con-
trive that the members of that party shall be intrinsically moderate, care-
ful, and almost shrinking men; and the next best to contrive, that the
leaders of the party, who have protested most in its behalf, shall be
placed in the closest contact with the actual world. Our English system
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possible in the sole way in which it can be so, by making it mild.
But these expedients, though they sufficiently remove the defects —
which make a common club or quarter-sessions impotent, would not
enable the House of Commons to govern England. A representative public
meeting is subject to a defect over and above those of other public meet-
ings. It may not be independent. The constituencies may not let it alone.
But if they do not, all the checks which have been enumerated upon the
evils of a party organization would be futile. The feeling of a constitu-
ency is the feeling of a dominant party, and that feeling is elicited, stimu-
lated, sometimes even manufactured by the local political agent. Such
an opinion could not be moderate; could not be subject to effectual dis-
cussion; could not be in close contact with pressing facts; could not be
framed under a chastening sense of near responsibility; could not be
formed as those form their opinions who have to act upon them. Con-
stituency government is the precise opposite of parliamentary govern-
ment. It is the government of immoderate persons far from the scene of
action, instead of the government of moderate persons close to the scene
of action; it is the judgment of persons judging in the last resort and
without a penalty, in lieu of persons judging in fear of a dissolution, and
ever conscious that they are subject to an appeal. Most persons would
admit these conditions of parliamentary government when they read them,
but two at least of the most prominent ideas in the public mind are
inconsistent with them. The scheme to which the arguments of our dema-
gogues distinctly tend, and the scheme to which the predilections of
some most eminent philosophers cleave, are both so. They would not
only make parliamentary government work ill, but they would prevent
its working at all; they would not render it bad, for they would make it
impossible.
The first of these is the ultra-democratic theory. This theory de-
mands that every man of twenty-one years of age (if not every woman,
too) should have an equal vote in electing Parliament. Suppose that last
year there were twelve millions adult males in England. Upon this theory
each man is to have one twelve-millionth share in electing a Parliament;
the rich and wise are not to have, by explicit law, more votes than the
poor and stupid; nor are any latent contrivances to give them an influ-
ence equivalent to more votes. The machinery for carrying out such a
plan is very easy. At each census the country ought to be divided into six
hundred and fifty-eight electoral districts, in each of which the number
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only constituencies, and elect the whole Parliament. But if the above
prerequisites are needful for parliamentary government, that Parliament
would not work.
Such a Parliament could not be composed of moderate men. The
electoral districts would be, some of them, in purely agricultural places,
and in these the parson and the squire would have almost unlimited
power. They would be able to drive or send to the poll an entire labouring
population. These districts would return an unmixed squirearchy. The
scattered small towns, which now send so many members to Parlia-
ment, would be lost in the clownish mass; their votes would send to
Parliament no distinct members. The agricultural part of England would
choose its representatives from quarter sessions exclusively. On the other
hand, a large part of the constituencies would be town districts; and
these would send up persons representing the beliefs or the unbeliefs of
the lowest classes in their towns. They would, perhaps, be divided be-
tween the genuine representatives of the artisans — not possibly of the
best of the artisans, who are a select and intellectual class, but of the
common order of work-people — and the merely pretended members
for that class, whom I may call the members for the public-houses. In all
big towns in which there is electioneering these houses are the centres of
illicit corruption and illicit management. There are pretty good records
of what that corruption and management are, but there is no need to
describe them here. Everybody will understand what sort of things I
mean, and the kind of unprincipled members that are returned by them.
Our new Parliament, therefore, would be made up of two sorts of repre-
sentatives from the town lowest class, and one sort of representatives
from the agricultural lowest class. The genuine representatives of the
country would be men of one marked sort, and the genuine representa-
tives for the county men of another marked sort, but very opposite: one
would have the prejudices of town artisans, and the other the prejudices
of county magistrates. Each class would speak a language of its own;
each would be unintelligible to the other; and the only thriving class
would be the immoral representatives, who were chosen by corrupt
machination, and who would probably get a good profit on the capital
they laid out in that corruption. If it be true that a parliamentary govern-
ment is possible only when the overwhelming majority of the represen-
tatives are men essentially moderate, of no marked varieties, free from
class prejudices, this ultra-democratic Parliament could not maintain
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moral violence and one sort of immoral.
I do not for a moment rank the scheme of Mr. Hare with the scheme
of the ultra-democrats. One can hardly help having a feeling of romance
about it. The world seems growing young when grave old lawyers and
mature philosophers propose a scheme promising so much. It is from
these classes that young men suffer commonly the chilling demonstra-
tion that their fine plans are opposed to rooted obstacles, that they are
repetitions of other plans which failed long ago, and that we must be
content with the very moderate results of tried machinery. But Mr. Hare
and Mr. Mill offer as the effect of their new scheme results as large and
improvements as interesting as a young enthusiast ever promised to him-
self in his happiest mood.
I do not give any weight to the supposed impracticability of Mr.
Hare’s scheme because it is new. Of course it cannot be put in practice
till it is old. A great change of this sort happily cannot be sudden; a free
people cannot be confused by new institutions which they do not under-
stand, for they will not adopt them till they understand them. But if Mr.
Hare’s plan would accomplish what its friends say, or half what they
say, it would be worth working for, if it were not adopted till the year
1966. We ought incessantly to popularize the principle by writing; and,
what is better than writing, small preliminary bits of experiment. There
is so much that is wearisome and detestable in all other election machin-
eries, that I well understand, and wish I could share, the sense of relief
with which the believers in this scheme throw aside all their trammels,
and look to an almost ideal future, when this captivating plan is carried.
Mr. Hare’s scheme cannot be satisfactorily discussed in the elabo-
rate form in which he presents it. No common person readily appre-
hends all the details in which, with loving care, he has embodied it. He
was so anxious to prove what could be done, that he has confused most
people as to what it is. I have heard a man say, “He never could remem-
ber it two days running.” But the difficulty which I feel is fundamental,
and wholly independent of detail.
There are two modes in which constituencies may be made. First,
the law may make them, as in England and almost everywhere: the law
may say such and such qualifications shall give a vote for constituency
X; those who have that qualification shall be constituency X. These are
what we may call compulsory constituencies, and we know all about
them. Or, secondly, the law may leave the electors themselves to make
them. The law may say all the adult males of a country shall vote, or130/Walter Bagehot
those males who can read and write, or those who have £50 a year, or
any persons any way defined, and then leave those voters to group them-
selves as they like. Suppose there were 658,000 voters to elect the House
of Commons; it is possible for the legislature to say, “We do not care
how you combine. On a given day let each set of persons give notice in
what group they mean to vote; if every voter gives notice, and every one
looks to make the most of his vote, each group will have just 1,000. But
the law shall not make this necessary — it shall take the 658 most nu-
merous groups, no matter whether they have 2,000 or 1,000, or 900, or
800 votes — the most numerous groups, whatever their number may
be; and these shall be the constituencies of the nation.” These are volun-
tary constituencies, if I may so call them; the simplest kind of voluntary
constituencies. Mr. Hare proposes a far more complex kind; but to show
the merits and demerits of the voluntary principle the simplest form is
much the best.
The temptation to that principle is very plain. Under the compul-
sory form of constituency the votes of the minorities are thrown away.
In the city of London, now, there are many Tories, but all the members
are Whigs; every London Tory, therefore, is by law and principle mis-
represented: his city sends to Parliament not the member whom he wished
to have, but the member he wished not to have. But upon the voluntary
system the London Tories, who are far more than 1,000 in number, may
combine; they may make a constituency, and return a member. In many
existing constituencies the disfranchisement of minorities is hopeless
and chronic. I have myself had a vote for an agricultural county for
twenty years, and I am a Liberal; but two Tories have always been
returned, and all my life will be returned. As matters now stand, my
vote is of no use. But if I could combine with 1,000 other Liberals in
that and other Conservative counties, we might choose a Liberal mem-
ber.
Again, this plan gets rid of all our difficulties as to the size of con-
stituencies. It is said to be unreasonable that Liverpool should return
only the same number of members as King’s Lynn or Lyme Regis; but
upon the voluntary plan, Liverpool could come down to King’s Lynn.
The Liberal minority in King’s Lynn could communicate with the Lib-
eral minority in Liverpool, and make up 1,000; and so everywhere. The
numbers of popular places would gain what is called their legitimate
advantage; they would, when constituencies are voluntarily made, be
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cies. Again, the admirers of a great man could make a worthy constitu-
ency for him. As it is, Mr. Mill was returned by the electors of
Westminster; and they have never, since they had members, clone them-
selves so great an honour. But what did the electors of Westminster
know of Mr. Mill? What fraction of his mind could be imagined by any
percentage of their minds? A great deal of his genius most of them would
not like. They meant to do homage to mental ability, but it was the
worship of an unknown god-if ever there was such a thing in this world.
But upon the voluntary plan, one thousand out of the many thousand
students of Mr. Mill’s book could have made an appreciating constitu-
ency for him.
I could reckon other advantages, but I have to object to the scheme,
not to recommend it. What are the counterweights which overpower
these merits? I reply that the voluntary composition of constituencies
appears to me inconsistent with the necessary prerequisites of parlia-
mentary government as they have been just laid down.
Under the voluntary system, the crisis of politics is not the election
of the member, but the making the constituency. President-making is
already a trade in America; and constituency-making would, under the
voluntary plan, be a trade here. Every party would have a numerical
problem to solve. The leaders would say, “We have 350,000 votes, we
must take care to have 350 members;” and the only way to obtain them
is to organize. A man who wanted to compose part of a liberal constitu-
ency must not himself hunt for 1,000 other Liberals; if he did, after
writing 10,000 letters, he would probably find he was making part of a
constituency of 100, all whose votes would be thrown away, the con-
stituency being too small to be reckoned. Such a Liberal must write to
the great Registration Association in Parliament Street; he must com-
municate with its able managers, and they would soon use his vote for
him. They would say, “Sir, you are late; Mr. Gladstone, sir, is full. He
got his 1,000 last year. Most of the gentlemen you read of in the papers
are full. As soon as a gentleman makes a nice speech, we get a heap of
letters to say, ‘Make us into that gentleman’s constituency.’ But we
cannot do that. Here is our list. If you do not want to throw your vote
away, you must be guided by us: here are three very satisfactory gentle-
men (and one is an Honourable): you may vote for either of these, and
we will write your name down; but if you go voting wildly, you’ll be
thrown out altogether.”
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men mainly. The member-makers would look, not for independence, but
for subservience — and they could hardly be blamed for so doing. They
are agents for the Liberal party; and, as such, they should be guided by
what they take to be the wishes of their principal. The mass of the Lib-
eral party wishes measure A, measure B, measure C. The managers of
the registration —the skilled manipulators —are busy men. They would
say, “Sir, here is our card; if you want to get into parliament on our side,
you must go for that card; it was drawn up by Mr. Lloyd; he used to be
engaged on railways, but since they passed this new voting plan, we get
him to attend to us; it is a sound card; stick to that and you will be
right.” Upon this (in theory) voluntary plan, you would get together a
set of members bound hard and fast with party bands and fetters, infi-
nitely tighter than any members now.
Whoever hopes any thing from desultory popular action if matched
against systematized popular action, should consider the way in which
the American President is chosen. The plan was that the citizens at large
should vote for the statesman they liked best. But no one does any thing
of the sort. They vote for the ticket made by “the caucus,” and the cau-
cus is a sort of representative meeting which sits voting and voting till
they have cut out all the known men against whom much is to be said,
and agreed on some unknown man against whom there is nothing known,
and therefore nothing to be alleged. Caucuses, or their equivalent, would
be far worse here in constituency-making than there in President-mak-
ing, because on great occasions the American nation can fix on some
one great man whom it knows, but the English nation could not fix on
six hundred and fifty-eight great men and choose them. It does not know
so many, and if it did, would go wrong in the difficulties of the manipu-
lation.
But though a common voter could only be ranged in an effectual
constituency, and a common candidate only reach a constituency by
obeying the orders of the political election-contrivers upon his side, cer-
tain voters and certain members would be quite independent of both.
There are organizations in this country which would soon make a set of
constituencies for themselves. Every chapel would be an office for vote
transferring before the plan had been known three months. The Church
would be much slower in learning it, and much less handy in using it;
but would learn. At present the Dissenters are a most energetic and
valuable component of the Liberal party; but under the voluntary plan
they would not be a component — they would be a separate, indepen-The English Constitution/133
dent element. We now propose to group boroughs; but then they would
combine chapels. There would be a member for the Baptist congrega-
tion of Tavistock, cum Totnes, cum, &c.
The full force of this cannot be appreciated except by referring to
the former proof that the mass of a Parliament ought to be men of mod-
erate sentiments, or they will elect an immoderate ministry, and enact
violent laws. But upon the plan suggested, the House would be made up
of party politicians selected by a party committee, chained to that com-
mittee and pledged to party violence, and of characteristic, and there-
fore immoderate representatives, for every “ism” in all England. Instead
of a deliberate assembly of moderate and judicious men, we should have
a various compound of all sorts of violence. I may seem to be drawing a
caricature, but I have not reached the worst. Bad as these members
would be, if they were left to themselves — if, in a free Parliament, they
were confronted with the perils of government, close responsibility might
improve them and make them tolerable. But they would not be left to
themselves. A voluntary constituency will nearly always be a despotic
constituency. Even in the best case, where a set of earnest men choose a
member to expound their earnestness, they will look after him to see that
he does expound it. The members will be like the minister of a dissent-
ing congregation. That congregation is collected by a unity of sentiment
in doctrine A, and the preacher is to preach doctrine A; if he does not, he
is dismissed. At present the member is free because the constituency is
not in earnest: no constituency has an acute, accurate doctrinal creed in
politics. The law made the constituencies by geographical divisions;
and they are not bound together by close unity of belief. They have
vague preferences for particular doctrines; and that is all. But a volun-
tary constituency would be a church with tenets; it would make its rep-
resentative the messenger of its mandates, and the delegate of its deter-
minations. As in the case of a dissenting congregation, one great minis-
ter sometimes rules it, while ninety-nine ministers in the hundred are
ruled by it, so here one noted man would rule his electors, but the elec-
tors would rule all the others.
Thus, the members for a good voluntary constituency would be
hopelessly enslaved, because of its goodness; but the members for a bad
voluntary constituency would be yet more enslaved because of its bad-
ness. The makers of these constituencies would keep the despotism in
their own hands. In America there is a division of politicians into wire-
pullers and blowers; under the voluntary system the member of Parlia-134/Walter Bagehot
ment would be the only momentary mouthpiece — the impotent blower;
while the constituency-maker would be the latent wire-puller — the con-
stant autocrat. He would write to gentlemen in Parliament, and say,
“You were elected upon ‘the Liberal ticket;’ if you deviate from that
ticket you cannot be chosen again.” And there would be no appeal for a
common-minded man. He is no more likely to make a constituency for
himself than a mole is likely to make a planet.
It may indeed be said that against a septennial Parliament such
machinations would be powerless; that a member elected for seven years
might defy the remonstrances of an earnest constituency, or the impre-
cations of the latent manipulators. But after the voluntary composition
of constituencies, there would soon be but short-lived Parliaments. Ear-
nest constituencies would exact frequent elections; they would not like
to part with their virtue for a long period; it would anger them to see it
used contrary to their wishes, amid circumstances which at the election
no one thought of. A seven years’ Parliament is often chosen in one
political period, lasts through a second, and is dissolved in a third. A
constituency collected by law and on compulsion endures this change
because it has no collective earnestness; it does not mind seeing the
power it gave used in a manner that it could not have foreseen. But a
self-formed constituency of eager opinions, a missionary constituency,
so to speak, would object; it would think it its bounden duty to object;
and the crafty manipulators, though they said nothing, in silence would
object still more. The two together would enjoin annual elections, and
would rule their members unflinchingly.
The voluntary plan, therefore, when tried in this easy form, is in-
consistent with the extrinsic independence as well as with the inherent
moderation of a Parliament — two of the conditions which, as we have
seen, are essential to the bare possibility of parliamentary government.
The same objections, as is inevitable, adhere to that principle under its
more complicated forms. It is in vain to pile detail on detail when the
objection is one of first principle. If the above reasoning be sound, com-
pulsory constituencies are necessary, voluntary constituencies destruc-
tive; the optional transferability of votes is not a salutary aid, but a
ruinous innovation.
I have dwelt upon the proposal of Mr. Hare and upon the ultra-
democratic proposal, not only because of the high intellectual interest of
the former and the possible practical interest of the latter, but because
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parliamentary government. But besides these necessary qualities which
are needful before a parliamentary government can work at all, there
are some additional prerequisites before it can work well. That a House
of Commons may work well it must perform, as we saw, five functions
well: it must elect a ministry well, legislate well, teach the nation well,
express the nation’s will well, bring matters to the nation’s attention
well.
The discussion has a difficulty of its own. What is meant by “well”?
Who is to judge? Is it to be some panel of philosophers, some fancied
posterity, or some other outside authority? I answer, no philosophy, no
posterity, no external authority, but the English nation here and now.
Free government is self-government a government of the people by
the people. The best government of this sort is that which the people
think best. An imposed government, a government like that of the En-
glish in India, may very possibly be better; it may represent the views of
a higher race than the governed race; but it is not therefore a free gov-
ernment. A free government is that which the people subject to it volun-
tarily choose. In a casual collection of loose people the only possible
free government is a democratic government. Where no one knows or
cares for or respects any one else, all must rank equal; no one’s opinion
can be more potent than that of another. But, as has been explained, a
deferential nation has a structure of its own. Certain persons are by
common consent agreed to be wiser than others, and their opinion is, by
consent, to rank for much more than its numerical value. We may in
these happy nations weigh votes as well as count them, though in less
favoured countries we can count only. But in free nations, the votes so
weighed or so counted must decide. A perfect free government is one
which decides perfectly according to those votes; an imperfect, one which
so decides imperfectly; a bad, one which does not so decide at all. Pub-
lic opinion is the test of this polity; the best opinion which, with its
existing habits of deference, the nation will accept: if the free govern-
ment goes by that opinion, it is a good government of its species; if it
contravenes that opinion, it is a bad one.
Tried by this rule the House of Commons does its appointing busi-
ness well. It chooses rulers as we wish rulers to be chosen. If it did not,
in a speaking and writing age we should soon know. I have heard a great
Liberal statesman say, “The time was coming when we must advertise
for a grievance.”[This was said in 1858.] What a good grievance it
would be were the ministry appointed and retained by the Parliament a136/Walter Bagehot
ministry detested by the nation. An anti-present-government league would
be instantly created, and it would be more instantly powerful and more
instantly successful than the Anti-Corn Law League.
It has, indeed, been objected that the choosing business of Parlia-
ment is done ill, because it does not choose strong governments. And it
is certain that when public opinion does not definitely decide upon a
marked policy, and when in consequence parties in the Parliament are
nearly even, individual cupidity and changeability may make Parlia-
ment change its appointees too often; may induce them never enough to
trust any of them; may make it keep all of them under a suspended
sentence of coming dismissal. But the experience of Lord Palmerston’s
second Government proves, I think, that these fears are exaggerated.
When the choice of a nation is really fixed on a statesman, Parliament
will fix upon him too. The parties in the Parliament of 1859 were as
nearly divided as in any probable Parliament; a great many Liberals did
not much like Lord Palmerston, and they would have gladly co-operated
in an attempt to dethrone him. But the same influence acted on Parlia-
ment within which acted on the nation without. The moderate men of
both parties were satisfied that Lord Palmerston’s was the best govern-
ment, and they therefore preserved it though it was hated by the immod-
erate on both sides. We have then found by a critical instance that a
government supported by what I may call “the common element,” — by
the like-minded men of unlike parties, — will be retained in power,
though parties are even, and though, as Treasury counting reckons, the
majority is imperceptible. If happily, by its intelligence and attractive-
ness, a cabinet can gain a hold upon the great middle part of Parliament,
it will continue to exist notwithstanding the hatching of small plots and
the machinations of mean factions.
On the whole, I think it indisputable that the selecting task of Par-
liament is performed as well as public opinion wishes it to be performed;
and if we want to improve that standard, we must first improve the
English nation, which imposes that standard. Of the substantial part of
its legislative task the same, too, may, I think, be said. The manner of
our legislation is indeed detestable, and the machinery for settling that
manner odious. A committee of the whole House, dealing, or attempting
to deal, with the elaborate clauses of a long Bill, is a wretched specimen
of severe but misplaced labour. It is sure to wedge some clause into the
Act, such as that which the judge said “seemed to have fallen by itself,
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do with any thing on either side or around it. At such times government
by a public meeting displays its inherent defects, and is little restrained
by its necessary checks. But the essence of our legislature may be sepa-
rated from its accidents. Subject to two considerable defects I think
Parliament passes laws as the nation wishes to have them passed.
Thirty years ago this was not so. The nation had outgrown its insti-
tutions, and was cramped by them. It was a man in the clothes of a boy;
every limb wanted more room, and every garment to be fresh made. “D-
mn me,” said Lord Eldon in the dialect of his age, “if I had to begin life
again I would begin as an agitator.” The shrewd old man saw that the
best life was that of a miscellaneous objector to the old world, though he
loved that world, believed in it, could imagine no other. But he would
not say so now. There is no worse trade than agitation at this time. A
man can hardly get an audience if he wishes to complain of any thing.
Now-a-days, not only does the mind and policy of Parliament (subject
to the exceptions before named) possess the common sort of moderation
essential to the possibility of parliamentary government, but also that
exact gradation, that precise species of moderation, most agreeable to
the nation at large. Not only does the nation endure a parliamentary
government, which it would not do if Parliament were immoderate, but
it likes parliamentary government. A sense of satisfaction permeates the
country because most of the country feels it has got the precise thing
that suits it.
The exceptions are two. First. That Parliament leans too much to
the opinions of the landed interest. The Cattle Plague Act is a conspicu-
ous instance of this defect. The details of that Bill may be good or bad,
and its policy wise or foolish. But the manner in which it was hurried
through the House savoured of despotism. The cotton trade or the wine
trade could not, in their maximum of peril, have obtained such aid in
such a manner. The House of Commons would hear of no pause and
would heed no arguments. The greatest number of them feared for their
incomes. The land of England returns many members annually for the
counties; these members the constitution gave them. But what is curious
is that the landed interest gives no seats to other classes, but takes plenty
of seats from other classes. Half the boroughs in England are repre-
sented by considerable land-owners, and when rent is in question, as in
the cattle case, they think more of themselves than of those who sent
them. In number the landed gentry in the House far surpass any other
class. They have, too, a more intimate connection with one another;138/Walter Bagehot
they were educated at the same schools; know one another’s family name
from boyhood; form a society; are the same kind of men; marry the
same kind of women. The merchants and manufacturers in Parliament
are a motley race — one educated here, another there, a third not edu-
cated at all; some are of the second generation of traders, who consider
self-made men intruders upon an hereditary place; others are self-made,
and regard the men of inherited wealth, which they did not make and do
not augment, as beings of neither mind nor place, inferior to themselves
because they have no brains, and inferior to lords because they have no
rank. Traders have no bond of union, no habits of intercourse; their
wives, if they care for society, want to see not the wives of other such
men, but “better people,” as they say the wives of men certainly with
land, and, if Heaven help, with the titles. Men who study the structure of
Parliament, not in abstract books, but in the concrete London world,
wonder not that the landed interest is very powerful, but that it is not
despotic. I believe it would be despotic if it were clever, or rather if its
representatives were so, but it has a fixed device to make them stupid.
The counties not only elect land-owners, which is natural, and perhaps
wise, but also elect only land-owners of their own county, which is ab-
surd. There is no free trade in the agricultural mind; each county pro-
hibits the import of able men from other counties. This is why eloquent
sceptics — Bolingbroke and Disraeli — have been so apt to lead the
unsceptical Tories. They will have people with a great piece of land in a
particular spot, and of course these people generally cannot speak, and
often cannot think. And so eloquent men who laugh at the party come to
lead the party. The landed interest has much more influence than it should
have; but it wastes that influence so much that the excess is, except on
singular occurrences (like the cattle plague), of secondary moment.
It is almost another side of the same matter to say that the structure
of Parliament gives too little weight to the growing districts of the coun-
try and too much to the stationary. In old times the south of England was
not only the pleasantest but the greatest part of England. Devonshire
was a great maritime county when the foundations of our representation
were fixed; Somersetshire and Wiltshire great manufacturing counties.
The harsher climate of the northern counties was associated with a ruder,
a sterner, and a sparser people. The immense preponderance which our
Parliament gave before 1832, and, though pruned and mitigated, still
gives to England south of the Trent, then corresponded to a real prepon-
derance in wealth and mind. How opposite the present contrast is we allThe English Constitution/139
know. And the case gets worse every day. The nature of modern trade is
to give to those who have much and take from those who have little.
Manufacture goes where manufacture is, because there and there alone
it finds attendant and auxiliary manufacture. Every railway takes trade
from the little town to the big town, because it enables the customer to
buy in the big town. Year by year the North (as we may roughly call the
new industrial world) gets more important, and the South (as we may
call the pleasant remnant of old times) gets less important. It is a grave
objection to our existing parliamentary constitution that it gives much
power to regions of past greatness, and refuses equal power to regions
of present greatness.
I think (though it is not a popular notion) that by far the greater part
of the cry for parliamentary reform is due to this inequality. The great
capitalists, Mr. Bright and his friends, believe they are sincere in asking
for more power for the working man, but, in fact, they very naturally
and very properly want more power for themselves. They cannot endure
— they ought not. to endure — that a rich, able manufacturer should be
a less man than a small, stupid squire. The notions of political equality
which Mr. Bright puts forward are as old as political speculation, and
have been refuted by the first efforts of that speculation. But for all that
they are likely to last as long as political society, because they are based
upon indelible principles in human nature. Edmund Burke called the
first East Indians “Jacobins to a man,” because they did not feel their
“present importance equal to their real wealth.” So long as there is an
uneasy class, a class which has not its just power, it will rashly clutch
and blindly believe the notion that all men should have the same power.
I do not consider the exclusion of the working classes from effectual
representation a defect in this aspect of our parliamentary representa-
tion. The working classes contribute almost nothing to our corporate
public opinion, and therefore the fact of their want of influence in Par-
liament does not impair the coincidence of Parliament with public opin-
ion. They are left out in the representation, and also in the thing repre-
sented.
Nor do I think the number of persons of aristocratic descent in Par-
liament impairs the accordance of Parliament with public opinion. No
doubt the direct descendants and collateral relatives of noble families
supply members to Parliament in far greater proportion than is war-
ranted by the number of such families in comparison with the whole
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character, or any common opinions, different from others of the landed
gentry. They have the opinions of the propertied rank in which they
were born. The English aristocracy have never been a caste apart, and
are not a caste apart now. They would keep up nothing that other landed
gentlemen would not. And if any landed gentlemen are to be sent to the
House of Commons, it is desirable that many should be men of some
rank. As long as we keep up a double set of institutions, — one dignified
and intended to impress the many, the other efficient and intended to
govern the many, — we should take care that the two match nicely, and
hide where the one begins and where the other ends. This is in part
effected by conceding some subordinate power to the august part of our
polity, but it is equally aided by keeping an aristocratic element in the
useful part of our polity. In truth, the deferential instinct secures both.
Aristocracy is a power in the “constituencies.” A man who is an
honourable or a baronet, or better yet, perhaps, a real earl, though Irish,
is coveted by half the electing bodies; and ceteris paribus, a
manufacturer’s son has no chance with him. The reality of the deferen-
tial feeling in the community is tested by the actual election of the class
deferred to, where there is a large free choice betwixt it and others.
Subject therefore to the two minor, but still not inconsiderable, de-
fects I have named, Parliament conforms itself accurately enough, both
as a chooser of executives and as a legislature, to the formed opinion of
the country. Similarly, and subject to the same exceptions; it expresses
the nation’s opinion in words well, when it happens that words, not
laws, are wanted. On foreign matters, where we cannot legislate, what-
ever the English nation thinks, or thinks it thinks, as to the critical events
of the world, whether in Denmark, in Italy, or America, and no matter
whether it thinks wisely or unwisely, that same something, wise or un-
wise, will be thoroughly well said in Parliament. The lyrical function of
Parliament, if I may use such a phrase, is well done; it pours out in
characteristic words the characteristic heart of the nation. And it can do
little more useful. Now that free government is in Europe so rare and in
America so distant, the opinion, even the incomplete, erroneous, rapid
opinion of the free English people is invaluable. It may je very wrong,
but it is sure to be unique; and if it is right it is sure to contain matter of
great magnitude, for it is only a first-class matter in distant things which
a free people ever sees or learns. The English people must miss a thou-
sand minutiae that continental bureaucracies know even too well; but if
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truth may greatly help the world.
But if in these ways, and subject to these exceptions, Parliament by
its policy and its speech well embodies and expresses public opinion, I
own I think it must be conceded that it is not equally successful in el-
evating public opinion. The teaching task of Parliament is the task it
does worst. Probably at this moment it is natural to exaggerate this
defect. The greatest teacher of all in Parliament, the head-master of the
nation, the great elevator of the country — so far as Parliament elevates
it — must be the Prime Minister; he has an influence, an authority, a
facility in giving a great tone to discussion, or a mean tone, which no
other man has. Now Lord Palmerston for many years steadily applied
his mind to giving, not indeed a mean tone, but a light tone, to the pro-
ceedings of Parliament. One of his greatest admirers has since his death
told a story of which he scarcely sees, or seems to see, the full effect.
When Lord Palmerston was first made leader of the House, his jaunty
manner was not at all popular, and some predicted failure. “No,” said
an old member, “he will soon educate us down to his level; the House
will soon prefer this Ha! Ha! style to the wit of Canning and the gravity
of Peel.” I am afraid that we must own that the prophecy was accom-
plished. No prime minister, so popular and so influential, has ever left in
the public memory so little noble teaching. Twenty years hence, when
men inquire as to the then fading memory of Palmerston, we shall be
able to point to no great truth which he taught, no great distinct policy
which he embodied, no noble words which once fascinated his age, and
which, in after years, men would not willingly let die. But we shall be
able to say, “He had a genial manner, a firm, sound sense; he had a kind
of cant of insincerity, but we always knew what he meant; he had the
brain of a ruler in the clothes of a man of fashion.” Posterity will hardly
understand the words of the aged reminiscent, but we now feel their
effect. The House of Commons, since it caught its tone from such a
statesman, has taught the nation worse, and elevated it less, than usual.
I think, however, that a correct observer would decide that in gen-
eral, and on principle, the House of Commons does not teach the public
as much as it might teach it, or as the public would wish to learn. I do
not wish very abstract, very philosophical, very hard matters to be stated
in Parliament. The teaching there given must be popular, and to be popu-
lar it must be concrete, embodied, short. The problem is to know the
highest truth which the people will bear, and to inculcate and preach
that. Certainly Lord Palmerston did not preach it. He a little degraded142/Walter Bagehot
us by preaching a doctrine just below our own standard; — a doctrine
not enough below us to repel us much, but yet enough below to harm us
by augmenting a worldliness which needed no addition, and by dimin-
ishing a love of principle and philosophy which did not want deduction.
In comparison with the debates of any other assembly, it is true the
debates by the English Parliament are most instructive. The debates in
the American Congress have little teaching efficacy; it is the character-
istic vice of Presidential Government to deprive them of that efficacy; in
that government a debate in the legislature has little effect, for it cannot
turn out the executive, and the executive can veto all it decides. The
French Chambers6 are suitable appendages to an Empire which desires
the power of despotism without its shame; they prevent the enemies of
the Empire being quite correct when they say there is no free speech: a
few permitted objectors fill the air with eloquence, which every one
knows to be often true, and always vain. The debates in an English
Parliament fill a space in the world which, in these auxiliary chambers,
is not possible. But I think any one who compares the discussions on
great questions in the higher part of the press, with the discussions in
Parliament, will feel that there is (of course amid much exaggeration
and vagueness) a greater vigour and a higher meaning in the writing
than in the speech; a vigour which the public appreciate — a meaning
that they like to hear.
The Saturday Review said, some years since, that the ability of Par-
liament was a “protected ability;” that there was at the door a differen-
tial duty of at least £2,000 a year. Accordingly the House of Commons,
representing only mind coupled with property, is not equal in mind to a
legislature chosen for mind only, and whether accompanied by wealth
or not. But I do not for a moment wish to see a representation of pure
mind; it would be contrary to the main thesis of this essay. I maintain
that Parliament ought to embody the public opinion of the English na-
tion; and, certainly, that opinion is much more fixed by its property than
by its mind. The “too clever by half” people, who live in “Bohemia,”
ought to have no more influence in Parliament than they have in En-
gland, and they can scarcely have less. Only, after every great abate-
ment and deduction, I think the country would bear a little more mind;
and that there is a profusion of opulent dulness in Parliament which
might a little — though only a little — be pruned away.
The only function of Parliament which remains to be considered is
the informing function, as I just now called it: the function which be-The English Constitution/143
longs to it, or to members of it, to bring before the nation the ideas,
grievances, and wishes of special classes. This must not be confounded
with what I have called its teaching function. In life, no doubt, the two
run one into another. But so do many things which it is very important in
definition to separate. The fact of two things being often found together
is rather a reason for, than an objection to, separating them in idea.
Sometimes they are not found together, and then we may be puzzled if
we have not trained ourselves to separate them. The teaching function
brings true ideas before the nation, and is the function of its highest
minds. The expressive function brings only special ideas, and is the
function of but special minds. Each class has its ideas, wants, and no-
tions; and certain brains are ingrained with them. Such sectarian con-
ceptions are not those by which a determining nation should regulate its
action, nor are orators, mainly animated by such conceptions, safe guides
in policy. But those orators should be heard; those conceptions should
be kept in sight. The great maxim of modern thought is not only the
toleration of every thing, but the examination of every thing. It is by
examining very bare, very dull, very unpromising things, that modern
science has come to be what it is. There is a story of a great chemist who
said he owed half his fame to his habit of examining, after his experi-
ments, what was going to be thrown away; everybody knew the result of
the experiment itself, but in the refuse matter there were many little
facts and unknown changes, which suggested the discoveries of a fa-
mous life to a person capable of looking for them. So with the special
notions of neglected classes. They may contain elements of truth which,
though small, are the very elements which we now require, because we
already know all the rest.
This doctrine was well known to our ancestors. They laboured to
give a character to the various constituencies, or to many of them. They
wished that the shipping trade, the wool trade, the linen trade, should
each have their spokesman: that the unsectional Parliament should know
what each section in the nation thought before it gave the national deci-
sion. This is the true reason for admitting the working classes to a share
in the representation, at least as far as the composition of Parliament is
to be improved by that admission. A great many ideas, a great many
feelings have gathered among the town artisans — a peculiar intellec-
tual life has sprung up among them. They believe that they have inter-
ests which are misconceived or neglected; that they know something
which others do not know; that the thoughts of Parliament are not as144/Walter Bagehot
their thoughts. They ought to be allowed to try to convince Parliament;
their notions ought to be stated as those of other classes are stated; their
advocates should be heard as other people’s advocates are heard. Be-
fore the Reform Bill, there was a recognized machinery for that pur-
pose. The member for Westminster, and other members, were elected by
universal suffrage (or what was in substance such); those members did,
in their day, state what were the grievances and ideas — or were thought
to be the grievances and ideas — of the working classes. It was the
single unbending franchise introduced in 1832 that has caused this dif-
ficulty, as it has others.
Until such a change is made the House of Commons will be defec-
tive, just as the House of Lords was defective. It will not look right. As
long as the Lords do not come to their own House, we may prove on
paper that it is a good revising chamber, but it will be difficult to make
the literary argument felt. Just so, as long as a great class, congregated
in political localities, and known to have political thoughts and wishes,
is without notorious and palpable advocates in Parliament, we may prove
on paper that our representation is adequate, but the world will not
believe it. There is a saying of the eighteenth century, that in politics
“gross appearances are great realities.” It is in vain to demonstrate that
the working classes have no grievances; that the middle classes have
done all that is possible for them, and so on with a crowd of arguments
which I need not repeat, for the newspapers keep them in type, and we
can say them by heart. But so long as the “gross appearance” is that
there are no evident, incessant representatives to speak the wants of
artisans, the “great reality” will be a diffused dissatisfaction. Thirty
years ago it was vain to prove that Gatton and Old Sarum were valuable
seats, and sent good members. Everybody said, “Why, there are no people
there.” Just so everybody must say now, “Our representative system
must be imperfect, for an immense class has no members to speak for
it.” The only answer to the cry against constituencies without inhabit-
ants was to transfer their power to constituencies with inhabitants. Just
so, the way to stop the complaint that artisans have no members is to
give them members, — to create a body of representatives, chosen by
artisans, believing, as Mr. Carlyle would say, “that artisanism is the one
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V. On Changes of Ministry.
There is one error as to the English Constitution which crops up peri-
odically. Circumstances which often, though irregularly, occur natu-
rally suggest that error, and as surely as they happen it revives. The
relation of Parliament, and especially of the House of Commons, to the
Executive Government is the specific peculiarity of our constitution,
and an event which frequently happens much puzzles some people as to
it.
That event is a change of ministry. All our administrators go out
together. The whole executive government changes — at least, all the
heads of it change in a body, and at every such change some speculators
are sure to exclaim that such a habit is foolish. They say, “No doubt Mr.
Gladstone and Lord Russell may have been wrong about Reform; no
doubt Mr. Gladstone may have been cross in the House of Commons;
but why should either or both of these events change all the heads of all
our practical departments? What could be more absurd than what hap-
pened in 1858? Lord Palmerston was for once in his life over-buoyant;
he gave rude answers to stupid inquiries; he brought into the Cabinet a
nobleman concerned in an ugly trial about a woman; he, or his Foreign
Secretary, did not answer a French despatch by a despatch, but told our
ambassador to reply orally. And because of these trifles, or at any rate
these isolated un-administrative mistakes, all our administration had
fresh heads. The Poor Law Board had a new chief, the Home Depart-
ment a new chief, the Public Works a new chief. Surely this was ab-
surd.” Now, is this objection good or bad? Speaking generally, is it wise
so to change all our rulers?
The practice produces three great evils. First, it brings in on a sud-
den new persons and untried persons to preside over our policy. A little
while ago Lord Cranborne7 had no more idea that he would now be
Indian Secretary than that he would be a bill broker. He had never given
any attention to Indian affairs; he can get them up, because he is an able
educated man who can get up any thing. But they are not “part and
parcel” of his mind; not his subjects of familiar reflection, nor things of
which he thinks by predilection, of which he cannot help thinking. But
because Lord Russell and Mr. Gladstone did not please the House of
Commons about Reform, there he is. A perfectly inexperienced man, so
far as Indian affairs go, rules all our Indian empire. And if all our heads
of offices change together, so very frequently it must be. If twenty of-
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clever men ready to take them. The difficulty of making up a govern-
ment is very much like the difficulty of putting together a Chinese puzzle:
the spaces do not suit what you have to put into them. And the difficulty
of matching a ministry is more than that of fitting a puzzle, because the
ministers to be put in can object, though the bits of a puzzle cannot. One
objector can throw out the combination. In 1847 Lord Grey would not
join Lord John Russell’s projected government if Lord Palmerston was
to be Foreign Secretary; Lord Palmerston would be Foreign Secretary,
and so the government was not formed. The cases in which a single
refusal prevents a government are rare, and there must be many concur-
rent circumstances to make it effectual. But the cases in which refusals
impair or spoil a government are very common. It almost never happens
that the ministry-maker can put into his offices exactly whom he would
like; a number of placemen are always too proud, too eager, or too
obstinate to go just where they should.
Again, this system not only makes new ministers ignorant, but keeps
present ministers indifferent. A man cannot feel the same interest that he
might in his work if he knows that by events over which he has no
control, — by errors in which he had no share, — by metamorphoses of
opinion which belong to a different sequence of phenomena, he may
have to leave that work in the middle, and may very likely never return
to it. The new man put into a fresh office ought to have the best motive
to learn his task thoroughly, but, in fact, in England, he has not at all the
best motive. The last wave of party and politics brought him there, the
next may take him away. Young and eager men take, even at this disad-
vantage, a keen interest in office work, but most men, especially old
men, hardly do so. Many a battered minister may be seen to think much
more of the vicissitudes which make him and unmake him, than of any
office matter.
Lastly, a sudden change of ministers may easily cause a mischie-
vous change of policy. In many matters of business, perhaps in most, a
continuity of mediocrity is better than a hotch-potch of excellences. For
example, now that progress in the scientific arts is revolutionizing the
instruments of war, rapid changes in our head-preparers for land and
sea war are most costly and most hurtful. A single competent selector of
new inventions would probably in the course of years, after some expe-
rience, arrive at something tolerable; it is in the nature of steady, regu-
lar, experimenting ability to diminish, if not vanquish, such difficulties.
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learn from each other’s experience; — you might as well expect the new
head boy at a public school to learn from the experience of the last head
boy. The most valuable result of many years is a nicely balanced mind
instinctively heedful of various errors; but such a mind is the incommu-
nicable gift of individual experience, and an outgoing minister can no
more leave it to his successor than an elder brother can pass it on to a
younger. Thus a desultory and incalculable policy may follow from a
rapid change of ministers.
These are formidable arguments, but four things may, I think, be
said in reply to, or mitigation of them. A little examination will show
that this change of ministers is essential to a Parliamentary government;
— that something like it will happen in all elective governments, and
that worse happens under presidential government; — that it is not nec-
essarily prejudicial to a good administration, but that, on the contrary,
something like it is a prerequisite of good administration; — that the
evident evils of English administration are not the results of Parliamen-
tary government, but of grave deficiencies in other parts of our political
and social state; — that, in a word, they result not from what we have,
but from what we have not.
As to the first point, those who wish to remove the choice of minis-
ters from Parliament have not adequately considered what a Parliament
is. A Parliament is nothing less than a big meeting of more or less idle
people. In proportion as you give it power it will inquire into every
thing, settle every thing, meddle in every thing. In an ordinary despo-
tism, the powers of a despot are limited by his bodily capacity, and by
the calls of pleasure; he is but one man; there are but twelve hours in his
day, and he is not disposed to employ more than a small part in dull
business; he keeps the rest for the court, or the harem, or for society. He
is at the top of the world, and all the pleasures of the world are set before
him. Mostly there is only a very small part of political business which
he cares to understand, and much of it (with the shrewd sensual sense
belonging to the race) he knows that he will never understand. But a
Parliament is composed of a great number of men by no means at the
top of the world. When you establish a predominant Parliament, you
give over the rule of the country to a despot who has unlimited time, —
who has unlimited vanity, — who has, or believes he has, unlimited
comprehension, whose pleasure is in action, whose life is work. There is
no limit to the curiosity of Parliament. Sir Robert Peel once suggested
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evening; they touched more or less on fifty subjects, and there were a
thousand other subjects which by parity of reason might have been added
too. As soon as bore A ends, bore B begins. Some inquire from genuine
love of knowledge, or from a real wish to improve what they ask about,
— others to see their name in the papers, — others to show a watchful
constituency that they are alert, — others to get on and to get a place in
the government, — others from an accumulation of little motives they
could not themselves analyze, or because it is their habit to ask things.
And a proper reply must be given. It was said that “Darby Griffith
destroyed Lord Palmerston’s first Government,” and undoubtedly the
cheerful impertinence with which in the conceit of victory that minister
answered. grave men much hurt his Parliamentary power. There is one
thing which no one will permit to be treated lightly, — himself. And so
there is one too which a sovereign assembly will never permit to be
lessened or ridiculed, — its own power. The minister of the day will
have to give an account in Parliament of all branches of administration,
to say why they act when they do, and why they do not when they don’t.
Nor is chance inquiry all a public department has most to fear. Fifty
members of Parliament may be zealous for a particular policy affecting
the department, and fifty others for another policy, and between them
they may divide its action, spoil its favourite aims, and prevent its con-
sistently working out either of their own aims. The process is very simple.
Every department at times looks as if it was in a scrape; some apparent
blunder, perhaps some real blunder, catches the public eye. At once the
antagonist Parliamentary sections, which want to act on the department,
seize the opportunity. They make speeches, they move for documents,
they amass statistics. They declare “that in no other country is such a
policy possible as that which the department is pursuing; that it is medi-
eval; that it costs money; that it wastes life; that America does the con-
trary; that Prussia does the contrary.” The newspapers follow according
to their nature. These bits of administrative scandal amuse the public.
Articles on them are very easy to write, easy to read, easy to talk about.
They please the vanity of mankind. We think as we read, “Thank God,
I am not as that man; I did not send green coffee to the Crimea; I did not
send patent cartridge to the common guns, and common cartridge to the
breech-loaders. I make money; that miserable public functionary only
wastes money.” As for the defence of the department, no one cares for it
or reads it. Naturally at first hearing it does not sound true. The opposi-
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dom choose a case in which the department, upon the surface of the
matter, seems to be right. The case of first impression will always be
that something shameful has happened; that such and such men did die;
that this and that gun would not go off; that this or that ship will not sail.
All the pretty reading is unfavourable, and all the praise is very dull.
Nothing is more helpless than such a department in Parliament if it
has no authorized official defender. The wasps of the House fasten on it;
here they perceive is something easy to sting, and safe, for it cannot
sting in return. The small grain of foundation for complaint germinates,
till it becomes a whole crop. At once the minister of the day is appealed
to; he is at the head of the administration, and he must put the errors
right, if such they are. The opposition leader says, “I put it to the right
honourable gentleman, the First Lord of the Treasury. He is a man of
business. I do not agree with him in his choice of ends, but he is an
almost perfect master of methods and means. What he wishes to do he
does do. Now I appeal to him whether such gratuitous errors, such fatu-
ous incapacity, are to be permitted in the public service. Perhaps the
right honourable gentleman will grant me his attention while I show
from the very documents of the department,” &c. What is the minister
to do? He never heard of this matter. He does not care about the matter.
Several of the supporters of the Government are interested in the oppo-
sition to the department; a grave man, supposed to be wise, mutters,
“This is too bad.” The Secretary of the Treasury tells him, “The House
is uneasy. A good many men are shaky. A. B. said yesterday he had
been dragged through the dirt four nights following. Indeed I am dis-
posed to think myself that the department has been somewhat lax. Per-
haps an inquiry,” &c. And upon that the Prime Minister rises and says,
“That Her Majesty’s Government having given very serious and grave
consideration to this most important subject, are not prepared to say
that in so complicated a matter the department has been perfectly ex-
empt from error. He does not indeed concur in all the statements which
have been made; it is obvious that several of the charges advanced are
inconsistent with one another. (If A. had really died from eating green
coffee on the Tuesday, it is plain he could not have suffered from insuf-
ficient medical attendance on the following Thursday. However, on so
complex a subject, and one so foreign to common experience, he will
not give a judgment. And if the honourable member would be satisfied
with having the matter inquired into by a committee of that House, he
will be prepared to accede to the suggestion.”150/Walter Bagehot
Possibly the outlying department, distrusting the ministry, crams a
friend. But it is happy indeed if it chances on a judicious friend. The
persons most ready to take up that sort of business are benevolent ama-
teurs, very well intentioned, very grave, very respectable, but also rather
dull. Their words are good, but about the joints their arguments are
weak. They speak very well, but while they are speaking, the decorum is
so great that everybody goes away. Such a man is no match for a couple
of House of Commons gladiators. They pull what he says to shreds.
They show or say that he is wrong about his facts. Then he rises in a
fuss and must explain: but in his hurry he mistakes, and cannot find the
right paper, and becomes first hot, then confused, next inaudible, and so
sits down. Probably he leaves the House with the notion that the defence
of the department has broken down, and so the Times announces to all
the world as soon as it awakes.
Some thinkers have naturally suggested that the heads of depart-
ments should as such have the right of speech in the House. But the
system when it has been tried has not answered. M. Guizot tells us from
his own experience that such a system is not effectual. A great popular
assembly has a corporate character; it has its own privileges, preju-
dices, and notions. And one of these notions is that its own members —
the persons it sees every day — whose qualities it knows, whose minds
it can test, are those whom it can most trust. A clerk speaking from
without would be an unfamiliar object. He would be an outsider. He
would speak under suspicion; he would speak without dignity. Very of-
ten he would speak as a victim. All the bores of the House would be
upon him. He would be put upon examination. He would have to an-
swer interrogatories. He would be put through the figures and cross-
questioned in detail. The whole effect of what he said would be lost in
quaestiunculae and hidden in a controversial detritus.
Again, such a person would rarely speak with great ability. He would
speak as a scribe. His habits must have been formed in the quiet of an
office; he is used to red tape, placidity, and the respect of subordinates.
Such a person will hardly ever be able to stand the hurly-burly of a
public assembly. He will lose his head — he will say what he should
not. He will get hot and red; he will feel he is a sort of culprit. After
being used to the flattering deference of deferential subordinates, he will
be pestered by fuss and confounded by invective. He will hate the House
as naturally as the House does not like him. He will be an incompetent
speaker addressing a hostile audience.The English Constitution/151
And what is more, an outside administrator addressing Parliament,
can move Parliament only by the goodness of his arguments. He has no
votes to back them up with. He is sure to be at chronic war with some
active minority of assailants or others. The natural mode in which a
department is improved on great points and new points is by external
suggestion; the worst foes of a department are the plausible errors which
the most visible facts suggest, and which only half visible facts confute.
Both the good ideas and the bad ideas are sure to find advocates first in
the press and then in Parliament. Against these a permanent clerk would
have to contend by argument alone. The Minister, the head of the parlia-
mentary Government, will not care for him. The Minister will say in
some undress soliloquy, “These permanent ‘fellows’ must look after
themselves. I cannot be bothered. I have only a majority of nine, and a
very shaky majority, too. I cannot afford to make enemies for those
whom I did not appoint. They did nothing for me, and I can do nothing
for them.” And if the permanent clerk come to ask his help he will say in
decorous language, “I am sure that if the department can evince to the
satisfaction of Parliament that its past management has been such as the
public interests require, no one will be more gratified than myself. I am
not aware if it will be in my power to attend in my place on Monday; but
if I can be so fortunate, I shall listen to your official statement with my
very best attention.” And so the permanent public servant will be teased
by the wits, oppressed by the bores, and massacred by the innovators of
Parliament.
The incessant tyranny of Parliament over the public offices is pre-
vented and can only be prevented by the appointment of a parliamentary
head, connected by close ties with the present ministry and the ruling
party in Parliament. The parliamentary head is a protecting machine.
He and the friends he brings stand between the department and the busy-
bodies and crotchet-makers of the House and the country. So long as at
any moment the policy of an office could be altered by chance votes in
either House of Parliament, there is no security for any consistency. Our
guns and our ships are not, perhaps, very good now. But they would be
much worse if any thirty or forty advocates for this gun or that gun
could make a motion in Parliament, beat the department, and get their
ships or their guns adopted. The “Black Breech Ordnance Company”
and the “Adamantine Ship Company” would soon find representatives
in Parliament, if forty or fifty members would get the national custom
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head of the department. As soon as the opposition begins the attack, he
looks up his means of defence. He studies the subject, compiles his
arguments, and builds little piles of statistics, which he hopes will have
some effect. He has his reputation at stake, and he wishes to show that
he is worth his present place, and fit for future promotion. He is well
known, perhaps liked, by the House — at any rate the House attends to
him; he is one of the regular speakers whom they hear and heed. He is
sure to be able to get himself heard, and he is sure to make the best
defence he can. And after he has settled his speech he loiters up to the
Secretary of the Treasury, and says quietly, “They have got a motion
against me on Tuesday, you know. I hope you will have your men here.
A lot of fellows have crotchets, and though they do not agree a bit with
one another, they are all against the department; they will all vote for the
inquiry.” And the Secretary answers, “Tuesday, you say; no (looking at
a paper), I do not think it will come on on Tuesday. There is Higgins, on
Education. He is good for a long time. But anyhow it shall be all right.”
And then he glides about and speaks a word here and a word there, in
consequence of which, when the anti-official motion is made, a consid-
erable array of steady, grave faces sits behind the Treasury Bench nay,
possibly a rising man who sits in outlying independence below the gang-
way rises to defend the transaction; the department wins by thirty-three,
and the management of that business pursues its steady way.
This contrast is no fancy picture. The experiment of conducting the
administration of a public department by an independent unsheltered
authority has often been tried, and always failed. Parliament always
poked at it, till it made it impossible. The most remarkable is that of the
Poor Law. The administration of that law is not now very good, but it is
not too much to say that almost the whole of its goodness has been
preserved by its having an official and party protector in the House of
Commons. Without that contrivance we should have drifted back into
the errors of the old Poor Law, and superadded to them the present
meanness and incompetence in our large towns. All would have been
given up to local management. Parliament would have interfered with
the central board till it made it impotent, and the local authorities would
have been despotic. The first administration of the new Poor Law was
by “Commissioners” — the three kings of Somerset House, as they
were called. The system was certainly not tried in untrustworthy hands.
At the crisis Mr. Chadwick, one of the most active and best administra-
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Commissioner was Sir George Lewis, perhaps the best selective admin-
istrator of our time. But the House of Commons would not let the Com-
mission alone. For a long time it was defended because the Whigs had
made the Commission, and felt bound as a party to protect it. The new
law started upon a certain intellectual impetus, and till that was spent its
administration was supported in a rickety existence by an abnormal
strength. But afterwards the Commissioners were left to their intrinsic
weakness. There were members for all the localities, but there were
none for them. There were members for every crotchet and corrupt in-
terest, but there were none for them. The rural guardians would have
liked to eke out wages by rates; the city guardians hated control, and
hated to spend money. The Commission had to be dissolved, and a par-
liamentary head was added; the result is not perfect, but it is an amazing
improvement on what would have happened in the old system. The new
system has not worked well because the central authority has too little
power; but under the previous system the central authority was getting
to have, and by this time would have had, no power at all. And if Sir
George Lewis and Mr. Chadwick could not maintain an outlying de-
partment in the face of Parliament, how unlikely that an inferior com-
pound of discretion and activity will ever maintain it!
These reasonings show why a changing parliamentary head, a head
changing as the ministry changes, is a necessity of good Parliamentary
government, and there is happily a natural provision that there will be
such heads. Party organization insures it. In America, where on account
of the fixedly recurring presidential election, and the perpetual minor
elections, party organization is much more effectually organized than
anywhere else, the effect on the offices is tremendous. Every office is
filled anew at every presidential change, at least every change which
brings in a new party. Not only the greatest posts, as in England, but the
minor posts change their occupants. The scale of the financial opera-
tions of the Federal government is now so increased that most likely in
that department, at least, there must in future remain a permanent ele-
ment of great efficiency; a revenue of £90,000,000 sterling cannot be
collected and expended with a trifling and changing staff. But till now
the Americans have tried to get on not only with changing heads to a
bureaucracy, as the English, but without any stable bureaucracy at all.
They have facilities for trying it which no one else has. All Americans
can administer, and the number of them really fit to be in succession
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as afraid of a change of all their officials as European countries must,
for the incoming substitutes are sure to be much better there than here;
and they do not fear, as we English fear, that the outgoing officials will
be left destitute in middle life, with no hope for the future and no recom-
pense for the past, for in America (whatever may be the cause of it)
opportunities are numberless, and a man who is ruined by being “off the
rails” in England soon there gets on another line. The Americans will
probably to some extent modify their past system of total administrative
cataclysms, but their very existence in the only competing form of free
government should prepare us for and make us patient with the mild
transitions of Parliamentary government.
These arguments will, I think, seem conclusive to almost every one;
but, at this moment, many people will meet them thus: they will say,
“You prove what we do not deny, that this system of periodical change
is a necessary ingredient in Parliamentary government, but you have not
proved what we do deny, that this change is a good thing. Parliamentary
government may have that effect, among others, for any thing we care:
we maintain merely that it is a defect.” In answer, I think it may be
shown not, indeed, that this precise change is necessary to a perma-
nently perfect administration, but that some analogous change, some
change of the same species, is so.
At this moment, in England, there is a sort of leaning towards bu-
reaucracy — at least, among writers and talkers. There is a seizure of
partiality to it. The English people do not easily change their rooted
notions, but they have many unrooted notions. Any great European event
is sure for a moment to excite a sort of twinge of conversion to some-
thing or other. Just now, the triumph of the Prussians — the bureau-
cratic people, as is believed, par excellence — has excited a kind of
admiration for bureaucracy, which a few years since we should have
thought impossible. I do not presume to criticise the Prussian bureau-
cracy of my own knowledge; it certainly is not a pleasant institution for
foreigners to come across, though agreeableness to travellers is but of
very second-rate importance. But it is quite certain that the Prussian
bureaucracy, though we, for a moment, half admire it at a distance, does
not permanently please the most intelligent and liberal Prussians at home.
What are two among the principal aims of the Fortschritt Partei — the
party of progress — as Mr. Grant Duff, the most accurate and philo-
sophical of our describers, delineates them?
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of the administration, with a view to avoiding the scandals now of fre-
quent occurrence, when an obstinate or bigoted official sets at defiance
the liberal initiations of the government, trusting to backstairs influ-
ence.”
Second, “an easy method of bringing to justice guilty officials, who
are at present, as in France, in all conflicts with simple citizens, like
men armed cap-à-pie fighting with undefenceless.” A system against
which the most intelligent native liberals bring even with colour of rea-
son such grave objections, is a dangerous model for foreign imitation.
The defects of bureaucracy are, indeed, well known. It is a form of
government which has been tried often enough in the world, and it is
easy to show what, human nature being what it in the long run is, the
defects of a bureaucracy must in the long run be.
It is an inevitable defect, that bureaucrats will care more for routine
than for results; or, as Burke put it, “that they will think the substance of
business not to be much more important than the forms of it.” Their
whole education and all the habit of their lives make them do so. They
are brought young into the particular part of the public service to which
they are attached; they are occupied for years in learning its forms —
afterwards, for years too, in applying these forms to trifling matters.
They are, to use the phrase of an old writer, “but the tailors of business;
they cut the clothes, but they do not find the body.” Men so trained must
come to think the routine of business not a means, but an end — to
imagine the elaborate machinery of which they form a part, and from
which they derive their dignity, to be a grand and achieved result, not a
working and changeable instrument. But in a miscellaneous world, there
is now one evil and now another. The very means which best helped you
yesterday, may very likely be those which most impede you to-morrow
— you may want to do a different thing to-morrow, and all your accu-
mulation of means for yesterday’s work is but an obstacle to the new
work. The Prussian military system is the theme of popular wonder
now, yet it sixty years pointed the moral against form. We have all heard
the saying that “ Frederic the Great lost the battle of Jena.” It was the
system which he had established-a good system for his wants and his
times, — which, blindly adhered to, and continued into a different age,
put to strive with new competitors, brought his country to ruin. The
“dead and formal’ Prussian system was then contrasted with the “liv-
ing” French system —the sudden outcome of the new explosive democ-
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the history of its predecessor is a warning what its future history may be
too. It is not more celebrated for its day than Frederic’s for his, and
principle teaches that a bureaucracy, elated by sudden success, and
marvelling at its own merit, is the most unimproving and shallow of
governments.
Not only does a bureaucracy thus tend to under-government, in point
of quality; it tends to over-government, in point of quantity. The trained
official hates the rude, untrained public. He thinks that they are stupid,
ignorant, reckless — that they cannot tell their own interest — that they
should have the leave of the office before they do any thing. Protection
is the natural inborn creed of every official body; free trade is an extrin-
sic idea, alien to its notions, and hardly to be assimilated with life; and
it is easy to see how an accomplished critic, used to a free and active
life, could thus describe the official.
“Every imaginable and real social interest,” says Mr. Laing, “reli-
gion, education, law, police, every branch of public or private business,
personal liberty to move from place to place, even from parish to parish
within the same jurisdiction; liberty to engage in any branch of trade or
industry, on a small or large scale, all the objects, in short, in which
body, mind, and capital can be employed in civilized society, were gradu-
ally laid hold of for the employment and support of functionaries, were
centralized in bureaux, were superintended, licensed, inspected, reported
upon, and interfered with by a host of officials scattered over the land,
and maintained at the public expense, yet with no conceivable utility in
their duties. They are not, however, gentlemen at large, enjoying salary
without service. They are under a semi-military discipline. In Bavaria,
for instance, the superior civil functionary can place his inferior func-
tionary under house-arrest, for neglect of duty, or other offence against
civil functionary discipline. In Würtemberg, the functionary cannot marry
without leave from his superior. Voltaire says, somewhere, that’ the art
of government is to make two-thirds of a nation pay all it possibly can
pay for the benefit of the other third. This is realized in Germany by the
functionary system. The functionaries are not there for the benefit of the
people, but the people for the benefit of the functionaries. All this ma-
chinery of functionarism, with its numerous ranks and gradations in
every district, filled with a staff of clerks and expectants in every de-
partment looking for employment, appointments, or promotions, was
intended to be a new support of the throne in the new social state of the
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official duties of interference in all public or private affairs, yet attached
by their interests to the kingly power. The Beamptenstand, or function-
ary class, was to be the equivalent to the class of nobility, gentry, capi-
talists, and men of larger landed property than the peasant-proprietors,
and was to make up in numbers for the want of individual weight and
influence. In France, at the expulsion of Louis Phillipe, the civil func-
tionaries were stated to amount to 807,030 individuals. This civil army
was more than double of the military. In Germany, this class is neces-
sarily more numerous in proportion to the population, the landwehr sys-
tem imposing many more restrictions than the conscription on the free
action of the people, and requiring more officials to manage it, and the
semi-feudal jurisdictions and forms of law requiring much more writing
and intricate forms of procedure before the courts than the Code Napo-
leon.”
A bureaucracy is sure to think that its duty is to augment official
power, official business, or official members, rather than to leave free
the energies of mankind; it overdoes the quantity of government, as well
as impairs its quality.
The truth is, that a skilled bureaucracy — a bureaucracy trained
from early life to its special avocation is, though it boasts of an appear-
ance of science, quite inconsistent with the true principles of the art of
business. That art has not yet been condensed into precepts, but a great
many experiments have been made, and a vast floating vapour of knowl-
edge floats through society. One of the most sure principles is, that suc-
cess depends on a due mixture of special and non-special minds — of
minds which attend to the means, and of minds which attend to the end.
The success of the great joint-stock banks of London — the most re-
markable achievement of recent business — has been an example of the
use of this mixture. These banks are managed by a board of persons
mostly not trained to the business, supplemented by, and annexed to, a
body of specially trained officers, who have been bred to banking all
their lives. These mixed banks have quite beaten the old banks, com-
posed exclusively of pure bankers; it is found that the board of directors
has greater and more flexible knowledge — more insight into the wants
of a commercial community — knows when to lend and when not to
lend, better than the old bankers, who had never looked at life, except
out of the bank windows. Just so the most successful railways in Europe
have been conducted — not by engineers or traffic managers — but by
capitalists; by men of a certain business culture, if of no other. These158/Walter Bagehot
capitalists buy and use the services of skilled managers, as the unlearned
attorney buys and uses the services of the skilled barrister, and manage
far better than any of the different sorts of special men under them.
They combine these different specialties — make it clear where the realm
of one ends and that of the other begins, and add to it a wide knowledge
of large affairs, which no special man can have, and which is only gained
by diversified action. But this utility of leading minds used to general-
ize, and acting upon various materials, is entirely dependent upon their
position. They must not be at the bottom — they must not even be half
way up — they must be at the top. A merchant’s clerk would be a child
at a bank counter; but the merchant himself could, very likely, give
good, clear, and useful advice in a bank court. The merchant’s clerk
would be equally at sea in a railway office, but the merchant himself
could give good advice, very likely, at a board of directors. The summits
(if I may so say) of the various kinds of business are, like the tops of
mountains, much more alike than the parts below —the bare principles
are much the same; it is only the rich variegated details of the lower
strata that so contrast with one another. But it needs travelling to know
that the summits are the same. Those who live on one mountain believe
that their mountain is wholly unlike all others.
The application of this principle to Parliamentary government is
very plain; it shows at once that the intrusion from without upon an
office of an exterior head of the office, is not an evil, but that, on the
contrary, it is essential to the perfection of that office. If it is left to
itself, the office will become technical, self-absorbed, self-multiplying.
It will be likely to overlook the end in the means; it will fail from nar-
rowness of mind; it will be eager in seeming to do; it will be idle in real
doing. An extrinsic chief is the fit corrector of such errors. He can say to
the permanent chief, skilled in the forms and pompous with the memo-
ries of his office, “Will you, Sir, explain to me how this regulation
conduces to the end in view? According to the natural view of things,
the applicant should state the whole of his wishes to one clerk on one
paper; you make him say it to five clerks on five papers.” Or, again,
“Does it not appear to you, Sir, that the reason of this formality is ex-
tinct? When we were building wood ships, it was quite right to have
such precautions against fire; but now that we are building iron ships,”
&c. If a junior clerk asked these questions, he would be “pooh-poohed!”
It is only the head of an office that can get them answered. It is he, and
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The immense importance of such a fresh mind is greatest in a coun-
try where business changes most. A dead, inactive, agricultural country
may be governed by an unalterable bureau for years and years, and no
harm come of it. If a wise man arranged the bureau rightly in the begin-
ning, it may run rightly a long time. But, if the country be a progressive,
eager, changing one, soon the bureau will either cramp improvement, or
be destroyed itself. This conception of the use of a Parliamentary head
shows how wrong is the obvious notion which regards him as the prin-
cipal administrator of his office. The late Sir George Lewis used to be
fond of explaining this subject. He had every means of knowing. He was
bred in the permanent civil service. He was a very successful Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer, a very successful Home Secretary, and he died
Minister for War. He used to say, “It is not the business of a Cabinet
Minister to work his department. His business is to see that it is prop-
erly worked. If he does much, he is probably doing harm. The perma-
nent staff of the office can do what he chooses to do much better, or if
they cannot, they ought to be removed. He is only a bird of passage, and
cannot compete with those who are in the office all their lives round.”
Sir George Lewis was a perfect Parliamentary head of an office, so far
as that head is to be a keen critic and rational corrector of it.
But Sir George Lewis was not perfect: he was not even an average
good head in another respect. The use of a fresh mind applied to the
official mind is not only a corrective use, it is also an animating use. A
public department is very apt to be dead to what is wanting for a great
occasion till the occasion is past. The vague public mind will appreciate
some signal duty before the precise, occupied administration perceives
it. The Duke of Newcastle was of this use at least in the Crimean war.
He roused up his department, though when roused it could not act. A
perfect parliamentary minister would be one who should add the ani-
mating capacity of the Duke of Newcastle to the accumulated sense, the
detective instinct, and the laissez faire habit of Sir George Lewis.
As soon as we take the true view of Parliamentary office we shall
perceive that, fairly, frequent change in the official is an advantage, not
a mistake. If his function is to bring a representative of outside sense
and outside animation in contact with the inside world, he ought often to
be changed. No man is a perfect representative of outside sense. “There
is some one,” says the true French saying, “who is more able than
Talleyrand, more able than Napoleon. C’est tout le monde.” That many-
sided sense finds no microcosm in any single individual. Still less are160/Walter Bagehot
the critical function and the animating function of a Parliamentary min-
ister likely to be perfectly exercised by one and the same man. Impelling
power and restraining wisdom are as opposite as any two things, and
are rarely found together. And even if the natural mind of the Parlia-
mentary minister was perfect, long contact with the office would de-
stroy his use. Inevitably he would accept the ways of office, think its
thoughts, live its life. The “dyer’s hand would be subdued to what it
works in.” If the function of a Parliamentary minister is to be an out-
sider to his office, we must not choose one who, by habit, thought, and
life, is acclimatized to its ways.
There is every reason to expect that a Parliamentary statesman will
be a man of quite sufficient intelligence, quite enough various knowl-
edge, quite enough miscellaneous experience, to represent effectually
general sense in opposition to bureaucratic sense. Most Cabinet minis-
ters in charge of considerable departments are men of superior ability; I
have heard an eminent living statesman of long experience say that in
his time he only knew one instance to the contrary. And there is the best
protection that it shall be so. A considerable Cabinet minister has to
defend his Department in the face of mankind; and though distant ob-
servers and sharp writers may depreciate it, this is a very difficult thing.
A fool, who has publicly to explain great affairs, who has publicly to
answer detective questions, who has publicly to argue against able and
quick opponents, must soon be shown to be a fool. The very nature of
Parliamentary government answers for the discovery of substantial in-
competence.
At any rate, none of the competing forms of government have nearly
so effectual a procedure for putting a good untechnical minister to cor-
rect and impel the routine ones. There are but four important forms of
government in the present state of the world, the Parliamentary, the Presi-
dential, the Hereditary, and the Dictatorial, or Revolutionary. Of these I
have shown that, as now worked in America, the Presidential form of
government is incompatible with a skilled bureaucracy. If the whole
official class change when a new party goes out or comes in, a good
official system is impossible. Even if more officials should be perma-
nent in America than now, still, vast numbers will always be changed.
The whole issue is based on a single election — on the choice of Presi-
dent; by that internecine conflict all else is won or lost. The managers of
the contest have that greatest possible facility in using what I may call
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give what places he likes to what persons, and when his friends tell A.
B., “ If we win, C. D. shall be turned out of Utica Postoffice, and you,
A. B., shall have it,” A. B. believes it, and is justified in doing so. But no
individual member of Parliament can promise place effectually. He may
not be able to give the places. His party may come in, but he will be
powerless. In the United States party intensity is aggravated by concen-
trating an overwhelming importance on a single contest, and the effi-
ciency of promised offices as a means of corruption is augmented, be-
cause the victor can give what he likes to whom he likes.
Nor is this the only defect of a presidential government in reference
to the choice of officers. The President has the principal anomaly of a
Parliamentary government without having its corrective. At each change
of party the President distributes (as here) the principal offices to his
principal supporters. But he has an opportunity for singular favouritism.
The minister lurks in the office; he need do nothing in public; he need
not show for years whether he is a fool or wise. The nation can tell what
a Parliamentary member is by the open test of Parliament; but no one,
save from actual contact, or by rare position, can tell any thing certain
of a Presidential minister.
The case of a minister under an hereditary form of government is
yet worse. The hereditary king may be weak; may be under the govern-
ment of women; may appoint a minister from childish motives; may
remove one from absurd whims. There is no security that an hereditary
king will be competent to choose a good chief minister, and thousands
of such kings have chosen millions of bad ministers.
By the Dictatorial, or Revolutionary, sort of government, I mean
that very important sort in which the sovereign — the absolute sover-
eign — is selected by insurrection. In theory, one would have certainly
hoped that by this time such a crude elective machinery would have
been reduced to a secondary part. But, in fact, the greatest nation (or,
perhaps, after the exploits of Bismarck, I should say one of the two
greatest nations of the Continent) vacillates between the Revolutionary
and the Parliamentary, and now is governed under the revolutionary
form. France elects its ruler in the streets of Paris. Flatterers may sug-
gest that the democratic empire will become hereditary, but close ob-
servers know that it cannot. The idea of the government is that the Em-
peror represents the people in capacity, in judgment, in instinct. But no
family through generations can have sufficient, or half sufficient, mind
to do so. The representative despot must be chosen by fighting, as Na-162/Walter Bagehot
poleon I and Napoleon III were chosen. And such a government is likely,
whatever be its other defects, to have a far better and abler administra-
tion than any other government. The head of the government must be a
man of the most consummate ability. He cannot keep his place, he can
hardly keep his life, unless he is. He is sure to be active, because he
knows that his power, and perhaps his head, may be lost if he be negli-
gent. The whole frame of his State is strained to keep down revolution.
The most difficult of all political problems is to be solved — the people
are to be at once thoroughly restrained and thoroughly pleased. The
executive must be like a steel shirt of the middle ages — extremely hard
and extremely flexible. It must give way to attractive novelties which do
not hurt; it must resist such as are dangerous; it must maintain old things
which are good and fitting; it must alter such as cramp and give pain.
The dictator dare not appoint a bad minister if he would. I admit that
such a despot is a better selector of administrators than a parliament;
that he will know how to mix fresh minds and used minds better; that he
is under a stronger motive to combine them well; that here is to be seen
the best of all choosers with the keenest motives to choose. But I need
not prove in England that the revolutionary selection of rulers obtains
administrative efficiency at a price altogether transcending its value;
that it shocks credit by its catastrophes; that for intervals it does not
protect property or life; that it maintains an undergrowth of fear through
all prosperity; that it may take years to find the true capable despot; that
the interregna of the incapable are full of all evil; that the fit despot may
die as soon as found; that the good administration and all else hang by
the thread of his life.
But if, with the exception of this terrible revolutionary government,
a Parliamentary government upon principle surpasses all its competi-
tors in administrative efficiency, why is it that our English Government,
which is beyond comparison the best of Parliamentary governments, is
not celebrated through the world for administrative efficiency? It is noted
for many things, why is it not noted for that? Why, according to popular
belief, is it rather characterized by the very contrary?
One great reason of the diffused impression is, that the English
Government attempts so much. Our military system is that which is
most attacked. Objectors say we spend much more on our army than the
great military monarchies, and yet with an inferior result. But, then,
what we attempt is incalculably more difficult. The continental monar-
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soldiers whom they force to fight; the English try to defend without any
compulsion — only by such soldiers as they persuade to serve — terri-
tories far surpassing all Europe in magnitude, and situated all over the
habitable globe. Our Horse Guards and War Office may not be at all
perfect — I believe they are not: but if they had sufficient recruits se-
lected by force of law — if they had, as in Prussia, the absolute com-
mand of each man’s time for a few years, and the right to call him out
afterwards when they liked, we should be much surprised at the sudden
ease and quickness with which they did things. I have no doubt too that
any accomplished soldier of the Continent would reject as impossible
what we after a fashion effect. He would not attempt to defend a vast
scattered empire, with many islands, a long frontier line in every conti-
nent, and a very tempting bit of plunder at the centre, by mere volunteer
recruits, who mostly come from the worst class of the people, — whom
the Great Duke called the “scum of the earth,” — who come in uncer-
tain numbers year by year, — who by some political accident may not
come in adequate numbers, or at all, in the year we need them most. Our
War Office attempts what foreign War Offices (perhaps rightly) would
not try at; their officers have means of incalculable force denied to ours,
though ours is set to harder tasks.
Again, the English navy undertakes to defend a line of coast and a
set of dependencies far surpassing those of any continental power. And
the extent of our operations is a singular difficulty just now. It requires
us to keep a large stock of ships and arms. But on the other hand, there
are most important reasons why we should not keep much. The naval
art and the military art are both in a state of transition; the last discovery
of to-day is out of date, and superseded by an antagonistic discovery to-
morrow. Any large accumulation of vessels or guns is sure to contain
much that will be useless, unfitting, antediluvian, when it comes to be
tried. There are two cries against the Admiralty which go on side by
side: one says, “We have not ships enough, no ‘relief’ ships, no navy, to
tell the truth;” the other cry says, “We have all the wrong ships, all the
wrong guns, and nothing but the wrong; in their foolish constructive
mania the Admiralty have been building when they ought to have been
waiting; they have heaped a, curious museum of exploded inventions,
but they have given us nothing serviceable.” The two cries for opposite
policies go on together, and blacken our Executive together, though each
is a defence of the Executive against the other.
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of which abroad they have long got rid. We love independent “local
authorities,” little centres of outlying authority. When the metropolitan
executive most wishes to act, it cannot act effectually because these
lesser bodies hesitate, deliberate, or even disobey. But local indepen-
dence has no necessary connection with Parliamentary government. The
degree of local freedom desirable in a country varies according to many
circumstances, and a Parliamentary government may consist with any
degree of it. We certainly ought not to debit Parliamentary government
as a general and applicable polity with the particular vices of the guard-
ians of the poor in England, though it is so debited every day.
Again, as our administration has in England this peculiar difficulty,
so on the other hand foreign competing administrations have a peculiar
advantage. Abroad a man under Government is a superior being; he is
higher than the rest of the world; he is envied by almost all of it. This
gives the Government the easy pick of the elite of the nation. All clever
people are eager to be under Government, and are hardly to be satisfied
elsewhere. But in England there is no such superiority, and the English
have no such feeling. We do not respect a stamp-office clerk, or an
exciseman’s assistant. A pursy grocer considers he is much above ei-
ther. Our Government cannot buy for minor clerks the best ability of the
nation in the cheap currency of pure honor, and no government is rich
enough to buy very much of it in money. Our mercantile opportunities
allure away the most ambitious minds. The foreign bureaux are filled
with a selection from the ablest men of the nation, but only a very few of
the best men approach the English offices.
But these are neither the only nor even the principal reasons why
our public administration is not so good as, according to principle and
to the unimpeded effects of Parliamentary government, it should be.
There are two great causes at work, which in their consequences run out
into many details, but which in their fundamental nature may be briefly
described. The first of these causes is our ignorance. No polity can get
out of a nation more than there is in the nation. A free government is
essentially a government by persuasion; and as are the people to be
persuaded, and as are the persuaders, so will that government be. On
many parts of our administration the effect of our extreme ignorance is
at once plain. The foreign policy of England has for many years been,
according to the judgment now in vogue, inconsequent, fruitless, ca-
sual; aiming at no distinct pre-imagined end, based on no steadily pre-
conceived principle. I have not room to discuss with how much or howThe English Constitution/165
little abatement this decisive censure should be accepted. However, I
entirely concede that our recent foreign policy has been open to very
grave and serious blame. But would it not have been a miracle if the
English people, directing their own policy, and being what they are, had
directed a good policy? Are they not above all nations divided from the
rest of the world, insular both in situation and in mind, both for good
and for evil? Are they not out of the current of common European causes
and affairs? Are they not a race contemptuous of others? Are they not a
race with no special education or culture as to the modern world, and
too often despising such culture? Who could expect such a people to
comprehend the new and strange events of foreign places? So far from
wondering that the English Parliament has been inefficient in foreign
policy, I think it is wonderful, and another sign of the rude, vague imagi-
nation that is at the bottom of our people, that we have done so well as
we have.
Again, the very conception of the English Constitution, as distin-
guished from a purely Parliamentary constitution, is that it contains
“dignified” parts — parts, that is, retained, not for intrinsic use, but
from their imaginative attraction upon an uncultured and rude popula-
tion. All such elements tend to diminish simple efficiency. They are like
the additional and solely ornamental wheels introduced into the clocks
of the middle ages, which tell the then age of the moon or the supreme
constellation; which make little men or birds come out and in theatri-
cally. All such ornamental work is a source of friction and error; it
prevents the time being marked accurately; each new wheel is a new
source of imperfection. So if authority is given to a person., not on
account of his working fitness, but on account of his imaginative effi-
ciency, he will commonly impair good administration. He may do some-
thing better than good work of detail, but will spoil good work of detail.
The English aristocracy is often of this sort. It has an influence over the
people of vast value still, and of infinite value formerly. But no man
would select the cadets of an aristocratic house as desirable administra-
tors. They have peculiar disadvantages in the acquisition of business
knowledge, business training, and business habits, and they have no
peculiar advantages.
Our middle class, too, is very unfit to give us the administrators we
ought to have. I cannot now discuss whether all that is said against our
education is well grounded; it is called by an excellent judge “preten-
tious, insufficient, and unsound.” But I will say that it does not fit men166/Walter Bagehot
to be men of business as it ought to fit them. Till lately the very simple
attainments and habits necessary for a banker’s clerk had a scarcity-
value. The sort of education which fits a man for the higher posts of
practical life is still very rare; there is not even a good agreement as to
what it is. Our public officers cannot be as good as the corresponding
officers of some foreign nations till our business education is as good as
theirs.8
But strong as is our ignorance in deteriorating our administration,
another cause is stronger still. There are but two foreign administra-
tions probably better than ours, and both these have had something which
we have not had. Theirs in both cases were arranged by a man of genius,
after careful forethought, and upon a special design. Napoleon built
upon a clear stage which the French Revolution bequeathed him. The
originality once ascribed to his edifice was indeed untrue; Tocqueville
and Lavergne have shown that he did but run up a conspicuous struc-
ture in imitation of a latent one before concealed by the medieval com-
plexities of the old regime. But what we are concerned with now is, not
Napoleon’s originality, but his work. He undoubtedly settled the admin-
istration of France upon an effective, consistent, and enduring system;
the succeeding governments have but worked the mechanism they in-
herited from him. Frederick the Great did the same in the new monarchy
of Prussia. Both the French system and the Prussian are new machines,
made in civilized times to do their appropriate work.
The English offices have never, since they were made, been arranged
with any reference to one another; or rather they were never made, but
grew as each could. The sort of free-trade which prevailed in public
institutions in the English middle ages is very curious. Our three courts
of law — the Queen’s Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer —
for the sake of the fees extended an originally contracted sphere into the
entire sphere of litigation. Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem, went
the old saying; or, in English, “It is the mark of a good judge to augment
the fees of his court,” his own income, and the income of his subordi-
nates. The central administration, the Treasury, never asked any ac-
count of the moneys the courts thus received; so long as it was not asked
to pay any thing, it was satisfied. Only last year one of the many rem-
nants of this system cropped up, to the wonder of the public. A clerk in
the Patent Office stole some fees, and naturally the men of the nine-
teenth century thought our principal finance minister, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, would be, as in France, responsible for it. But the En-The English Constitution/167
glish law was different somehow. The Patent Office was under the Lord
Chancellor, and the Court of Chancery is one of the multitude of our
institutions which owe their existence to fee competition, — and so it
was the Lord Chancellor’s business to look after the fees, which of course,
as an occupied judge, he could not. A certain Act of Parliament did
indeed require that the fees of the Patent Office should be paid into the
“Exchequer;” and, again, the “Chancellor of the Exchequer” was thought
to be responsible in the matter, but only by those who did not know.
According to our system the Chancellor of the Exchequer is the enemy
of the Exchequer; a whole series of enactments try to protect it from
him. Until a few months ago there was a very lucrative sinecure called
the “Comptrollership of the Exchequer,” designed to guard the Exche-
quer against its Chancellor; and the last holder, Lord Monteagle, used
to say he was the pivot of the English Constitution. I have not room to
explain what he meant, and it is not needful; what is to the purpose is
that, by an inherited series of historical complexities, a defaulting clerk
in an office of no litigation was not under natural authority, the finance
minister, but under a far-away judge who had never heard of him.
The whole office of the Lord Chancellor is a heap of anomalies. He
is a judge, and it is contrary to obvious principle that any part of admin-
istration should be intrusted to a judge; it is of very grave moment that
the administration of justice should be kept clear of any sinister tempta-
tions. Yet the Lord Chancellor, our chief judge, sits in the Cabinet, and
makes party speeches in the Lords. Lord Lyndhurst was a principal
Tory politician, and yet he presided in the O’Connell case. Lord Westbury
was in chronic wrangle with the bishops, but he gave judgment upon
“Essays and Reviews.” In truth, the Lord Chancellor became a Cabinet
Minister, because, being near the person of the sovereign, he was high
in court precedence, and not upon a political theory wrong or right.
A friend once told me that an intelligent Italian asked him about the
principal English officers, and that he was very puzzled to explain their
duties, and especially to explain the relation of their duties to their titles.
I do not remember all the cases, but I can recollect that the Italian could
not comprehend why the First “Lord of the Treasury” had as a rule
nothing to do with the Treasury, or why the “Woods and Forests” looked
after the sewerage of towns. This conversation was years before the
cattle plague, but I should like to have heard the reasons why the Privy
Council office had charge of that malady. Of course one could give an
historical reason, but I mean an administrative reason, a reason which168/Walter Bagehot
would show, not how it came to have the duty, but why in future it
should keep it.
But the unsystematic and casual arrangement of our public offices
is not more striking than their difference of arrangement for the one
purpose they have in common. They all, being under the ultimate direc-
tion of a Parliamentary official, ought to have the best means of bring-
ing the whole of the higher concerns of the office before that official.
When the fresh mind rules, the fresh mind requires to be informed. And
most business being rather alike, the machinery for bringing it before
the extrinsic chief ought, for the most part, to be similar; at any rate,
where it is different, it ought to be different upon reason; and where it is
similar, similar upon reason. Yet there are almost no two offices which
are exactly alike in the defined relations of the permanent official to the
Parliamentary chief. Let us see. The army and navy are the most similar
in nature, yet there is in the army a permanent outside office, called the
Horse Guards, to which there is nothing else like. In the navy, there is a
curious anomaly — a Board of Admiralty, also changing with every
government, which is to instruct the First Lord in what he does not
know. The relations between the First Lord and the Board have not
always been easily intelligible, and those between the War Office and
the Horse Guards are in extreme confusion. Even now a Parliamentary
paper relating to them has just been presented to the House of Com-
mons, which says the fundamental and ruling document cannot be traced
beyond the possession of Sir George Lewis, who was Secretary for War
three years since; and the confused details are endless, as they must be
in a chronic contention of offices. At the Board of Trade there is only
the hypothesis of a Board; it has long ceased to exist. Even the President
and Vice-President do not regularly meet for the transaction of affairs.
The patent of the latter is only to transact business in the absence of the
President, and if the two are not intimate, and the President chooses to
act himself, the Vice-President sees no papers, and does nothing. At the
Treasury the shadow of a Board exists, but its members have no power,
and are the very officials whom Canning said existed to make a House,
to keep a House, and to cheer the ministers. The India Office has a fixed
“Council;” but the Colonial Office, which rules over our other depen-
dencies and colonies, has not, and never had, the vestige of a council.
Any of these varied Constitutions may be right, but all of them can
scarcely be right.
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permanent chief has been discussed only once in England: that case was
a peculiar and anomalous one, and the decision then taken was dubious.
A new India Office, when the East India Company was abolished, had
to be made. The late Mr. James Wilson, a consummate judge of admin-
istrative affairs, then maintained that no council ought to be appointed
eo nomine, but that the true Council of a Cabinet minister was a certain
number of highly paid, much occupied, responsible secretaries, whom
the minister could consult. either separately or together, as, and when,
he chose. Such secretaries, Mr. Wilson maintained, must be able, for no
minister will sacrifice his own convenience, and endanger his own repu-
tation by appointing a fool to a post so near himself, and where he can
do much harm. A member of a Board may easily be incompetent; if
some other members and the chairmen are able, the addition of one or
two stupid men will not be felt; they will receive their salaries and do
nothing. But a permanent under-secretary, charged with a real control
over much important business, must be able, or his superior will be
blamed, and there will be “a scrape in Parliament.”
I cannot here discuss, nor am I competent to discuss, the best mode
of composing public offices, and of adjusting them to a Parliamentary
head. There ought to be on record skilled evidence on the subject, before
a person without any specific experience can to any purpose think about
it. But I may observe that the plan which Mr. Wilson suggested is that
followed in the most successful part of our administration, the “Ways
and Means” part. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer prepares a
Budget, he requires from the responsible heads of the revenue depart-
ment their estimates of the public revenue upon the preliminary hypoth-
esis that no change is made, but that last year’s taxes will continue; if,
afterwards, he thinks of making an alteration, he requires a report on
that too. If he has to renew Exchequer bills, or operate anyhow in the
City, he takes the opinion, oral or written, of the ablest and most respon-
sible person at the National Debt Office, and the ablest and most re-
sponsible at the Treasury. Mr. Gladstone, by far the greatest Chancellor
of the Exchequer of this generation, one of the very greatest of any
generation, has often gone out of his way to express his obligation to
these responsible skilled advisers. The more a man knows himself, the
more habituated he is to action in general, the more sure he is to take
and to value responsible counsel emanating from ability and suggested
by experience. That this principle brings good fruit is certain. We have,
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the rest of our administration be as good if we did but apply the same
method to it?
I leave this to stand as it was originally written, since it does not
profess to rest on my own knowledge, and only offers a suggestion on
good authority. Recent experience seems, however, to show that in all
great administrative departments there ought to be some one permanent
responsible head through whom the changing Parliamentary chief al-
ways acts, from whom he learns every thing, and to whom he communi-
cates every thing. The daily work of the Exchequer is a trifle compared
with that of the Admiralty or the Home Office, and therefore a single
principal head is not there so necessary. But the preponderance of evi-
dence at present is that in all offices of very great work some one such
head is essential.
VI. Its Supposed Checks and Balances.
In a former essay I devoted an elaborate discussion to the comparison of
the royal and unroyal form of Parliamentary Government. I showed that
at the formation of a ministry, and during the continuance of a ministry,
a really sagacious monarch might be of rare use. I ascertained that it
was a mistake to fancy that at such times a constitutional monarch had
no role and no duties. But I proved likewise that the temper, the disposi-
tion, and the faculties then needful to fit a constitutional monarch for
usefulness were very rare, at least as rare as the faculties of a great
absolute monarch, and that a common man in that place is apt to do at
least as much harm as good — perhaps more harm. But in that essay I
could not discuss fully the functions of a king at the conclusion of an
administration, for then the most peculiar parts of the English govern-
ment — the power to dissolve the House of Commons, and the power to
create new peers — come into play, and until the nature of the House of
Lords and the nature of the House of Commons had been explained, I
had no premises for an argument as to the characteristic action of the
king upon them. We have since considered the functions of the two houses,
and also the effects of changes of ministry on our administrative sys-
tem; we are now, therefore, in a position to discuss the functions of a
king at the end of an administration.
I may seem over-formal in this matter, but I am very formal on
purpose. It appears to me that the functions of our executive in dissolv-
ing the Commons and augmenting the Peers are among the most impor-
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hundreds of errors have been made in copying the English Constitution
from not comprehending them.
Hobbes told us long ago, and everybody now understands that there
must be a supreme authority, a conclusive power, in every state on every
point somewhere. The idea of government involves it — when that idea
is properly understood. But there are two classes of governments. In
one the supreme determining power is upon all points the same; in the
other, that ultimate power is different upon different points — now re-
sides in one part of the constitution, and now in another. The Americans
thought that they were imitating the English in making their constitution
upon the last principle — in having one ultimate authority for one sort
of matter, and another for another sort. But in truth, the English consti-
tution is the type of the opposite species; it has only one authority for all
sorts of matters. To gain a living conception of the difference let us see
what the Americans did.
First, they altogether retained what, in part, they could not help, the
sovereignty of the separate states. A fundamental article of the Federal
constitution says that the powers not “delegated” to the central govern-
ment are “reserved to the states respectively.” And the whole recent
history of the Union — perhaps all its history — has been more deter-
mined by that enactment than by any other single cause. The sover-
eignty of the principal matters of state has rested not with the highest
government, but with the subordinate government. The Federal govern-
ment could not touch slavery — the “domestic institution” which di-
vided the Union into two halves, unlike one another in morals, politics,
and social condition, and at last set them to fight. This determining
political fact was not in the jurisdiction of the highest government in the
country, where you might expect its highest wisdom, nor in the central
government, where you might look for impartiality, but in local govern-
ments, where petty interests were sure to be considered, and where only
inferior abilities were likely to be employed. The capital fact was re-
served for the minor jurisdictions. Again there has been only one matter
comparable to slavery in the United States, and that has been vitally
affected by the State governments also. Their ultra-democracy is not a
result of Federal legislation, but of State legislation. The Federal consti-
tution deputed one of the main items of its structure to the subordinate
governments. One of its clauses provides that the suffrages for the Fed-
eral House of Representative shall be, in each State, the same as for the
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fixes the suffrage for its own legislatures, the States altogether fix the
suffrage for the Federal Lower Chamber. By another clause of the Fed-
eral constitution the States fix the electoral qualification for voting at a
Presidential election. The primary element in a free government — the
determination how many people shall have a share in it — in America
depends not on the government, but on certain subordinate local, and
sometimes, as in the South now, hostile bodies.
Doubtless the framers of the constitution had not much choice in the
matter. The wisest of them were anxious to get as much power for the
central government, and to leave as little to the local governments as
they could. But a cry was got up that this wisdom would create a tyr-
anny and impair freedom, and with that help, local jealousy triumphed
easily. All Federal government is, in truth, a case in which what I have
called the dignified elements of government do not coincide with the
serviceable elements. At the beginning of every league the separate States
are the old governments which attract and keep the love and loyalty of
the people; the Federal government is a useful thing, but new and unat-
tractive. It must concede much to the State governments, for it is in-
debted to them for motive power: they are the governments which the
people voluntarily obey. When the State governments are not thus loved,
they vanish as the little Italian and the little German potentates van-
ished; no federation is needed; a single central government rules all.
But the division of the sovereign authority in the American consti-
tution is far more complex than this. The part of that authority left to the
Federal government is itself divided and subdivided. The greatest in-
stance is the most obvious. The Congress rules the law, but the Presi-
dent rules the administration. One means of unity the constitution does
give; the President can veto laws he does not like. But when two-thirds
of both houses are unanimous (as has lately happened), they can over-
rule the President and make the laws without him; so here there are three
separate repositories of the legislative power in different cases: first,
Congress and the President when they agree; next, the President when
he effectually exerts his power; then the requisite two-thirds of Con-
gress when they overrule the President. And the President need not be
over-active in carrying out a law he does not approve of. He may indeed
be impeached for gross neglect; but between criminal non-feasance and
zealous activity there are infinite degrees. Mr. Johnson does not carry
out the Freedman’s Bureau Bill as Mr. Lincoln, who approved of it,
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trivance for varying the supreme legislative authority in different cases,
and dividing the administrative authority from it in all cases.
But the administrative power itself is not left thus simple and undi-
vided. One most important part of administration is international policy,
and the supreme authority here is not in the President, still less in the
House of Representatives, but in the Senate. The President can only
make treaties, “provided two-thirds of Senators present” concur. The
sovereignty therefore for the greatest international questions is in a dif-
ferent part of the State altogether from any common administrative or
legislative question. It is put in a place by itself.
Again, the Congress declares war, but they would find it very diffi-
cult, according to the recent construction of their laws, to compel the
President to make a peace. The authors of the constitution doubtless
intended that Congress should be able to control the American execu-
tive as our Parliament controls ours. They placed the granting of sup-
plies in the House of Representatives exclusively. But they forgot to
look after “paper money;” and now it has been held that the President
has power to emit such money without consulting Congress at all. The
first part of the late war was so carried on by Mr. Lincoln; he relied not
on the grants of Congress, but on the prerogative of emission. It sounds
a joke, but it is true nevertheless, that this power to issue greenbacks is
decided to belong to the President as commander-in-chief of the army; it
is part of what was called the “war power.” In truth, money was wanted
in the late war, and the administration got it in the readiest way; and the
nation, glad not to be more taxed, wholly approved of it. But the fact
remains that the President has now, by precedent and decision, a mighty
power to continue a war without the consent of Congress, and perhaps
against its wish. Against the united will of the American people a Presi-
dent would of course be impotent; such is the genius of the place and
nation that he would never think of it. But when the nation was (as of
late) divided into two parties, one cleaving to the President the other to
the Congress, the now unquestionable power of the President to issue
paper-money may give him the power to continue the war, though Par-
liament (as we should speak) may enjoin the war to cease.
And lastly, the whole region of the very highest questions is with-
drawn from the ordinary authorities of the State, and reserved for spe-
cial authorities. The “constitution” cannot be altered by any authorities
within the constitution, but only by authorities without it. Every alter-
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complicated proportion of States or legislatures. The consequence is
that the most obvious evils cannot be quickly remedied; that the most
absurd fictions must be framed to evade the plain sense of mischievous
clauses; that a clumsy working and curious technicality mark the poli-
tics of a rough-and-ready people. The practical arguments and the legal
disquisitions in America are often like those of trustees carrying out a
misdrawn will — the sense of what they mean is good, but it can never
be worked out fully or defended simply, so hampered is it by the old
words of an old testament.
These instances (and others might be added) prove, as history proves
too, what was the principal thought of the American constitution-mak-
ers. They shrank from placing sovereign power anywhere. They feared
that it would generate tyranny; George III. had been a tyrant to them,
and come what might, they would not make a George III. Accredited
theories said that the English Constitution divided the sovereign author-
ity, and in imitation the Americans split up theirs.
The result is seen now. At the critical moment of their history there
is no ready, deciding power. The South, after a great rebellion, lies at
the feet of its conquerors; its conquerors have to settle what to do  with
it.9 They must decide the conditions upon which the Secessionists shall
again become fellow-citizens, shall again vote, again be represented,
again perhaps govern. “The most difficult of problems is how to change
late foes into free friends.” The safety of their great public debt, and
with that debt their future credit and their whole power in future wars,
may depend on their not giving too much power to those who must see
in the debt the cost of their own subjugation, and who must have an
inclination towards the repudiation of it, now that their own debt, — the
cost of their defence, — has been repudiated. A race, too, formerly
enslaved, is now at the mercy of men who hate and despise it, and those
who set it free are bound to give it a fair chance for new life. The slave
was formerly protected by his chains; he was an article of value; but
now he belongs to himself, no one but himself has an interest in his life;
and he is at the mercy of the “mean whites,” whose labour he depreci-
ates, and who regard him with a loathing hatred. The greatest moral
duty ever set before a government, and the most fearful political prob-
lem ever set before a government, are now set before the American. But
there is no decision, and no possibility of a decision. The President wants
one course, and has power to prevent any other; the Congress wants
another course, and has power to prevent any other. The splitting ofThe English Constitution/175
sovereignty into many parts amounts to there being no sovereign.
The Americans of 1787 thought they were copying the English Con-
stitution, but they were contriving a contrast to it. Just as the American
is the type of composite governments, in which the supreme power is
divided between many bodies and functionaries, so the English is the
type of simple constitutions, in which the ultimate power upon all ques-
tion is in the hands of the same persons.
The ultimate authority in the English Constitution is a newly elected
House of Commons. No matter whether the question upon which it de-
cides be administrative or legislative; no matter whether it concerns high
matters of the essential constitution or small matters of daily detail; no
matter whether it be a question of making a war or continuing a war; no
matter whether it be the imposing a tax or the issuing a paper currency;
no matter whether it be a question relating to India, or Ireland, or Lon-
don, — a new House of Commons can despotically and finally resolve.
The House of Commons may, as was explained, assent in minor
matters to the revision of the House of Lords, and submit in matters
about which it cares little to the suspensive veto of the House of Lords;
but when sure of the popular assent, and when freshly elected, it is
absolute, — it can rule as it likes and decide as it likes. And it can take
the best security that it does not decide in vain. It can insure that its
decrees shall be executed, for it, and it alone, appoints the executive; it
can inflict the most severe of all penalties on neglect, for it can remove
the executive. It can choose, to effect its wishes, those who wish the
same; and so its will is sure to be done. A stipulated majority of both
Houses of the American Congress can overrule by stated enactment
their executive; but the popular branch of our legislature can make and
unmake ours.
The English constitution, in a word, is framed on the principle of
choosing a single sovereign authority, ind making it good: the Ameri-
can, upon the principle of having many sovereign authorities, and hop-
ing that their multitude may atone for their inferiority. The Americans
now extol their institutions, and so defraud themselves of their due praise.
But if they had not a genius for politics; if they had not a moderation in
action singularly curious where superficial speech is so violent; if they
had not a regard for law, such as no great people have yet evinced, and
infinitely surpassing ours, — the multiplicity of authorities in the Ameri-
can Constitution would long ago have brought it to a bad end. Sensible
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settlement; and so the men of Massachusetts could, I believe, work any
constitution.10 But political philosophy must analyze political history; it
must distinguish what is due to the excellence of the people, and what to
the excellence of the laws; it must carefully calculate the exact effect of
each part of the constitution, though thus it may destroy many an idol of
the multitude, and detect the secret of utility where but few imagined it
to lie.
How important singleness and unity are in political action no one, I
imagine, can doubt. We may distinguish and define its parts; but policy
is a unit and a whole. It acts by laws — by administrators; it requires
now one, now the other; unless it can easily move both it will be im-
peded soon; unless it has an absolute command of both its work will be
imperfect. The interlaced character of human affairs requires single de-
termining energy; a distinct force for each artificial compartment will
make but a motley patchwork, if it live long enough to make any thing.
The excellence of the British Constitution is that it has achieved this
unity; that in it the sovereign power is single, possible, and good.
The success is primarily due to the peculiar provision of the English
Constitution, which places the choice of the executive in the “people’s
house;” but it could not have been thoroughly achieved except for two
parts, which I venture to call the “safety-valve” of the constitution, and
the “regulator.”
The safety-valve is the peculiar provision of the constitution, of
which I spoke at great length in my essay on the House of Lords. The
head of the executive can overcome the resistance of the second cham-
ber by choosing new members of that chamber; if he do not find a ma-
jority, he can make a majority. This is a safety-valve of the truest kind.
It enables the popular will the will of which the executive is the expo-
nent, the will of which it is the appointee — to carry out within the
constitution desires and conceptions which one branch of the constitu-
tion dislikes and resists. It lets forth a dangerous accumulation of inhib-
ited power, which might sweep this constitution before it, as like accu-
mulations have often swept away like constitutions.
The regulator, as I venture to call it, of our single sovereignty is the
power of dissolving the otherwise sovereign chamber confided to the
chief executive. The defects of the popular branch of a legislature as a
sovereign have been expounded at length in a previous essay. Briefly,
they may be summed up in three accusations.
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ing chamber. Wherever in our colonies parliamentary government is
unsuccessful, or is alleged to be unsuccessful, this is the vice which first
impairs it. The assembly cannot be induced to maintain any administra-
tion; it shifts its selection now from one minister to another minister,
and in consequence there is no government at all.
Secondly. The very remedy for such caprice entails another evil.
The only mode by which a cohesive majority and a lasting administra-
tion can be upheld in a Parliamentary government, is party organiza-
tion; but that organization itself tends to aggravate party violence and
party animosity. It is, in substance, subjecting the whole nation to the
rule of a section of the nation, selected because of its speciality. Parlia-
mentary government is, in its essence, a sectarian government, and is
possible only when sects are cohesive.
Thirdly. A parliament, like every other sort of sovereign, has pecu-
liar feelings, peculiar prejudices, peculiar interests; and it may pursue
these in opposition to the desires, and even in opposition to the well-
being of the nation. It has its selfishness as well as its caprice and its
parties.
The mode in which the regulating wheel of our constitution pro-
duces it. effect is plain. It does not impair the authority of Parliaments
as a species, bu it impairs the power of the individual Parliament. I
enables a particular person outside parliament to say “ You Members of
Parliament are not doing you duty. You are gratifying caprice at the cost
of the nation. You are indulging party spirit at the cost of the nation.
You are helping yourself at the cost of the nation. I will see whether the
nation approves what you are doing or not; I will appeal from Parlia-
ment No. 1 to Parliament No. 2.”
By far the best way to appreciate this peculiar provision of our
constitution is to trace it in action, — to see, as we saw before of the
other powers of English royalty, how far it is dependent on the existence
of an hereditary king, and how far it can be exercised by a premier
whom Parliament elects. When we examine the nature of the particular
person required to exercise the power, a vivid idea of that power is itself
brought home to us.
First. As to the caprice of parliament in the choice of a premier,
who is the best person to check it? Clearly the premier himself. He is the
person most interested in maintaining his administration, and therefore
the most likely person to use efficiently and dextrously the power by
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sions a difficulty. A capricious Parliament may always hope that his
caprice may coincide with theirs. In the days when George III assailed
his governments, the premier was habitually deprived of his due author-
ity. Intrigues were encouraged because it was always dubious whether
the king-hated minister would be permitted to appeal from the intrigu-
ers, and always a balance that the conspiring monarch might appoint
one of the conspirators to be premier in his room. The caprice of Parlia-
ment is better checked when the faculty of dissolution is intrusted to its
appointee, than when it is set apart in an outlying and an alien authority.
But, on the contrary, the party zeal and the self-seeking of Parlia-
ment are best checked by an authority which has no connection with
Parliament or dependence upon it — supposing that such authority is
morally and intellectually equal to the performance of the intrusted func-
tion. The Prime Minister obviously being the nominee of a party major-
ity is likely to share its feeling, and is sure to be obliged to say that he
shares it. The actual contact with affairs is indeed likely to purify him
from many prejudices, to tame him of many fanaticisms, to beat out of
him many errors. The present Conservative Government contains more
than one member who regards his party as intellectually benighted; who
either never speaks their peculiar dialect, or who speaks it condescend-
ingly, and with an “aside;” who respects their accumulated prejudices
as the “potential energies” on which he subsists, but who despises them
while he lives by them. Years ago Mr. Disraeli called Sir Robert Peel’s
Ministry — the last Conservative Ministry that had real power — “an
organized hypocrisy,” so much did the ideas of its “head” differ from
the sensations of its “tail.” Probably he now comprehends — if he did
not always — that the air of Downing Street brings certain ideas to
those who live there, and that the hard, compact prejudices of opposi-
tion are soon melted and mitigated in the great gulf stream of affairs.
Lord Palmerston, too, was a typical example of a leader lulling, rather
than arousing, assuaging rather than acerbating the minds of his follow-
ers. But though the composing effect of close difficulties will commonly
make a premier cease to be an immoderate partisan, yet a partisan to
some extent he must be, and a violent one he may be; and in that case he
is not a good person to check the party. When the leading sect (so to
speak) in Parliament is doing what the nation do not like, an instant
appeal ought to be registered, and Parliament ought to be dissolved. But
a zealot of a premier will not appeal; he will follow his formulae; he will
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unpopular consequences the narrow maxims of an inchoate theory. At
such a minute a constitutional king — such as Leopold the First was,
and as Prince Albert might have been — is invaluable; he can and will
prevent Parliament from hurting the nation.
Again, too, on the selfishness of Parliament an extrinsic check is
clearly more efficient than an intrinsic. A premier who is made by Par-
liament may share the bad impulses of those who chose him; or, at any
rate, he may have made “capital” out of the — he may have seemed to
share them. The self-interests, the jobbing propensities of the assembly
are sure indeed to be of very secondary interest to him. What he will
care most for is the permanence, is the interest — whether corrupt or
uncorrupt of his own ministry. He will be disinclined to any thing coarsely
unpopular. In the order of nature, a new assembly must come before
long, and he will be indisposed to shock the feelings of the electors from
whom that assembly must emanate. But though the interest of the min-
ister is inconsistent with appalling jobbery, he will be inclined to miti-
gated jobbery. He will temporize; he will try to give a seemly dress to
unseemly matters; to do as much harm as will content the assembly, and
yet not so much harm as will offend the nation. He will not shrink from
becoming a particeps criminis; he will but endeavour to dilute the crime..
The intervention of an extrinsic, impartial, and capable authority — if
such can be found — will undoubtedly restrain the covetousness as well
as the factiousness of a choosing assembly.
But can such a head be found? In one case I think it has been found.
Our colonial governors are precisely Dei ex machina. They are always
intelligent, for they have to live by a difficult trade; they are nearly sure
to be impartial, for they come from the ends of the earth; they are sure
not to participate in the selfish desires of any colonial class or body, for
long before those desires can have attained fruition they will have passed
to the other side of the world, be busy with other faces and other minds,
be almost out of hearing what happens in a region they have half forgot-
ten. A colonial governor is a super-parliamentary authority, animated
by a wisdom which is probably in quantity considerable, and is different
from that of the local Parliament, even if not above it. But even in this
case the advantage of this extrinsic authority is purchased at a heavy
price — a price which must not be made light of, because it is often
worth paying. A colonial governor is a ruler who has no permanent
interest in the colony he governs; who perhaps had to look for it in the
map when he was sent thither; who takes years before he really under-180/Walter Bagehot
stands its parties and its controversies; who, though without prejudice
himself, is apt to be a slave to the prejudices of local people near him;
who inevitably, and almost laudably, governs not in the interest of the
colony, which he may mistake, but in his own interest, which he sees
and is sure of. The first desire of a colonial governor is not to get into a
“scrape,” not to do any thing which may give trouble to his superiors —
the Colonial Office — at home, which may cause an untimely and dubi-
ous recall, which may hurt his after career. He is sure to leave upon the
colony the feeling that they have a ruler who only half knows them, and
does not so much as half care for them. We hardly appreciate this com-
mon feeling in our colonies, because we appoint their sovereign; but we
should understand it in an instant if, by a political metamorphosis, the
choice were turned the other way — if they appointed our sovereign. We
should then say at once, “How is it possible a man from New Zealand
can understand England? how is it possible that a man longing to get
back to the antipodes can care for England? how can we trust one who
lives by the fluctuating favour of a distant authority? how can we heart-
ily obey one who is but a foreigner with the accident of an identical
language?”
I dwell on the evils which impair the advantage of colonial gover-
norship because that is the most favoured case of super-parliamentary
royalty, and because from looking at it we can bring freshly home to our
minds what the real difficulties of that institution are. We are so familiar
with it, that we do not understand it. We are like people who have known
a man all their lives, and yet are quite surprised when he displays some
obvious characteristic which casual observers have detected at a glance.
I have known a man who did not know what colour his sister’s eyes
were, though he had seen her every day for twenty years; or rather, he
did not know because he had so seen her: so true is the philosophical
maxim that we neglect the constant element in our thoughts, though it is
probably the most important, and attend almost only to the varying ele-
ments — the differentiating elements (as men now speak) — though
they are apt to be less potent. But when we perceive by the roundabout
example of a colonial governor how difficult the task of a constitutional
king is in the exercise of the function of dissolving parliament, we at
once see how unlikely it is that an hereditary monarch will be possessed
of the requisite faculties.
An hereditary king is but an ordinary person, upon an average, at
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likely to have a taste for business; he is solicited from youth by every
temptation to pleasure; he probably passed the whole of his youth in the
vicious situation of the heir-apparent, who can do nothing because he
has no appointed work, and whoo will be considered almost to outstep
his function if he undertake optional work. For the most part, a consti-
tutional king is a damaged common man; not forced to business by
necessity as a despot often is, but yet spoiled for business by most of the
temptations which spoil a despot. History, too, seems to show that he-
reditary royal families gather from the repeated influence of their cor-
rupting situation some dark taint in the blood, some transmitted and
growing poison which hurts their judgments, darkens all their sorrow,
and. is a cloud on half their pleasure. It has been said, not truly, but with
a possible approximation to truth, “That in 1802 every hereditary mon-
arch was insane.” Is it likely that this sort of monarchs will be able to
catch the exact moment when, in opposition to the wishes of a trium-
phant ministry, they ought to dissolve Parliament? To do so with effi-
ciency they must be able to perceive that the Parliament is wrong, and
that the nation knows it is wrong. Now to know that Parliament is wrong,
a man must be, if not a great statesman, yet a considerable statesman a
statesman of some sort. He must have great natural vigour, for no less
will comprehend the hard principles of national policy. He must have
incessant industry, for no less will keep him abreast with the involved
detail to which those principles relate, and the miscellaneous occasions
to which they must be applied. A man made common by nature, and
made worse by life, is not likely to have either; he is nearly sure not to be
both clever and industrious. And a monarch in the recesses of a palace,
listening to a charmed flattery, unbiassed by the miscellaneous world,
who has always been hedged in by rank, is likely to be but a poor judge
of public opinion. He may have an inborn tact for finding it out; but his
life will never teach it him, and will probably enfeeble it in him.
But there is a still worse case, a case which the life of George III —
which is a sort of museum of the defects of a constitutional king sug-
gests at once. The Parliament may be wiser than the people, and yet the
king may be of the same mind with the people. During the last years of
the American war, the Premier, Lord North, upon whom the first re-
sponsibility rested, was averse to continuing it, and knew it could not
succeed. Parliament was much of the same mind; if Lord North had
been able to come down to Parliament with a peace in his hand, Parlia-
ment would probably have rejoiced, and the nation under the guidance182/Walter Bagehot
of Parliament, though saddened by its losses, probably would have been
satisfied. The opinion of that day was more like the American opinion
of the present day than like our present opinion. It was much slower in
its formation than our opinion now, and obeyed much more easily sud-
den impulses from the central administration. If Lord North had been
able to throw the undivided energy and the undistracted authority of the
Executive Government into the excellent work of making a peace and
carrying a peace, years of bloodshed might have been spared, and an
entail of enmity cut off that has not yet run out. But there was a power
behind the Prime Minister; George III was madly eager to continue the
war, and the nation — not seeing how hopeless the strife was, not com-
prehending the lasting antipathy which their obstinacy was creating —
ignorant, dull, and helpless —was ready to go on too. Even if Lord
North had wished to make peace, and had persuaded Parliament ac-
cordingly, all his work would have been useless; a superior power could
and would have appealed from a wise and pacific Parliament to a sullen
and warlike nation. The check which our constitution finds for the spe-
cial vices of our Parliament was misused to curb its wisdom.
The more we study the nature of Cabinet Government, the more we
shall shrink from exposing at a vital instant its delicate machinery to a
blow from a casual, incompetent, and perhaps semi-insane outsider. The
preponderant probability is that on a great occasion the Premier and
Parliament will really be wiser than the king. The Premier is sure to be
able, and is sure to be most anxious to decide well; if he fail to decide, he
loses his place, though through all blunders the king keeps his; the judg-
ment of the man, naturally very discerning, is sharpened by a heavy
penalty, from which the judgment of the man, by nature much less intel-
ligent, is exempt. Parliament, too, is for the most part a sound, careful,
and practical body of men. Principle shows that the power of dismissing
a Government with which Parliament is satisfied, and of dissolving that
Parliament upon an appeal to the people, is not a power which a com-
mon hereditary monarch will in the long run be able beneficially to ex-
ercise.
Accordingly this power has almost, if not quite, dropped out of the
reality of our constitution. Nothing, perhaps, would more surprise the
English people than if the Queen by a coup d’état and on a sudden
destroyed a ministry firm in the allegiance and secure of a majority in
Parliament. That power indisputably, in theory, belongs to her; but it
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them, if she used it, like a volcanic eruption from Primrose Hill. The last
analogy to it is not one to be coveted as a precedent. In 1835 William IV
dismissed an administration which, though disorganized by the loss of
its leader in the Commons, was an existing Government, had a premier
in the Lords ready to go on, and a leader in the Commons willing to
begin. The King fancied that public opinion was leaving the Whigs and
going over to the Tories, and he thought he should accelerate the transi-
tion by ejecting the former. But the event showed that he misjudged. His
perception indeed was right; the English people were wavering in their
allegiance to the Whigs, who had no leader that touched the popular
heart, none in whom Liberalism could personify itself and become a
passion — who besides were a body long used to opposition, and there-
fore making blunders in office — who were borne to power by a popu-
lar impulse which they only half comprehended, and perhaps less than
half shared. But the King’s policy was wrong; he impeded the re-action
instead of aiding it. He forced on a premature Tory Government, which
was as unsuccessful as all wise people perceived that it must be. The
popular distaste to the Whigs was as yet but incipient, inefficient; and
the intervention of the Crown was advantageous to them, because it
looked inconsistent with the liberties of the people. And in so far as
William IV was right in detecting an incipient change of opinion, he did
but detect an erroneous change. What was desirable was the prolonga-
tion of Liberal rule. The commencing dissatisfaction did but relate to
the personal demerits of the Whig leaders, and other temporary adjuncts
of free principles, and not to those principles intrinsically. So that the
last precedent for a royal onslaught on a ministry ended thus: — in
opposing the right principles, in aiding the wrong principles, in hurting
the party it was meant to help. After such a warning, it is likely that our
monarchs will pursue the policy which a long course of quiet precedent
at present directs — they will leave a Ministry trusted by Parliament to
the judgment of Parliament.
Indeed, the dangers arising from a party spirit in Parliament ex-
ceeding that of the nation, and of a selfishness in Parliament contradict-
ing the true interest of the nation, are not great dangers in a country
where the mind of the nation is steadily political, and where its control
over its representatives is constant. A steady opposition to a formed
public opinion is hardly possible in our House of Commons, so inces-
sant is the national attention to politics, and so keen the fear in the mind
of each member that he may lose his valued seat. These dangers belong184/Walter Bagehot
to early and scattered communities, where there are no interesting po-
litical questions, where the distances are great, where no vigilant opin-
ion passes judgment on parliamentary excesses, where few care to have
seats in the chamber, and where many of those few are from their char-
acters and their antecedents better not there than there. The one great
vice of parliamentary government in an adult political nation is the ca-
price of Parliament in the choice of a ministry. A nation can hardly
control it here; and it is not good that, except within wide limits, it
should control it. The Parliamentary judgment of the merits or demerits
of an administration very generally depends on matters which the Par-
liament, being close at hand, distinctly sees, and which the distant na-
tion does not see. But where personality enters, capriciousness begins.
It is easy to imagine a House of Commons which is discontented with all
statesmen, which is contented with none, which is made up of little par-
ties, which votes in small knots, which will adhere steadily to no leader,
which gives every leader a chance and a hope. Such Parliaments require
the imminent check of possible dissolution; but that check is (as has
been shown) better in the premier than in the sovereign; and by the late
practice of our constitution, its use is yearly ebbing from the sovereign
and yearly centring in the premier. The Queen can hardly now refuse a
defeated minister the chance of a dissolution, any more than she can
dissolve in the time of an undefeated one, and without his consent.
We shall find the case much the same with the safety-valve, as I
have called it, of our constitution. A good, capable, hereditary monarch
would exercise it better than a premier, but a premier could manage it
well enough; and a monarch capable of doing better will be born only
once in a century, whereas monarchs likely to do worse will be born
every day. There are two modes in which the power of our executive to
create Peers — to nominate, that is, additional members of our upper
and revising chamber — now acts: one constant, habitual, though not
adequately noticed by the popular mind as it goes on; and the other
possible and terrific, scarcely ever really exercised, but always by its
reserved magic maintaining a great and a restraining influence. The
Crown creates Peers, a few year by year, and thus modifies continually
the characteristic feeling of the House of Lords. I have heard people say,
who ought to know, that the English peerage (the only one upon which
unhappily the power of new creation now acts) is now more Whig than
Tory. Thirty years ago the majority was indisputably the other way.
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nated in power as a good deal of speculation predicts they would, and a
good deal of current language assumes they have. The Whig party were
in office some seventy years (with very small breaks), from the death of
Queen Anne to the coalition between Lord North and Mr. Fox; then the
Tories (with only such breaks) were in power for nearly fifty years, till
1832; and since, the Whig party has always, with very trifling intervals,
been predominant. Consequently, each continuously governing party has
had the means of modifying the upper house to suit its views. The pro-
fuse Tory creations of half a century had made the House of Lords
bigotedly Tory before the first Reform Act, but it is wonderfully miti-
gated now. The Irish Peers and the Scotch Peers — being nominated by
an almost unaltered constituency, and representing the feelings of the
majority of that constituency only (no minority having any voice) —
present an unchangeable Tory element. But the element in which change
is permitted has been changed. Whether the English Peerage be or be
not predominantly now Tory, it is certainly not Tory after the fashion of
the Toryism of 1832. The Whig additions have indeed sprung from a
class commonly rather adjoining upon Toryism than much inclining to
Radicalism. It is not from men of large wealth that a very great impetus
to organic change should be expected. The additions to the Peers have
matched nicely enough with the old Peers, and therefore they have ef-
fected more easily a greater and more permeating modification. The
addition of a contrasting mass would have excited the old leaven, but
the delicate infusion of ingredients similar in genus, though different in
species, has modified the new compound without irritating the old origi-
nal.
This ordinary and common use of the peer-creating power is always
in the hands of the premier, and depends for its characteristic use on
being there. He, as the head of the predominant party, is the proper
person to modify gradually the permanent chamber which, perhaps, was
at starting hostile to him; and, at any rate, can be best harmonized with
the public opinion he represents by the additions he makes. Hardly any
contrived constitution possesses a machinery for modifying its second-
ary house so delicate, so flexible, and so constant. If the power of creat-
ing life peers had been added, the mitigating influence of the responsible
executive upon the House of Lords would have been as good as such a
thing can be.
The catastrophic creation of Peers for the purpose of swamping the
upper house is utterly different. If an able and impartial exterior king is186/Walter Bagehot
at hand, this power is best in that king. It is a power only to be used on
great occasions, when the object is immense, and the party strife unmiti-
gated. This is the conclusive, the swaying power of the moment, and of
course, therefore, it had better be in the hands of a power both capable
and impartial, than of a premier who must in some degree be a partisan.
The value of a discreet, calm, wise monarch, if such should happen to
be reigning at the acute crisis of a nation’s destiny, is priceless. He may
prevent years of tumult, save bloodshed and civil war, lay up a store of
grateful fame to himself, prevent the accumulated intestine hatred of
each party to its opposite. But the question comes back, Will there be
such a monarch just then? What is the chance of having him just then?
What will be the use of the monarch whom the accidents of inheritance,
such as we know them to be, must upon an average bring us just then?
The answer to these questions is not satisfactory, if we take it from
the little experience we have had in this rare matter. There have been but
two cases at all approaching to a catastrophic creation of Peers — to a
creation which would suddenly change the majority of the Lords — in
English history. One was in Queen Anne’s time. The majority of peers
in Queen Anne’s time were Whig, and by profuse and quick creations
Harley’s Ministry changed it to a Tory majority. So great was the popu-
lar effect, that in the next reign one of the most contested ministerial
proposals was a proposal to take the power of indefinite peer-creation
from the Crown, and to make the number of Lords fixed, as that of the
Commons is fixed. But the sovereign had little to do with the matter.
Queen Anne was one of the smallest people ever set in a great place.
Swift bitterly and justly said “she had not a store of amity by her for
more than one friend at a time,” and just then her affection was concen-
trated on a waiting-maid. Her waiting-maid told her to make peers, and
she made them. But of large thought and comprehensive statesmanship
she was as destitute as Mrs. Marsham. She supported a bad ministry by
the most extreme of measures, and she did it on caprice. The case of
William IV is still more instructive. He was a very conscientious king,
but at the same time an exceedingly weak king. His correspondence
with Lord Grey on this subject fills more than half a large volume, or
rather his secretary’s correspondence, for he kept a very clever man to
write what he thought, or at least what those about him thought. It is a
strange instance of high-placed weakness and conscientious vacillation.
After endless letters the king consents to make a reasonable number of
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owing to desertion of the “Waverers” from the Tories, the second read-
ing is carried without it by nine, and then the king refuses to make peers,
or at least enough peers, when a vital amendment is carried by Lord
Lyndhurst, which would have destroyed, and was meant to destroy the
bill. In consequence, there was a tremendous crisis, and nearly. a Revo-
lution. A more striking example of well-meaning imbecility is scarcely
to be found in history. No one who reads it carefully will doubt that the
discretionary power of making peers would have been far better in Lord
Grey’s hands than in the king’s. It was the uncertainty whether the king
would exercise it, and how far he would exercise it, that mainly ani-
mated the opposition. In fact, you may place power in weak hands at a
revolution, but you cannot keep it in weak hands. It runs out of them
into strong ones. An ordinary hereditary sovereign — a William IV, or a
George IV — is unfit to exercise the peer-creating power when most
wanted. A half-insane king, like George III, would be worse. He might
use it by unaccountable impulse when not required, and refuse to use it
out of sullen madness when required.
The existence of a fancied check on the premier is in truth an evil,
because it prevents the enforcement of a real check. It would be easy to
provide by law that an extraordinary number of Peers-say more than ten
annually — should not be created except on a vote of some large major-
ity, suppose three-fourths of the lower house. This would insure that the
premier should not use the reserve force of the constitution as if it were
an ordinary force; that he should not use it except when the whole nation
fixedly wished it; that it should be kept for a revolution, not expended
on administration; and it would insure that he should then have it to use.
Queen Anne’s case and William IV’s case prove that neither object is
certainly attained by intrusting this critical and extreme force to the
chance idiosyncrasies and habitual mediocrity of an hereditary sover-
eign.
It may be asked why I argue at such length a question in appearance
so removed from practice, and in one point of view so irrelevant to my
subject. No one proposes to remove Queen Victoria; if any one is in a
safe place on earth, she is in a safe place. In these very essays it has been
shown that the mass of our people would obey no one else, that the
reverence she excites is the potential energy -as science now speaks —
out of which all minor forces are made, and from which lesser functions
take their efficiency. But looking not to the present hour, and this single
country, but to the world at large and coming times, no question can be188/Walter Bagehot
more practical.
What grows upon the world is a certain matter-of-factness. The test
of each century, more than of the century before, is the test of results.
New countries are arising all over the world where there are no fixed
sources of reverence; which have to make them; which have to create
institutions which must generate loyalty by conspicuous utility. This
matter-of-factness is the growth even in Europe of the two greatest and
newest intellectual agencies of our time. One of these is business. We
see so much of the material fruits of commerce, that we forget its mental
fruits. It begets a mind desirous of things, careless of ideas, not ac-
quainted with the niceties of words. In all labour there should be profit,
is its motto. It is not only true that we have “left swords for ledgers,” but
war itself is made as much by the ledger as by the sword. The soldier —
that is, the great soldier — of to-day is not a romantic animal, dashing
at forlorn hopes, animated by frantic sentiment, full of fancies as to a
lady-love or a sovereign; but a quiet, grave man, busied in charts, exact
in sums, master of the art of tactics, occupied in trivial detail; thinking,
as the Duke of Wellington was said to do, most of the shoes of his
soldiers; despising all manner of eclat and eloquence; perhaps, like Count
Moltke, “silent in seven languages.” We have reached a “climate” of
opinion where figures rule, where our very supporter of Divine right, as
we deemed him, our Count Bismarck, amputates kings right and left,
applies the test of results to each, and lets none live who are not to do
something. There has in truth been a great change during the last five
hundred years in the predominant occupations of the ruling part of man-
kind; formerly they passed their time either in exciting action or inani-
mate repose. A feudal baron had nothing between war and the chase —
keenly animating things both — and what was called “inglorious ease.”
Modern life is scanty in excitements, but incessant in quiet action. Its
perpetual commerce is creating a “stock-taking” habit — the habit of
asking each man. thing, and institution, “Well, what have you done since
I saw you last?”
Our physical science, which is becoming the dominant culture of
thousands, and which is beginning to permeate our common literature
to an extent which few watch enough, quite tends the same way. The
two peculiarities are its homeliness and its inquisitiveness: its value for
the most “stupid” facts, as one used to call them, and its incessant wish
for verification — to be sure, by tiresome seeing and hearing, that they
are facts. The old excitement of thought has half died out, or rather it isThe English Constitution/189
diffused in quiet pleasure over a life, instead of being concentrated in
intense and eager spasms. An old philosopher — a Descartes, suppose
— fancied that out of primitive truths, which he could by ardent
excogitation know, he might by pure deduction evolve the entire uni-
verse. Intense self-examination, and intense reason would, he thought,
make out every thing. The soul, “itself by itself,” could tell all it wanted
if it would be true to its sublimer isolation. The greatest enjoyment pos-
sible to man was that which this philosophy promises its votaries — the
pleasure of being always right, and always reasoning — without ever
being bound to look at any thing. But our most ambitious schemes of
philosophy now start quite differently. Mr. Darwin begins:
“When on board H.M.S. Beagle, as naturalist, I was much struck
with certain facts in the distribution of the organic beings inhabiting
South America, and in the geological relations of the present to the past
inhabitants of that continent. These facts, as will be seen in the latter
chapters of this volume, seemed to throw some light on the origin of
species — that mystery of mysteries, as it has been called by one of our
greatest philosophers. On my return home, it occurred to me, in 1837,
that something might perhaps be made out on this question by patiently
accumulating and reflecting on all sorts of facts which could possibly
have any bearing on it. After five years’ work I allowed myself to specu-
late on the subject, and drew up some short notes; these I enlarged in
1844 into a sketch of the conclusions which then seemed to me prob-
able: from that period to the present day I have steadily pursued the
same object. I hope that I may be excused for entering on these personal
details, as I give them to show that I have not been hasty in coming to a
decision.”
If he hopes finally to solve his great problem, it is by careful experi-
ments in pigeon fancying, and other sorts of artificial variety making.
His hero is not a self-enclosed, excited philosopher, but “that most skil-
ful breeder, Sir John Sebright, who used to say, with respect to pigeons,
that he would produce any given feathers in three years, but it would
take him six years to obtain a head and a beak.” I am not saying that the
new thought is better than the old; it is no business of mine to say any
thing about that; I only wish to bring home to the mind, as nothing but
instances can bring it home, how matter-of-fact, how petty, as it would
at first sight look, even our most ambitious science has become.
In the new communities which our emigrating habit now constantly
creates, this prosaic turn of mind is intensified. In the American mind190/Walter Bagehot
and in the colonial mind there is, as contrasted with the old English
mind, a literalness, a tendency to say, “The facts are so-and-so, what-
ever may be thought or fancied about them.” We used before the civil
war to say that the Americans worshipped the almighty dollar; we now
know that they can scatter money almost recklessly when they will. But
what we meant was half right — they worship visible value: obvious,
undeniable, intrusive result. And in Australia and New Zealand the same
turn comes uppermost. It grows from the struggle with the wilderness.
Physical difficulty is the enemy of early communities, and an incessant
conflict with it for generations leaves a mark of reality on the mind — a
painful mark almost to us, used to impalpable fears and the half-fanci-
ful dangers of an old and complicated society. The “new Englands” of
all latitudes are bare-minded (if I may so say) as compared with the
“old.”
When, therefore, the new communities of the colonized world have
to choose a government, they must choose one in which all the institu-
tions are of an obvious evident utility. We catch the Americans smiling
at our Queen with her secret mystery, and our Prince of Wales with his
happy inaction. It is impossible, in fact, to convince their prosaic minds
that constitutional royalty is a rational government, that it is suited to a
new age and an unbroken country, that those who start afresh can start
with it. The princelings who run about the world with excellent inten-
tions, but an entire ignorance of business, are to them a locomotive
advertisement that this sort of government is European in its limitations
and mediaeval in its origin; that though it has yet a great part to play in
the old states, it has no place or part in new states. The réalisme
impitoyable which good critics find in a most characteristic part of the
literature of the nineteenth century, is to be found also in its politics. An
ostentatious utility must characterize its creations.
The deepest interest, therefore, attaches to the problem of this es-
say. If hereditary royalty had been essential to parliamentary govern-
ment, we might well have despaired of that government. But accurate
investigation shows that this royalty is not essential; that, upon an aver-
age, it is not even in a high degree useful; that though a king with high
courage and fine discretion, — a king with a genius for the place, — is
always useful, and at rare moments priceless, yet that a common king, a
king such as birth brings, is of no use at difficult crises, while in the
common course of things his aid is neither likely nor required — he will
do nothing, and he need do nothing. But we happily find that a newThe English Constitution/191
country need not fall back into the fatal division of powers incidental to
a presidential government; it may, if other conditions serve, obtain the
ready, well-placed, identical sort of sovereignty which belongs to the
English Constitution, under the unroyal form of Parliamentary Govern-
ment.
VII. The Prerequisites of Cabinet Government,
and the Peculiar Form Which They Have
Assumed in England.
Cabinet government is rare because its prerequisites are many. It re-
quires the co-existence of several national characteristics which are not
often found together in the world, and which should be perceived more
distinctly than they often are. It is fancied that the possession of a cer-
tain intelligence, and a few simple virtues, are the sole requisites. These
mental and moral qualities are necessary, but much else is necessary
also. A cabinet government is the government of a committee elected by
the legislature, and there are therefore a double set of conditions to it:
first, those which are essential to all elective governments as such; and
second, those which are requisite to this particular elective government.
There are prerequisites for the genus, and additional ones for the spe-
cies.
The first prerequisite of elective government is the mutual confi-
dence of the electors. We are so accustomed to submit to be ruled by
elected ministers, that we are apt to fancy all mankind would readily be
so too. Knowledge and civilization have at least made this progress, that
we instinctively, without argument, almost without consciousness, al-
low a certain number of specified persons to choose our rulers for us. It
seems to us the simplest thing in the world. But it is one of the gravest
things.
The peculiar marks of semi-barbarous people are diffused distrust
and indiscriminate suspicion. People, in all but the most favoured times
and places, are rooted to the places where they were born, think the
thoughts of those places, can endure no other thoughts. The next parish
even is suspected. Its inhabitants have different usages, almost imper-
ceptibly different, but yet different; they speak a varying accent; they
use a few peculiar words; tradition says that their faith is dubious. And
if the next parish is a little suspected, the next county is much more192/Walter Bagehot
suspected. Here is a definite beginning of new maxims, new thoughts,
new ways: the immemorial boundary mark begins in feeling a strange
world. And if the next county is dubious, a remote county is untrustwor-
thy. “Vagrants come from thence” men know, and they know nothing
else. The inhabitants of the north speak a dialect different from the dia-
lect of the south: they have other laws, another aristocracy, another life.
In ages when distant territories are blanks in the mind, when
neighbourhood is a sentiment, when locality is a passion, concerted co-
operation between remote regions is impossible even on trivial matters.
Neither would rely enough upon the good faith, good sense, and good
judgment of the other. Neither could enough calculate on the other.
And if such co-operation is not to be expected in trivial matters, it is
not to be thought of in the most vital matter of government — the choice
of the executive ruler. To fancy that Northumberland in the thirteenth
century would have consented to ally itself with Somersetshire for the
choice of a chief magistrate is absurd; it would scarcely have allied
itself to choose a hangman. Even now, if it were palpably explained,
neither district would like it. But no one says at a county election, “The
object of this present meeting is to choose our delegate to what the
Americans call the “Electoral College,” to the assembly which names
our first magistrate — our substitute for their president. Representa-
tives from this county will meet representatives from other counties,
from cities and boroughs, and proceed to choose our rulers.” Such bald
exposition would have been impossible in old times; it would be consid-
ered queer, eccentric, if it were used now. Happily, the process of elec-
tion is so indirect and hidden, and the introduction of that process was
so gradual and latent, that we scarcely perceive the immense political
trust we repose in each other. The best mercantile credit seems to those
who give it, natural, simple, obvious; they do not argue about it, or
think about it. The best political credit is analogous; we trust our coun-
trymen without remembering that we trust them. A second and very rare
condition of an elective government is a calm national mind — a tone of
mind sufficiently stable to bear the necessary excitement of conspicu-
ous revolutions. No barbarous, no semi-civilized nation has ever pos-
sessed this. The mass of uneducated men could not now in England be
told “go to, choose your rulers;” they would go wild; their imaginations
would fancy unreal dangers, and the attempt at election would issue in
some forcible usurpation. The incalculable advantage of august institu-
tions in a free state is, that they prevent this collapse. The excitement ofThe English Constitution/193
choosing our rulers is prevented by the apparent existence of an unchosen
ruler. The poorer and more ignorant classes — those who would most
feel excitement, who would most be misled by excitement — really be-
lieve that the Queen governs. You could not explain to them the recon-
dite difference between “reigning” and “governing;” the words neces-
sary to express it do not exist in their dialect; the ideas necessary to
comprehend it do not exist in their minds. The separation of principal
power from principal station is a refinement which they could not even
conceive. They fancy they are governed by an hereditary queen, a queen
by the grace of God, when they are really governed by a cabinet and a
parliament — men like themselves, chosen by themselves. The con-
spicuous dignity awakens the sentiment of reverence, and men, often
very undignified, seize the occasion to govern by means of it.
Lastly. The third condition of all elective government is what I may
call rationality, by which I mean a power involving intelligence, but yet
distinct from it. A whole people electing its rulers must be able to form
a distinct conception of distant objects. Mostly, the “divinity” that sur-
rounds a king altogether prevents any thing like a steady conception of
him. You fancy that the object of your loyalty is as much elevated above
you by intrinsic nature as he is by extrinsic position; you deify him in
sentiment, as once men deified him in doctrine. This illusion has been
and still is of incalculable benefit to the human race. It prevents, indeed,
men from choosing their rulers; you cannot invest with that loyal illu-
sion a man who was yesterday what you are, who to-morrow may be so
again, whom you chose to be what he is. But though this superstition
prevents the election of rulers, it renders possible the existence of
unelected rulers. Untaught people fancy that their king, crowned with
the holy crown, anointed with the oil of Rheims, descended of the House
of Plantagenet, is a different sort of being from any one not descended
of the Royal House —not crowned-not anointed. They believe that there
is one man whom by mystic right they should obey; and therefore they
do obey him. It is only in later times, when the world is wider, its expe-
rience larger, and its thought colder, that the plain rule of a palpably
chosen ruler is even possible.
These conditions narrowly restrict elective government. But the pre-
requisites of a cabinet government are rarer still; it demands not only
the conditions I have mentioned, but the possibility likewise of a good
legislature — a legislature competent to elect a sufficient administra-
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Now a competent legislature is very rare. Any permanent legisla-
ture at all, any constantly acting mechanism for enacting and repealing
laws, is, though it seems to us so natural, quite contrary to the inveterate
conceptions of mankind. The great majority of nations conceive of their
law, either as something Divinely given, and therefore unalterable, or as
a fundamental habit, inherited from the past to be transmitted to the
future. The English Parliament, of which the prominent functions are
now legislative, was not all so once. It was rather a preservative body.
The custom of the realm —the aboriginal transmitted law — the law
which was in the breast of the judges, could not be altered without the
consent of parliament, and therefore everybody felt sure it would not be
altered except in grave, peculiar, and anomalous cases. The valued use
of parliament was not half so much to alter the law, as to prevent the
laws being altered. And such too was its real use. In early societies it
matters much more that the law should be fixed than that it should be
good. Any law which the people of ignorant times enact is sure to in-
volve many misconceptions, and to cause many evils. Perfection in leg-
islation is not to be looked for, and is not, indeed, much wanted in a
rude, painful, confined life. But such an age covets fixity. That men
should enjoy the fruits of their labour, that the law of property should be
known, that the law of marriage should be known, that the whole course
of life should be kept in a calculable track, is the summum bonum of
early ages, the first desire of semi-civilized mankind. In that age men do
not want to have their laws adapted, but to have their laws steady. The
passions are so powerful, force so eager, the social bond so weak, that
the august spectacle of an all but unalterable law is necessary to pre-
serve society. In the early stages of human society all change is thought
an evil. And most change is an evil. The conditions of life are so simple
and so unvarying that any decent sort of rules suffice, so long as men
know what they are. Custom is the first check on tyranny; that fixed
routine of social life at which modern innovations chafe, and by which
modern improvement is impeded, is the primitive check on base power.
The perception of political expediency has then hardly begun; the sense
of abstract justice is weak and vague; and a rigid adherence to the fixed
mould of transmitted usage is essential to an unmarred, unspoiled, un-
broken life.
In such an age a legislature continuously sitting, always making
laws, always repealing laws, would have been both an anomaly and a
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difficulties are obsolete. There is a diffused desire in civilized communi-
ties for an adjusting legislation; for a legislation which should adapt the
inherited laws to the new wants of a world which now changes every
day. It has ceased to be necessary to maintain bad laws, because it is
necessary to have some laws. Civilization is robust enough to bear the
incision of legal improvements. But taking history at large, the rarity of
cabinets is mostly due to the greater rarity of continuous legislatures.
Other conditions, however, limit even at the present day the area of
a cabinet government. It must be possible to have not only a legislature,
but to have a competent legislature — a legislature willing to elect and
willing to maintain an efficient executive. And this is no easy matter. It
is indeed true that we need not trouble ourselves to look for that elabo-
rate and complicated organization which partially exists in the House of
Commons, and which is more fully and freely expanded in plans for
improving the House of Commons. We are not now concerned with
perfection or excellence; we seek only for simple fitness and bare com-
petency.
The conditions of fitness are two. First, you must get a good legis-
lature; and next, you must keep it good. And these are by no means so
nearly connected as might be thought at first sight. To keep a legislature
efficient, it must have a sufficient supply of substantial business. If you
employ the best set of men to do nearly nothing, they will quarrel with
each other about that nothing. Where great questions end, little parties
begin. And a very happy community, with few new laws to make, few
old bad laws to repeal, and but simple foreign relations to adjust, has
great difficulty in employing a legislature. There is nothing for it to
enact, and nothing for it to settle. Accordingly, there is great danger that
the legislature, being debarred from all other kind of business, may take
to quarrelling about its elective business; that controversies as to minis-
tries may occupy all its time, and yet that time be perniciously em-
ployed; that a constant succession of feeble administrations, unable to
govern and unfit to govern, may be substituted for the proper result of
cabinet government, — a sufficient body of men long enough in power
to evince their sufficiency. The exact amount of non-elective business
necessary for a parliament which is to elect the executive cannot, of
course, be formally stated. There are no numbers and no statistics in the
theory of constitutions. All we can say is, that a parliament with little
business, which is to be as efficient as a Parliament with much business,
must be in all other respects much better. An indifferent parliament may196/Walter Bagehot
be much improved by the steadying effect of grave affairs, but a parlia-
ment which has no such affairs must be intrinsically excellent, or it will
fail utterly.
But the difficulty of keeping a good legislature is evidently second-
ary to the difficulty of first getting it. There are two kinds of nations
which can elect a good parliament. The first is a nation in which the
mass of the people are intelligent, and in which they are comfortable.
Where there is no honest poverty, where education is diffused, and po-
litical intelligence is common, it is easy for the mass of the people to
elect a fair legislature. The ideal is roughly realized in the North Ameri-
can colonies of, England, and in the whole free States of the Union. In
these countries there is no such thing as honest poverty; physical com-
fort, such as the poor cannot imagine here, is there easily attainable by
healthy industry. Education is diffused much, and is fast spreading. Ig-
norant emigrants from the Old World often prize the intellectual advan-
tages of which they are themselves destitute, and are annoyed at their
inferiority in a place where rudimentary culture is so common. The great-
est difficulty of such new communities is commonly geographical. The
population is mostly scattered; and where population is sparse, discus-
sion is difficult. But in a country very large, as we reckon in Europe, a
people really intelligent, really educated, really comfortable, would soon
form a good opinion. No one can doubt that the New England States, if
they were a separate community, would have an education, a political
capacity, and an intelligence such as the numerical majority of no people,
equally numerous, has ever possessed. In a state of this sort, where all
the community is fit to choose a sufficient legislature, it is possible, it is
almost easy, to create that legislature. If the New England States pos-
sessed a cabinet government as a separate nation, they would be as
renowned in the world for political sagacity as they now are for diffused
happiness.
The structure of these communities is indeed based on the principle
of equality, and it is impossible that any such community can wholly
satisfy the severe requirements of a political theorist. In every old com-
munity its primitive and guiding assumption is at war with truth. By its
theory all people are entitled to the same political power, and they can
only be so entitled on the ground that in politics they are equally wise.
But at the outset of an agricultural colony this postulate is as near the
truth as politics want. There are in such communities no large proper-
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and homely, and no one is at all more. Equality is not artificially estab-
lished in a new colony; it establishes itself. There is a story that among
the first settlers in Western Australia, some, who were rich, took out
labourers at their own expense, and also carriages to ride in. But soon
they had to try if they could live in the carriages. Before the masters’
houses were built, the labourers had gone off — they were building
houses and cultivating land for themselves, and the masters were left to
sit in their carriages. Whether this exact thing happened I do not know,
but this sort of thing has happened a thousand times. There have been a
whole series of attempts to transplant to the colonies a graduated En-
glish society. But they have always failed at the first step. The rude
classes at the bottom felt that they were equal to or better than the deli-
cate classes at the top; they shifted for themselves, and left the
“gentlefolks” to shift for themselves; the base of the elaborate pyramid
spread abroad, and the apex tumbled in and perished. In the early ages
of an agricultural colony, whether you have political democracy or not,
social democracy you must have, for nature makes it, and not you. But
in time, wealth grows and inequality begins. A and his children are
industrious, and prosper; B and his children are idle, and fail. If manu-
factures on a considerable scale are established -and most young com-
munities strive even by protection to establish them — the tendency to
inequality is intensified. The capitalist becomes a unit with much, and
his laborers a crowd with little. After generations of education, too,
there arise varieties of culture — there will be an upper thousand, or ten
thousand, of highly cultivated people in the midst of a great nation of
moderately educated people. In theory it is desirable that this highest
class of wealth and leisure should have an influence far out of propor-
tion to its mere number: a perfect constitution would find for it a deli-
cate expedient to make its fine thought tell upon the surrounding cruder
thought. But as the world goes, when the whole of the population is as
instructed and as intelligent as in the case I am supposing, we need not
care much about this. Great communities have scarcely ever — never
save for transient moments — been ruled by their highest thought. And
if we can get them ruled by a decent capable thought, we may be well
enough contented with our work. We have done more than could be
expected, though not all which could be desired. At any rate, an isocratic
polity — a polity where every one votes, and where every one votes
alike — is, in a community of sound education and diffused intelli-
gence, a conceivable case of cabinet government. It satisfies the essen-198/Walter Bagehot
tial condition; there is a people able to elect a parliament able to choose.
But suppose the mass of the people are not able to elect — and this
is the case with the numerical majority of all but the rarest nations —
how is a cabinet government to be then possible? It is only possible in
what I may venture to call deferential nations. It has been thought strange,
but there are nations in which the numerous unwiser part wishes to be
ruled by the less numerous wiser part. The numerical majority — whether
by custom or by choice, is immaterial-is ready, is eager to delegate its
power of choosing its ruler to a certain select minority. It abdicates in
favour of its elite, and consents to obey whoever that elite may confide
in. It acknowledges as its secondary electors — as the choosers of its
government — an educated minority, at once competent and unresisted;
it has a kind of loyalty to some superior persons who are fit to choose a
good government, and whom no other class opposes. A nation in such a
happy state as this has obvious advantages for constructing a cabinet
government. It has the best people to elect a legislature, and therefore it
may fairly be expected to choose a good legislature — a legislature
competent to select a good administration.
England is the type of deferential countries, and the manner in which
it is so, and has become so, is extremely curious. The middle classes —
the ordinary majority of educated men — are in the present day the
despotic power in England. “Public opinion,” now-a-days, “is the opin-
ion of the bald-headed man at the back of the omnibus.” It is not the
opinion of the aristocratical classes as such; or of the most educated or
refined classes as such; it is simply the opinion of the ordinary mass of
educated, but still commonplace mankind. If you look at the mass of the
constituencies, you will see that they are not very interesting people;
and perhaps if you look behind the scenes and see the people who ma-
nipulate and work the constituencies, you will find that these are yet
more uninteresting. The English constitution in its palpable form is this
— the mass of the people yield obedience to a select few; and when you
see this select few, you perceive that though not of the lowest class, nor
of an unrespectable class, they are yet of a heavy sensible class — the
last people in the world to whom, if they were drawn up in a row, an
immense nation would ever give an exclusive preference.
In fact, the mass of the English people yield a deference rather to
something else than to their rulers. They defer to what we may call the
theatrical show of society. A certain state passes before them; a certain
pomp of great men; a certain spectacle of beautiful women; a wonderfulThe English Constitution/199
scene of wealth and enjoyment is displayed, and they are coerced by it.
Their imagination is bowed down; they feel they are not equal to the life
which is revealed to them. Courts and aristocracies have the great qual-
ity which rules the multitude, though philosophers can see nothing in it-
visibility. Courtiers can do what others cannot. A common man may as
well try to rival the actors on the stage in their acting, as the aristocracy
in their acting. The higher world, as it looks from without, is a stage on
which the actors walk their parts much better than the spectators can.
This play is played in every district. Every rustic feels that his house is
not like my lord’s house; his life like my lord’s life; his wife like my
lady. The climax of the play is the Queen: nobody supposes that their
house is like the court; their life like her life; her orders like their orders.
There is in England a certain charmed spectacle which imposes on the
many, and guides their fancies as it will. As a rustic on coming to Lon-
don finds himself in presence of a great show and vast exhibition of
inconceivable mechanical things, so by the structure of our society he
finds himself face to face with a great exhibition of political things which
he could not have imagined, which he could not make — to which he
feels in himself scarcely any thing analogous.
Philosophers may deride this superstition, but its results are inesti-
mable. By the spectacle of this august society, countless ignorant men
and women are induced to obey the few nominal electors — the £10
borough renters, and the £50 county renters — who have nothing im-
posing about them, nothing which would attract the eye or fascinate the
fancy. What impresses men is not mind, but the result of mind. And the
greatest of these results is this wonderful spectacle of society, which is
ever new, and yet ever the same; in which accidents pass and essence
remains; in which one generation dies and another succeeds, as if they
were birds in a cage, or animals in a menagerie; of which it seems al-
most more than a metaphor to treat the parts as limbs of a perpetual
living thing, so silently do they seem to change, so wonderfully and so
perfectly does the conspicuous life of the new year take the place of the
conspicuous life of last year. The apparent rulers of the English nation
are like the most imposing personages of a splendid procession: it is by
them the mob are influenced; it is they whom the spectators cheer. The
real rulers are secreted in second-rate carriages; no one cares for them
or asks about them, but they are obeyed implicitly and unconsciously by
reason of the splendor of those who eclipsed and preceded them.
It is quite true that this imaginative sentiment is supported by a200/Walter Bagehot
sensation of political satisfaction. It cannot be said that the mass of the
English people are well off. There are whole classes who have not a
conception of what the higher orders call comfort; who have not the
prerequisites of moral existence; who cannot lead the life that becomes
a man. But the most miserable of these classes do not impute their mis-
ery to politics. If a political agitator were to lecture to the peasants of
Dorsetshire, and try to excite political dissatisfaction, it is much more
likely that he would be pelted than that he would succeed. Of parliament
these miserable creatures know scarcely any thing; of the cabinet they
never heard. But they would say that, “for all they have heard, the Queen
is very good;” and rebelling against the structure of society is to their
minds rebelling against the Queen, who rules that society, in whom all
its most impressive part — the part that they know — culminates. The
mass of the English people are politically contented as well as politi-
cally deferential.
A deferential community, even though its lowest classes are not
intelligent, is far more suited to a cabinet government than any kind of
democratic country, because it is more suited to political excellence.
The highest classes can rule in it; and the highest classes must, as such,
have more political ability than the lower classes. A life of labour, and
incomplete education, a monotonous occupation, a career in which the
hands are used much and the judgment is used little, cannot create as
much flexible thought, as much applicable intelligence, as a life of lei-
sure, a long culture, a varied experience, an existence by which the
judgment is incessantly exercised, and by which it may be incessantly
improved. A country of respectful poor, though far less happy than where
there are no poor to be respectful, is nevertheless far more fitted for the
best government. You can use the best classes of the respectful country;
you can only use the worst where every man thinks he is as good as
every other.
It is evident that no difficulty can be greater than that of founding a
deferential nation. Respect is traditional; it is given not to what is proved
to be good, but to what is known to be old. Certain classes in certain
nations retain by common acceptance a marked political preference,
because they have always possessed it, and because they inherit a sort
of pomp which seems to make them worthy of it. But in a new colony, in
a community where merit may be equal, and where there cannot be
traditional marks of merit and fitness, it is obvious that a political defer-
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ence, and next of its political value. But it is nearly impossible to give
such a proof so as to satisfy persons of less culture. In a future and
better age of the world it may be effected; but in this age the requisite
premises scarcely exist; if the discussion be effectually open, if the de-
bate be fairly begun, it is hardly possible to obtain a rational, an argu-
mentative acquiescence in the rule of the cultivated few. As yet the few
rule by their hold, not over the reason of the multitude, but over their
imaginations, and their habits; over their fancies as to distant things
they do not know at all, over their customs as to near things which they
know very well.
A deferential community in which the bulk of the people are igno-
rant, is therefore in a state of what is called in mechanics unstable equi-
librium. If the equilibrium is once disturbed there is no tendency to re-
turn to it, but rather to depart from it. A cone balanced on its point is in
unstable equilibrium, for if you push it ever so little it will depart farther
and farther from its position and fall to the earth. So in communities
where the masses are ignorant but respectful, if you once permit the
ignorant class to begin to rule you may bid farewell to deference for
ever. Their demagogues will inculcate, their newspapers will recount,
that the rule of the existing dynasty (the people) is better than the rule of
the fallen dynasty (the aristocracy). A people very rarely hears two sides
of a subject in which it is much interested; the popular organs take up
the side which is acceptable, and none but the popular organs in fact
reach the people. A people never hears censure of itself. No one will tell
it that the educated minority whom it dethroned governed better or more
wisely than it governs. A democracy will never, save after an awful
catastrophe, return what has once been conceded to it, for to do so would
be to admit an inferiority in itself, of which, except by some almost
unbearable misfortune, it could never be convinced.
VIII. Its History, and the Effects of That History. —
Conclusion.
A volume might seem wanted to say any thing worth saying11 on the
History of the English Constitution, and a great and new volume might
still be written on it, if a competent writer took it in hand. The subject
has never been treated by any one combining the lights of the newest
research and the lights of the most matured philosophy. Since the mas-
terly book of Hallam was written, both political thought and historical
knowledge have gained much, and we might have a treatise applying202/Walter Bagehot
our strengthened calculus to our augmented facts. I do not pretend that
I could write such a book, but there are a few salient particulars which
may be fitly brought together, both because of their past interest and of
their present importance.
There is a certain common polity, or germ of polity, which we find
in all the rude nations that have attained civilization. These nations seem
to begin in what I may call a consultative and tentative absolutism. The
king of early days, in vigorous nations, was not absolute as despots now
are; there was then no standing army to repress rebellion, no organized
espionage to spy out discontent, no skilled bureaucracy to smooth the
ruts of obedient life. The early king was indeed consecrated by a reli-
gious sanction; he was essentially a man apart, a man above others,
divinely anointed, or even God-begotten. But in nations capable of free-
dom this religious domination was never despotic. There was indeed no
legal limit: the very words could not be translated into the dialect of
those times. The notion of law as we have it —of a rule imposed by
human authority, capable of being altered by that authority when it likes,
and in fact, so altered habitually —could not be conveyed to early na-
tions, who regarded law half as an invincible prescription, and half as a
Divine revelation. Law “came out of the king’s mouth;” he gave it as
Solomon gave judgment, — embedded in the particular case, and upon
the authority of Heaven as well as his own. A Divine limit to the Divine
revealer was impossible, and there was no other source of law. But
though there was no legal limit, there was a practical limit to subjection
in (what may be called) the pagan part of human nature, — the insepa-
rable obstinacy of freemen. They never would do exactly what they
were told.
To early royalty, as Homer describes it in Greece and as we may
well imagine it elsewhere, there were always two adjuncts: one, the “old
men,” the men of weight, the council, the boulh of which the king asked
advice, from the debates in which the king tried to learn what he could
do and what he ought to do. Besides this there was the agora, the purely
listening assembly, as some have called it, but the tentative assembly, as
I think it might best be called. The king came down to his assembled
people in form to announce his will, but in reality, speaking in very
modern words, to “feel his way.” He was sacred, no doubt; and popular,
very likely; still he was half like a popular premier speaking to a high-
spirited chamber; there were limits to his authority and power-limits
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mandate, or only hollow murmurs and a thinking silence.
This polity is a good one for its era and its place, but there is a fatal
defect in it. The reverential associations upon which the government is
built are transmitted according to one law, and the capacity needful to
work the government is transmitted according to another law. The popular
homage clings to the line of god-descended kings; it is transmitted by
inheritance. But very soon that line comes to a child or an idiot, or one
by some defect or other incapable. Then we find everywhere the truth of
the old saying, that liberty thrives under weak princes; then the listening
assembly begins not only to murmur, but to speak; then the grave coun-
cil begins not so much to suggest as to inculcate, not so much to advise
as to enjoin.
Mr. Grote has told at length how out of these appendages of the
original kingdom the free States of Greece derived their origin, and how
they gradually grew — the oligarchical States expanding the council,
and the democratical expanding the assembly. The history has as many
varieties in detail as there were Greek cities, but the essence is the same
everywhere. The political characteristic of the early Greeks, and of the
early Romans, too, is that out of the tentacula of a monarchy they de-
veloped the organs of a republic.
English history has been in substance the same, though its form is
different, and its growth far slower and longer. The scale was larger,
and the elements more various. A Greek city soon got rid of its kings,
for the political sacredness of the monarch would not bear the daily
inspection and constant criticism of an eager and talking multitude.
Everywhere in Greece the slave population — the most ignorant, and
therefore the most unsusceptible of intellectual influences — was struck
out of the account. But England began as a kingdom of considerable
size, inhabited by distinct races, none of them fit for prosaic criticism,
and all subject to the superstition of royalty. In early England, too, roy-
alty was much more than a superstition. A very strong executive was
needed to keep down a divided, an armed, and an impatient country; and
therefore the problem of political development was delicate. A formed
free government in a homogeneous nation may have a strong executive;
but during the transition state, while the republic is in course of devel-
opment and the monarchy in course of decay, the executive is of neces-
sity weak. The polity is divided, and its action feeble and failing. The
different orders of English people have progressed, too, at different rates.
The change in the state of the higher classes since the Middle Ages is204/Walter Bagehot
enormous, and it is all improvement; but the lower have varied little,
and many argue that in some important respects they have got worse,
even if in others they have got better. The development of the English
Constitution was of necessity slow, because a quick one would have
destroyed the executive, and killed the State, and because the most nu-
merous classes, who changed very little, were not prepared for any cata-
strophic change in our institutions.
I cannot presume to speak of the time before the conquest, and the
exact nature even of all Anglo-Norman institutions is perhaps dubious:
at least, in nearly all cases there have been many controversies. Political
zeal, whether Whig or Tory, has wanted to find a model in the past; and
the whole state of society being confused, the precedents altering with
the caprice of men and the chance of events, ingenious advocacy has
had a happy field. But all that I need speak of is quite plain. There was
a great “council” of the realm, to which the king summoned the most
considerable persons in England, the persons he most wanted to advise
him, and the persons who whimpers he was most anxious to ascertain.
Exactly who came to it at first is obscure and unimportant. I need not
distinguish between the “magnum concilium in Parliament” and the
“magnum concilium out of Parliament.” Gradually the principal as-
semblies summoned by the English sovereign took the precise and defi-
nite form of Lords and Commons, as in their outside we now see them.
But their real nature was very different. The Parliament of to-day is a
ruling body; the mediaeval Parliament was, if I may so say,.an expres-
sive body. Its function was to tell the executive -the king — what the
nation wished he should do; to some extent, to guide him by new wis-
dom, and, to a very great extent, to guide him by new facts. These facts
were their own feelings, which were the feelings of the people, because
they were part and parcel of the people. From thence the king learned,
or had the means to learn, what the nation would endure, and what it
would not endure; — what he might do, and what he might not do. If he
much mistook this, there was a rebellion.
There are, as is well known, three great periods in the English Con-
stitution. The first of these is the ante-Tudor period. The English Parlia-
ment then seemed to be gaining extraordinary strength and power. The
title to the crown was uncertain; some monarchs were imbecile. Many
ambitious men wanted to “ take the people into partnership.” Certain
precedents of that time were cited with grave authority centuries after,
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growth soon produced an even more sudden decline. Confusion fostered
it, and confusion destroyed it. The structure of society en was feudal;
the towns were only an adjunct and a make-weight. The principal popu-
lar force was an aristocratic force, acting with the co-operation of the
gentry and yeomanry, and resting on the loyal fealty of sworn retainers.
The head of this force, on whom its efficiency depended, was the high
nobility. But the high nobility killed itself out. The great barons who
adhered to the “Red Rose” or the “White Rose,” or who fluctuated from
one to the other, became poorer, fewer, and less potent every year. When
the great struggle ended at Bosworth, a large part of the greatest com-
batants were gone. The restless, aspiring, rich barons, who made the
civil war, were broken by it. Henry VII attained a kingdom in which
there was a Parliament to advise, but scarcely a Parliament to control.
The consultative government of the ante-Tudor period had little re-
semblance to some of the modern governments which French philoso-
phers call by that name. The French Empire, I believe, calls itself so.
But its assemblies are symmetrical “shams.” They are elected by a uni-
versal suffrage, by the ballot, and in districts once marked out with an
eye to equality, and still retaining a look of equality. But our English
parliaments were unsymmetrical realities. They were elected anyhow;
the sheriff had a considerable license in sending writs to boroughs, that
is, he could in part pick its constituencies; and in each borough there
was a rush and scramble for the franchise, so that the strongest local
party got it, whether few or many. But in England at that time there was
a great and distinct desire to know the opinion of the nation, because
there was a real and close necessity. The nation was wanted to do some-
thing — to assist the sovereign in some war, to pay some old debt, to
contribute its force and aid in the critical conjuncture of the time. It
would not have suited the ante-Tudor kings to have had a fictitious as-
sembly; they would have lost their sole feeler, their only instrument for
discovering national opinion. Nor could they have manufactured such
an assembly if they wished. The instrument in that behalf is the central-
ized executive, and there was then no préfet by whom the opinion of a
rural locality could be made to order, and adjusted to suit the wishes of
the capital. Looking at the mode of election a theorist would say that
these parliaments were but “ chance “ collections of influential English-
men. There would be many corrections and limitations to add to that
statement if it were wanted to make it accurate, but the statement itself
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collections of Englishmen, they were “undesigned” collections; no ad-
ministrations made them or could make them. They were bona fide coun-
sellors, whose opinion might be wise or unwise, but was anyhow of
paramount importance, because their co-operation was wanted for what
was in hand.
Legislation as a positive power was very secondary in those old
parliaments. I believe no statute at all, as far as we know, was passed in
the reign of Richard I., and all the ante-Tudor acts together would look
meagre enough to a modern Parliamentary agent who had to live by
them. But the negative action of parliament upon the law was essential
to its whole idea, and ran through every part of its use. That the king
could not change what was then the almost sacred datum of the common
law, without seeing whether his nation liked it or not, was an essential
part of the “tentative” system. The king had to feel his way in this ex-
ceptional, singular act, as those ages deemed original legislation, as
well as in lesser acts. The legislation was his at last; he enacted after
consulting his Lords and Commons; his was the sacred mouth which
gave holy firmness to the enactment; but he only dared alter the rule
regulating the common life of his people after consulting those people;
he would not have been obeyed if he had not, by a rude age which did
not fear civil war as we fear it now. Many most important enactments of
that period (and the fact is most characteristic) are declaratory acts.
They do not profess to enjoin by inherent authority what the law shall in
future be, but to state and mark what the law is; they are declarations of
immemorial custom, not precepts of new duties. Even in the “Great
Charter” the notion of new enactments was secondary, it was a great
mixture of old and new; it was a sort of compact defining what was
doubtful in floating custom, and was re-enacted over and over again, as
boundaries are perambulated once a year, and rights and claims tending
to desuetude thereby made patent and cleared of new obstructions. In
truth, such great “charters” were rather treaties between different or-
ders and factions, confirming ancient rights, or what claimed to be such,
than laws in our ordinary sense. They were the “deeds of arrangement”
of mediaeval society affirmed and re-affirmed from time to time, and the
principal controversy was, of course, between the king and nation —
the king trying to see how far the nation would let him go, and the nation
murmuring and recalcitrating, and seeing how many acts of administra-
tion they could prevent, and how many of its claims they could resist.
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of taxation into the shield of liberty,” but it did nothing of the sort. The
liberty existed before, and the right to be taxed was an efflorescence and
instance of it, not a substratum or a cause. The necessity of consulting
the great council of the realm before taxation, the principle that the
declaration of grievances by the Parliament was to precede the grant of
supplies to the sovereign, are but conspicuous instances of the primitive
doctrine of the ante-Tudor period, that the king must consult the great
council of the realm before he did any thing, since he always wanted
help. The right of self-taxation was justly inserted in the “great treaty;
but it would have been a dead letter, save for the armed force and aris-
tocratic organization which compelled the king to make a treaty; it was
a result, not a basis — an example, not a cause.
The civil wars of many years killed out the old councils (if I might
so say): that is, destroyed three parts of the greater nobility who were its
most potent members, tired the small nobility and the gentry, and over-
threw the aristocratic organization on which all previous effectual resis-
tance to the sovereign had been based.
The second period of the British Constitution begins with the acces-
sion of the House of Tudor, and goes down to 1688; it is in substance
the history of the growth, development, and gradually acquired supremacy
of the new great council. I have no room and no occasion to narrate
again the familiar history of the many steps by which the slavish Parlia-
ment of Henry VIII grew into the murmuring Parliament of Queen Eliza-
beth, the mutinous Parliament of James I, and the rebellious Parliament
of Charles I. The steps were many, but the energy was one — the growth
of the English middle-class using that word in its most inclusive sense,
and its animation under the influence of Protestantism. No one, I think,
can doubt that Lord Macaulay is right in saying that political causes
would not alone have then provoked such a resistance to the sovereign,
unless propelled by religious theory. Of course the English people went
to and fro from Catholicism to Protestantism, and from Protestantism
to Catholicism (not to mention that the Protestantism was of several
shades and sects), just as the first Tudor kings. and queens wished. But
that was in the pre-Puritan era. The mass of Englishmen were in an
undecided state, just as Hooper tells us his father was — “Not believing
in Protestantism, yet not disinclined to it.” Gradually, however, a strong
Evangelic spirit (as we should now speak) and a still stronger anti-Pa-
pal spirit entered into the middle sort of Englishmen, and added to that
force, fibre, and substance which they have never wanted, an ideal warmth208/Walter Bagehot
and fervour which they have almost always wanted. Hence the saying
that Cromwell founded the English Constitution. Of course, in seeming,
Cromwell’s work died with him; his dynasty was rejected, his republic
cast aside; but the spirit which culminated in him never sank again,
never ceased to be a potent, though often a latent and volcanic, force in
the country. Charles II said that he would never go again on his travels
for any thing or anybody; and he well knew that though the men whom
he met at Worcester might be dead, still the spirit which warmed them
was alive and young in others.
But the Cromwellian republic and the strict Puritan creed were ut-
terly hateful to most Englishmen. They were, if I may venture on saying
so, like the ‘Rouge’ element in France and elsewhere — the sole revolu-
tionary force in the entire State, and were hated as such. That force
could do little of itself; indeed, its bare appearance tended to frighten
and alienate the moderate and dull as well as the refined and reasoning
classes. Alone it was impotent against the solid clay of the English apa-
thetic nature. But give this fiery element a body of decent-looking earth;
give it an excuse for breaking out on an occasion, when the decent, the
cultivated, and aristocratic classes could join with it, and they could
conquer by means of it, and it could be disguised in their covering.
Such an excuse was found in 1688. James II, by incredible and
pertinacious folly, irritated not only the classes which had fought against
his father, but also those who had fought for his father. He offended the
Anglican classes as well as the Puritan classes; all the Whig nobles and
half the Tory nobles, as well as the dissenting bourgeois. The rule of
Parliament was established by the concurrence of the usual supporters
of royalty with the usual opponents of it. But the result was long weak.
Our revolution has been called the minimum of a revolution, because in
law, at least, it only changed the dynasty, but exactly on that account it
was the greatest shock to the common multitude, who see the dynasty
but see nothing else. The support of the main aristocracy held together
the bulk of the deferential classes, but it held them together imperfectly,
uneasily, and unwillingly. Huge masses of crude prejudice swayed hither
and thither for many years. If an able Stuart had with credible sincerity
professed Protestantism, probably he might have overturned the House
of Hanover. So strong was inbred reverence for hereditary right, that
until the accession of George III the English government was always
subject to the unceasing attrition of a competitive sovereign.
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necessary to insist on, for it is a cardinal particular in the whole topic.
Many of the English people — the higher and more educated portion —
had come to comprehend the nature of constitutional government, but
the mass did not comprehend it. They looked to the sovereign as the
government, and to the sovereign only. These were carried forward by
the magic of the aristocracy, and principally by the influence of the
great Whig families with their adjuncts. Without that aid reason or lib-
erty would never have held them.
Though the rule of Parliament was definitely established in 1688,
yet the mode of exercising that rule has since changed. At first Parlia-
ment did not know how to exercise it; the organization of parties and the
appointment of cabinets by parties grew up in the manner Macaulay has
described so well. Up to the latest period the sovereign was supposed, to
a most mischievous extent, to interfere in the choice of the persons to be
Ministers. When George III finally became insane, in 1810, every one
believed that George IV, on assuming power as Prince Regent, would
turn out Mr. Perceval’s government and empower Lord Grey or Lord
Grenville, the Whig leaders, to form another. The Tory ministry was
carrying on a successful war — a war of existence — against Napo-
leon; but in the people’s mind, the necessity at such an occasion for an
unchanged government did not outweigh the fancy that George IV was
a Whig. And a Whig, it is true, he had been before the French Revolu-
tion, when he lived an indescribable life in St. James’s Street with Mr.
Fox. But Lord Grey and Lord Grenville were rigid men, and had no
immoral sort of influence. What liberalism of opinion the Regent ever
had was frightened out of him (as of other people) by the Reign of
Terror. He felt, according to the saying of another monarch, that “he
lived by being a royalist.” It soon appeared that he was most anxious to
retain Mr. Perceval, and that he was most eager to quarrel with the
Whig Lords. As we all know, he kept the ministry whom he found in
office; but that it should have been thought he could then change them,
is a significant example how exceedingly modern our notions of the
despotic action of Parliament in fact are.
By the steps of the struggle thus rudely mentioned (and by others
which I have no room to speak of, nor need I), the change which in the
Greek cities was effected both in appearance and in fact, has been ef-
fected in England, though in reality only, and not in outside. Here, too,
the appendages of a monarchy have been converted into the essence of a
republic; only here, because of a more numerous heterogeneous politi-210/Walter Bagehot
cal population, it is needful to keep the ancient show while we secretly
interpolate the new reality.
This long and curious history has left its trace on almost every part
of our present political condition; its effects lie at the root of many of
our most important controversies; and because these effects are not rightly
perceived, many of these controversies are misconceived.
One of the most curious peculiarities of the English people is its
dislike of the executive government. We are not in this respect “un vrai
peuple moderne,” like the Americans. The Americans conceive of their
executive as one of their appointed agents; when it intervenes in com-
mon life, it does so, they consider, in virtue of the mandate of the sover-
eign people, and there is no invasion or dereliction of freedom in that
people interfering with itself. The French, the Swiss, and all nations
who breathe the full atmosphere of the nineteenth century, think so too.
The material necessities of this age require a strong executive; a nation
destitute of it cannot be clean, or healthy, or vigorous like a nation pos-
sessing it. By definition, a nation calling itself free should have no jeal-
ousy of the executive, for freedom means that the nation, the political
part of the nation, wields the executive. But our history has reversed the
English feeling: our freedom is the result of centuries of resistance, more
or less legal, or more or less illegal, more or less audacious, or more or
less timid, to the executive Government. We have, accordingly, inher-
ited the traditions of conflict, and preserve them in the fulness of vic-
tory. We look on State action, not as our own action, but as alien action;
as an imposed tyranny from without, not as the consummated result of
our own organized wishes. I remember at the Census of 1851 hearing a
very sensible old lady say that “the liberties of England were at an end;”
if Government might be thus inquisitorial, if they might ask who slept in
your house, or what your age was, what, she argued, might they not ask
and what might they not do?
The natural impulse of the English people is to resist authority. The
introduction of effectual policemen was not liked; I know people, old
people I admit, who to this day consider them an infringement of free-
dom, and an imitation of the gendarmes of France. If the original police-
men had been started with the present helmets, the result might have
been dubious; there might have been a cry of military tyranny, and the
inbred insubordination of the English people might have prevailed over
the very modern love of perfect peace and order. The old notion that the
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is no longer true, and though in calm and intellectual moments we well
know it is not. Nor is it merely our history which produces this effect;
we might get over that; but the results of that history co-operate. Our
double Government so acts: when we want to point the antipathy to the
executive, we refer to the jealousy of the Crown, so deeply imbedded in
the very substance of constitutional authority; so many people are loath
to admit the Queen, in spite of law and fact, to be the people’s appointee
and agent, that it is a good rhetorical emphasis to speak of her preroga-
tive as something non-popular, and therefore to be distrusted. By the
very nature of our Government our executive cannot be liked and trusted
as the Swiss or the American is liked and trusted.
Out of the same history and the same results proceed our tolerance
of those “local authorities” which so puzzle many foreigners. In the
struggle with the Crown these local centres served as props and ful-
crums. In the early parliaments it was the local bodies who sent mem-
bers to parliament, the counties, and the boroughs; and in that way, and
because of their free life, the parliament was free too. If active, real
bodies had not sent the representatives, they would have been power-
less. This is very much the reason why our old rights of suffrage were so
various; the Government let whatever people happened to be the stron-
gest in each town choose the members. They applied to the electing
bodies the test of ‘natural selection;’ whatever set of people were locally
strong enough to elect, did so. Afterwards, in the civil war, many of the
corporations, like that of London, were important bases of resistance.
The case of London is typical and remarkable. Probably, if there is any
body more than another which an educated Englishman now-a-days re-
gards with little favour, it is the Corporation of London. He connects it
with hereditary abuses perfectly preserved, with large revenues imper-
fectly accounted for, with a system which stops the principal city gov-
ernment at an old archway, with the perpetuation of a hundred detest-
able parishes, with the maintenance of a horde of luxurious and useless
bodies. For the want of all which makes Paris nice and splendid we
justly reproach the Corporation of London; for the existence of much of
what makes London mean and squalid we justly reproach it too. Yet the
Corporation of London was for centuries a bulwark of English liberty.
The conscious support of the near and organized capital gave the Long
Parliament a vigour and vitality which they could have found nowhere
else. Their leading patriots took refuge in the City, and the nearest ap-
proach to an English “sitting in permanence” is the committee at212/Walter Bagehot
Guildhall, where all members “that came were to have voices.” Down to
George III’s time the City was a useful centre of popular judgment.
Here, as elsewhere, we have built into our polity pieces of the scaffold-
ing by which it was erected.
De Tocqueville indeed used to maintain that in this matter the En-
glish were not merely historically excusable, but likewise politically
judicious. He founded what may be called the culté of corporations.
And it was natural that in France, where there is scarcely any power of
self-organization in the people, where the préfet must be asked upon
every subject, and take the initiative in every movement, a solitary thinker
should be repelled from the exaggerations of which he knew the evil, to
the contrary exaggeration of which he did not. But in a country like
England, where business is in the air, where we can organize a vigilance
committee on every abuse and an executive committee for every remedy
—as a matter of political instruction, which was De Tocqueville’s point
— we need not care how much power is delegated to outlying bodies,
and how much is kept for the central body. We have had the instruction
municipalities could give us: we have been through all that. Now we are
quite grown up, and can put away childish things.
The same causes account for the innumerable anomalies of our pol-
ity. I own that I do not entirely sympathize with the horror of these
anomalies which haunts some of our best critics. It is natural that those
who by special and admirable culture have come to look at all things
upon the artistic side, should start back from these queer peculiarities.
But it is natural also that persons used to analyze political institutions
should look at these anomalies with a little tenderness and a little inter-
est. They may have something to teach us. Political philosophy is still
more imperfect; it has been framed from observations taken upon regu-
lar specimens of politics and States; as to these its teaching is most
valuable. But we must ever remember that its data are imperfect. The
lessons are good where its primitive assumptions hold, but may be false
where those assumptions fail. A philosophical politician regards a po-
litical anomaly as a scientific physician regards a rare disease — it is to
him an “interesting case.” There may still be instruction here, though
we have worked out the lessons of common cases. I cannot, therefore,
join in the full cry against anomalies; in my judgment it may quickly
overrun the scent, and so miss what we should be glad to find.
Subject to this saving remark, however, I not only admit, but main-
tain, that our constitution is full of curious oddities, which are impedingThe English Constitution/213
and. mischievous, and ought to be struck out. Our law very often re-
minds one of those outskirts of cities where you cannot for a long time
tell how the streets come to wind about in so capricious and serpent-like
a manner. At last it strikes you that they grew up, house by house, on the
devious tracts of the old green lanes; and if you follow on to the existing
fields, you may often find the change half complete. Just so the lines of
our constitution were framed in old eras of sparse population, few wants,
and simple habits; and we adhere in seeming to their shape, though
civilization has come with its dangers, complications, and enjoyments.
These anomalies, in a hundred instances, mark the old boundaries of a
constitutional struggle. The casual line was traced according to the
strength of deceased combatants; succeeding generations fought else-
where; and the hesitating line of a half-drawn battle was left to stand for
a perpetual limit.
I do not count as an anomaly the existence of our double govern-
ment, with all its infinite accidents, though half the superficial pecu-
liarities that are often complained of arise out of it. The co-existence of
a Queen’s seeming prerogative and a Downing Street’s real government
is just suited to such a country as this, in such an age as ours.12
Notes
1. It is said that at the end of the cabinet which agreed to propose a fixed
duty on corn, Lord Melbourne put his back to the door, and said,
“Now is it to lower the price of corn, or isn’t it? It is not much matter
which we say, but mind, we must all say the same.” This is the most
graphic story of a cabinet I ever heard, but I cannot vouch for its
truth. Lord Melbourne’s is a character about which men make sto-
ries.
2. It is worth observing that even during the short existence of the Con-
federate Government these evils distinctly showed themselves. Al-
most the last incident at the Richmond Congress was an angry finan-
cial correspondence with Jefferson Davis.
3. I leave this passage to stand as it was written, just after the assassina-
tion of Mr. Lincoln, and when every one said Mr. Johnson would be
very hostile to the South.
4. The framers of the constitution expected that the vice-president would
be elected by the Electoral College as the second wisest man in the
country. The vice-presidentship being a sinecure, a second-rate man
agreeable to the wire-pullers is always smuggled in. The chance of214/Walter Bagehot
succession to the presidentship is too distant to be thought of.
5. In accordance with a recent resolution of the House of Lords, proxies
are now disused. Note to second edition.
6. This of course relates to the assemblies of the Empire.
7. Now Lord Salisbury, who when this was written was Indian Secre-
tary. Note to second edition.
8. I am happy to state that this evil is much diminishing. The improve-
ment of school education of the middle class in the last twenty-five
years is marvellous.
9. This was written just after the close of the civil war, but I do not know
that the great problem stated in it has as yet been adequately solved.
10. Of course I am not speaking here of the South and South-East, as
they now are. How any free government is to exist in societies where
so many bad elements are so much perturbed, I cannot imagine.
11. Since the first edition of this book was published, several valuable
works have appeared, which, on many points, throw much light on
our early constitutional history, especially Mr. Stubbs’ Select Char-
ters and other Illustrations of English Constitutional History, from
the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward the First, Mr. Freeman’s
lecture on The Growth of the English Constitution, and the chapter
on the Anglo-Saxon Constitution in his History of the Norman Con-
quest but we have not yet a great and authoritative work on the whole
subject such as I wished for when I wrote the passage in the text, and
as it is most desirable that we should have.
12. So well is our real Government concealed, that if you tell a cabman
to drive to “Downing Street” he most likely will never have heard of
it, and will not in the least know where to take you. It is only a “dis-
guised republic” which is suited to such a being as the Englishman in
such a century as the nineteenth.